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Greek banking
profitability: recent 
developments*
Heather D. Gibson
Economic Research Department
In an article co-authored with Barry Eichengreen
for the Bank of Greece – Brookings conference on
the Greek economy back in December 2000, we
argued that the Greek banking system was being
driven by three main forces: catch-up, competi-
tion and privatisation. We focused on the impact
of these forces on various characteristics of the
banking sector, including, in particular, its prof-
itability (Eichengreen and Gibson, 2001).1
Since writing the article, a number of papers have
been published on the Greek banking sector.
These focus on issues of efficiency and the related
question of whether Greek banks enjoy econo-
mies of scale (Christopoulos and Tsionas, 2001,
Christopoulos et al., 2002, Tsionas et al,. 2003,
Kamberoglou et al., 2004), the existence of excess
capacity (Kapopoulos, 2001) and the impact of
mergers and acquisitions (Athanasoglou and Bris-
simis, 2004). Mamatzakis and Remoundos (2003)
and Athanasoglou et al. (2004) focus explicitly on
the issue of profitability using data from 1989-
2000 and 1985-2001, respectively, and a similar
framework to that found in Eichengreen and Gibson
(2001). The results of the Mamatzakis-Remoundos
paper suggest that profitability is strongly influ-
enced by both bank and market characteristics,
although they find little support for the Structure,
Conduct and Performance hypothesis.2 Athanasoglou
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* The views expressed in this article are the author’s and do not
necessarily reflect those of the Bank of Greece. The author would
like to thank Vassilis Droukopoulos and Isaak Sabethai for their
helpful comments on an earlier version.
1 The paper "Greek Banking at the Dawn of the New Millenium"
was first presented at the conference "Greece’s Economic
Performance and Prospects" organised by the Bank of Greece and
the Brookings Institution in December 2000 and subsequently
published in the edited volume from the conference.
2 The Structure, Conduct, Performance hypothesis states that
profitability is positively related to the degree of concentration in
the banking sector and banks with market power will use that
power to extract higher profits.
et al. focus (2004) explicitly on the impact of the
macroeconomic environment on bank profitabil-
ity and conclude that bank profits move procycli-
cally with a tendency to rise more quickly during
expansions than they contract during recessions.
The purpose of the present paper is to provide
an update of developments in the sector using
data up to 2003 rather than 1998 as in the orig-
inal paper. We argue that the period since 1998
has largely been one of consolidation with the
result that the downward trend in the degree of
concentration in the banking sector which had
begun in 1985 has been reversed somewhat.
This might suggest a decline in the degree of
competition. However, two factors have been
countering the rise in concentration. First, the
sector has moved further away from being dom-
inated by one leader; instead a number of banks
are now of sufficient size to compete with each
other for market share. Second, another wave of
new entrants has occurred since 1998. At the
same time, the profitability of Greek banks has
exhibited rather erratic behaviour. To a great
extent, this reflects the huge surge in profitabil-
ity provided during the years of the stock mar-
ket boom (1998-2000); more recently, prof-
itability has returned to more ‘normal’ levels
and indications of a long-term downward trend
in profitability are evident from the beginning of
liberalisation (towards the end of the 1980s)
onwards.
The remainder of the article is organised as fol-
lows: In the next section, we provide some
descriptive statistics for the banking sector,
focusing, as in the original article (Eichengreen
and Gibson, 2001), on the impact of size and
ownership on various aspects of bank behav-
iour and characteristics. Section 2 re-estimates
the profitability equations using data from 1993
to 2003 instead of to 1998 and re-examines the
various hypotheses put forward in the original
article.3 The results suggest that the period of
rapid structural change is perhaps coming to an
end with the banking sector settling down to
more normal behaviour of profits. There is also
evidence that banks with stronger market
power earn higher profits. Finally, the impact of
size on profitability is much weaker than in the
earlier period; to the extent that size is signifi-
cant, the results indicate that growing bigger
did not help banks in the period examined to
increase profitability, something which is sug-
gestive of the fact that economies of scale may
have been limited for the larger Greek banks.
1. Banking sector structure and characteristics
Table 1 provides a first impression of the extent
of structural change in the sector over the period
from 1993 to 2003. Of the banks in independent
existence in 1993, the majority had disappeared
by 2003, having been acquired by other banks in
the system. Both in 2000 and again in 2003,
there were a lot of new entrants, with the result
that there are around 10 banks with market
shares of less than 1.5%. Table 1 also gives the
reader a picture of the banks in our sample and
it should be clear from a cursory glance at the
table that the majority of banks in the banking
system are included.
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3 Our dataset runs from 1980 to 2003 and is collected from
banks’ published accounts. From 1980 to 1993 we have only the
major aggregates. From 1993 we have full sets of accounts which
we use in the econometric analysis that follows.
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Charts 1-3 provide a graphical representation of
the structure of the banking sector. The
Herfindahl-Hirschman index (based either on
total assets or total assets plus off-balance sheet
—OBS— activity) suggests that the downward
trend in concentration halted in the mid-to-late
1990s; subsequently, concentration levels have
been rising, without, however, reaching anything
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like the levels witnessed in the 1980s.4 A qualita-
tively similar picture is drawn in Chart 2, which
graphs three and four-firm concentration ratios.
What these pictures show is that concentration is
still high in the sector.
Chart 3 delves more deeply into the question of
market shares and concentration and gives a more
complete picture of the structural changes that have
been occurring. The declining share of the National
Bank of Greece which was evident in the 1990s has
continued. At the same time, the share of a number
of other banks has been rising, with the result that
there are now around 6 banks with enough market
share to enable them to have an impact. Since
2000, these banks have pulled away from the
remainder with market shares well under 3%. Three
of these banks, Alpha Bank, Eurobank and Pireaus
Bank, are those which have been growing rapidly
and to a large extent through acquisitions; the other
two are the older publicly-owned banks, the
Agricultural Bank and the Commercial Bank, which
have had a roughly constant market share of around
10% over the last few years.
The impact of these changes on competition is
unclear. On the one hand, rising concentration
might be expected to have reduced competition;
on the other hand, the declining dominance of the
National Bank and the rising shares of several
other banks are likely to have caused competition
to increase.
Tables 2 and 3 examine various characteristics of
the banking sector depending on the size of the
Greek banking profitability: recent developments
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4 The Herfindahl-Hirschman index is calculated as:
HH = ™MSi
2
i
where MSi is the market share of bank i. We calculate market
shares on the basis of both total assets and total assets plus OBS
items. The index, which measures the size dispersion of firms in a
particular market, can vary between zero for an atomistically com-
petitive market to 10,000 for a monopolised one.
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bank5 and whether it is publicly or privately-
owned. For ease of comparison, the results from
the earlier sample (up to 1998) are also reported
alongside the full sample (1980-2003) and the
sub-period 1999-2003. Many of the characteristics
which were present continue to hold, although by
looking at sub-periods some interesting changes
emerge. On the whole, one can say that the differ-
ences between private and publicly-owned banks
have narrowed, with public banks tending to con-
verge on the characteristics of private banks. This
suggests that ownership is less important for bank
behaviour and perhaps results from the greater
independence which publicly-owned banks acquired
in the second half of the 1990s.
Thus, although small private banks still tend to
grow faster than large publicly-owned banks over
the whole period, in the last few years (1999-
2003) there is no significant difference between
public and private banks, with the former’s total
assets including OBS items growing at real rates
of around 35% per annum.6 In the period up to
1998, medium-sized private banks were the most
profitable; the difference between public and pri-
vately-owned banks disappears in the years 1999-
2003 and it is big rather than medium-sized banks
which are the most profitable.
On the asset side of the balance sheet, OBS busi-
ness has been growing through time in all cate-
gories of banks, with the difference between pub-
lic and private banks in the later period having nar-
rowed significantly. Although large, publicly-
owned banks still tend to have more invested in
bonds, reflecting the legacy of their heavy invest-
ment in government bonds in the early 1990s, in
the later period (1999-2003) the proportion of
assets invested in bonds by small and medium-
sized banks has been rising. This reflects the
growth of private bond issues by companies which
are generally held by the banking system. On the
liabilities side, reliance on the interbank market is
greater for smaller banks, as might be expected,
and for publicly-owned banks; moreover, the dif-
ferences have been widening over time.
Finally, there are the various measures of effi-
ciency. Large banks tend to have smaller costs
(both total operating costs and staff costs) and
more loans and deposits per worker. Public banks
also have smaller operating costs, although rela-
tively higher staff costs. In the last few years, pri-
vate banks’ operating costs have been declining
and are now at almost the same level as those of
public banks. The picture with regard to loans and
deposits per worker is more mixed, with private
banks having less loans and more deposits per
worker than their publicly-owned counterparts,
although latterly private banks have experienced
higher loans per worker as well.
2. The determinants of bank profitability –
multivariate analysis
Whilst the descriptive statistics presented above
give us some idea of what might influence prof-
itability, a more precise examination of the determi-
nants of bank profitability and the relative contribu-
tion of each determinant can only really be uncov-
ered using multivariate techniques. In Charts 4 and 5
ECONOMIC BULLETIN, 24   1/0514
5 Size 1 denotes the smallest third of banks in a given year, size 2
the middle third and size 3 the largest third.
6 The mean is somewhat skewed upwards by the presence of a few
banks with exceptionally high growth rates. The median growth rate
of real assets including OBS items between 1999 and 2003 was
11% for public banks compared to 21% for private banks.
we plot the various measures of profitability
through time – the rate of return on total assets, the
rate of return on total assets plus OBS business and
the rate of return on equity.7 There is a tendency for
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7 The vertical lines indicate the year 1993 since the econometric
estimations cover the period 1993-2003. As we noted above,
because of a change in accounting conventions a number of the
explanatory variables are only available from 1993 onwards and
this limits the sample period for the regressions.
all measures to trend downwards over the whole
period. The sharp increase in profitability in the
period 1998-2000 was related to the stock market
boom. Banks generally took advantage of the boom
to sell and in many cases repurchase shares, thus
allowing them to realise capital gains that had
accrued (but which did not appear in their balance
sheets since shares are not valued at market prices).
The subsequent fall in profitability after 2000 repre-
sents a return to more normal profit levels.
In order to explain profitability and to examine
whether its determinants have changed over the
recent period, we re-estimate the panel regres-
sions presented in Eichengreen and Gibson
(2001). That is, we start with a basic model of the
persistence of profits which provides evidence
about the timing and extent of structural change
and we then augment it with various explanatory
variables representing the effect of both bank
characteristics (such as size, asset and liability
management strategies, efficiency) and market
characteristics (concentration, market share).8
The estimated model is a fixed-effects model (that
is, we control for factors which differ across banks
but are constant through time and which we can-
not measure directly – so-called unobserved bank
heterogeneity) and includes time dummies:
it=· + ‚(it–1) + ™Ái XMit  + ™‰i XBit + ™ÏtDt + Ìt(1)
where it is the profitability of bank i at time t;
™ÁiXMit are the various market characteristics and
™‰iXBit are the bank characteristics (both vary
across time and banks with the exception of con-
centration); and, finally, ™ÏtDt are time dummies
capturing environmental factors which are the
same for all banks but vary through time (e.g.
business cycle effects and, more specifically, the
stock market boom and its effect mentioned
above). Profitability, the market characteristics
and the bank characteristics are measured as the
deviation from the mean for each bank across the
whole time period in order to control for the fixed
effects mentioned above. The coefficient on the
lagged dependent variable, ‚, gives us some infor-
mation about the structure of the market. A value
of ‚ between 0 and 1 implies that any shock to
profits will persist but that eventually profits
return to their normal (average) level. In compet-
itive industries, we expect this to occur quickly,
while in less competitive industries we might
anticipate high persistence and a value of ‚ closer
to 1. If ‚ lies between 0 and –1, then profits revert
to normal in an oscillating manner. This might
occur in periods of rapid change in the structure
of the financial system which can cause bank
profitability to become highly volatile.
Equation (1) is estimated using data over the
period 1993-2003 (189 observations) and the
results are presented in Tables 4-6 for three mea-
sures of profitability: the return on assets, the
return on total assets including OBS items, and
the return on equity.
The value of ‚ differs somewhat depending on the
measure of profitability used. However, more sig-
nificant is the difference between the results pre-
sented here and those for the period 1993-98. In
the results for the shorter sample period, we
found negative persistence, which we attributed
to the fact that the banking system between 1993
and 1998 was passing through a period of rapid
structural change following financial liberalisation
ECONOMIC BULLETIN, 24   1/0516
8 For a discussion of the various methods of examining bank
profitability and efficiency, see Bikker and Bos (2004).
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which led to high variability of profits. For the
longer period up to 2003, the coefficient on
lagged profitability is now positive and is signifi-
cant in the case of profitability measured relative
to total assets plus OBS items. The value of 0.4
(see Table 5) indicates quite a bit of persistence
which is suggestive of an absence of competitive
conditions. A similar result is found by Athanasoglou
et al. (2004). This should be balanced against the
results in Tables 4 and 6 for the other measure of
profitability, where, although ‚ is positive, it is not
significantly different from zero, suggesting the
presence of competitive forces. This is consistent
with the findings of Mamatzakis and Remoundos
(2003) for the period 1989-2000.
Table 7 examines the question of persistence over
a longer period by estimating equation (1) without
the various bank and market characteristics. As in
the period up to 1998, the results for the whole
period (1982-2003) indicate fairly high levels of
persistence. In the previous article, as we reduced
the sample period from 1982-98 to 1983-98,
1984-98 and so forth, the coefficient on lagged
profits began to shrink showing a sharp fall at the
end of the 1980s and into the 1990s. This sup-
ported our conclusion that a period of structural
change followed on the heels of liberalisation
(1987 onwards). With the extension of the sample
period to 2003, there is a fall in the degree of per-
sistence, but it never becomes negative, suggest-
ing that the period of rapid change is over.
Turning now to the importance of individual bank
characteristics, the effect of size is much less sig-
nificant than before. The coefficients suggest a
non-linear bell-shaped relationship between size
and profitability – that is, profitability increases
with size before declining. However, whereas
previously the turning point was close to average
bank size, it is now the case that there are very
few observations in our sample on the upward
sloping part of the curve. That is, for the size of
banks that we have in our sample, the relationship
between size and profitability is downward slop-
ing – as size increases so bank profitability falls.
This perhaps suggests that economies of scale
have been exhausted and that growing bigger in
and of itself can no longer help to improve prof-
itability. A similar conclusion is reached by
Kamberoglou et al. (2004) in their study of the
cost efficiency of the Greek banking sector which
estimates scale economies directly from a
translog cost function.
We include a number of variables designed to
capture asset management (the proportion of
OBS business and the loan/deposit ratio) as well
as liability management (leverage and interbank
deposits as a proportion of total deposits). The
earlier results provided some support for the
hypothesis that banks that engage in OBS busi-
ness are more profitable (at least in terms of the
rate of return on equity). This result is much
weaker now – it is both less significant and the
elasticity for the return on equity equation is
almost half its size in the previous paper. This per-
haps reflects the fact that more banks are active in
OBS business as we noted in Section 1 above; the
market is thus likely to be more competitive and
hence the extent to which banks engage in OBS
business is less useful in helping us distinguish
between banks according to their profitability.
The loan/deposit ratio has a stronger negative
effect now, indicating that making loans does not
enhance profitability; in the period up to 1998, it
was negative but significant only in the equation
for the return on assets. The elasticity suggests
Greek banking profitability: recent developments
ECONOMIC BULLETIN, 24   1/05 19
ECONOMIC BULLETIN, 24   1/0520
N
ot
es
:
**
* 
im
pl
ie
s 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 a
t 
1%
 le
ve
l; 
**
 a
t 
5%
 le
ve
l; 
an
d 
* 
at
 1
0%
 le
ve
l; 
th
e 
fig
ur
es
 s
ho
w
 t
he
 p
-v
al
ue
s.
Si
ze
 e
ffe
ct
 is
 b
el
l-s
ha
pe
d 
w
ith
 t
ur
ni
ng
 p
oi
nt
 (
m
ax
im
um
) 
at
 1
1.
75
5 
co
m
pa
re
d 
to
 m
ea
n 
si
ze
 o
f 1
3.
99
7.
So
ur
ce
:
O
w
n 
ca
lc
ul
at
io
ns
 u
si
ng
 s
am
pl
e 
co
lle
ct
ed
 (
se
e 
te
xt
).
T
a
b
le
 6
Ra
te
 o
f r
et
ur
n 
on
 t
ot
al
 e
qu
ity
 
M
ea
n
Lo
ng
-r
un
 e
la
st
ic
-
ity
Sh
or
t-r
un
 e
la
st
ic
-
ity
Si
gn
ifi
ca
nc
e
t-s
ta
tis
tic
St
an
da
rd
 e
rr
or
C
oe
ffi
ci
en
t
V
ar
ia
bl
e
La
gg
ed
 p
ro
fit
ab
ili
ty
 
0.
12
37
0.
07
78
1.
58
93
0.
11
0.
12
8
O
w
ne
rs
hi
p 
–0
.0
80
9
0.
17
61
–0
.4
59
2
–8
.0
89
–9
.2
31
Si
ze
0.
76
55
0.
41
41
1.
84
87
*
–1
.1
41
–1
.3
02
13
.9
97
Si
ze
 s
qu
ar
ed
 
–0
.0
32
6
0.
01
57
–2
.0
69
9
**
Pr
op
or
tio
n 
of
 O
BS
 b
us
in
es
s 
0.
39
98
0.
23
62
1.
69
29
*
1.
66
4
1.
89
9
0.
55
3
Lo
an
/d
ep
os
it 
ra
tio
–0
.0
18
0
0.
00
43
–4
.2
32
5
**
*
–0
.2
32
–0
.2
64
1.
64
6
O
pe
ra
tin
g 
ex
pe
ns
es
 
1.
37
83
1.
75
68
0.
78
46
0.
33
3
0.
38
1
0.
03
1
St
af
f e
xp
en
se
s 
0.
85
78
0.
35
68
2.
40
42
**
4.
26
8
4.
87
1
0.
63
7
D
ep
os
its
 p
er
 1
,0
00
 w
or
ke
rs
 
0.
04
59
0.
06
59
0.
69
65
0.
48
6
0.
55
5
1.
35
6
Lo
an
s 
pe
r 
1,
00
0 
w
or
ke
rs
 
0.
00
08
0.
10
08
0.
00
83
0.
00
7
0.
00
8
1.
02
5
In
te
rb
an
k 
de
po
si
ts
/to
ta
l d
ep
os
its
0.
14
63
0.
26
28
0.
55
68
0.
20
8
0.
23
7
0.
18
2
Le
ve
ra
ge
 (
x1
,0
00
)
1.
27
41
0.
36
45
3.
49
55
**
*
0.
12
9
0.
14
7
0.
01
3
O
w
n 
ca
pi
ta
l –
 o
m
itt
ed
 
Li
qu
id
ity
 
0.
25
35
0.
05
50
4.
61
17
**
*
0.
55
3
0.
63
1
0.
27
9
H
er
fin
da
hl
 in
de
x 
(x
10
,0
00
)
2.
92
30
1.
59
30
1.
83
49
*
3.
57
7
4.
08
2
0.
15
7
M
ar
ke
t 
sh
ar
e 
0.
01
34
0.
00
99
1.
35
14
0.
18
0.
50
2
0.
57
3
4.
80
8
C
on
st
an
t 
–5
.5
75
6
2.
83
62
–1
.9
65
9
Ye
ar
 d
um
m
ie
s 
F(
9,
13
7)
 =
 1
.0
6 
(0
.3
9)
Fi
xe
d 
ef
fe
ct
s 
F(
25
,1
37
) 
=
 2
.6
6 
(0
.0
0)
N
um
be
r 
of
 o
bs
er
va
tio
ns
18
7
N
um
be
r 
of
 b
an
ks
 
26
that a 10% increase in the ratio causes profitabil-
ity to fall by 2-3%.
With respect to liability management, reliance on
the interbank market for funds has no impact on
profitability. This is in line with the previous
results. Leverage still has a significant positive
effect and the elasticity at 1-1.5% is similar across
the two periods.
The results for the efficiency indicators are mixed
and no clear picture emerges. There is still some
evidence that staff costs are positively associated
with profitability, which may indicate that banks
with more or better paid staff offer better quality
or simply the fact that profitable banks share their
rents with their employees (we discuss this in
more detail below). The fact that Greek banks
could improve profitability by becoming more
efficient is provided by research which focuses on
cost efficiency directly and suggests that there is
significant room for efficiency improvements in
the Greek banking sector (Christopoulos and
Tsionas, 2001, Christopoulos et al., 2002, Tsionas
et al., 2003, and Kamberoglou et al., 2004).9
Finally, as we found in the earlier results, there is
no evidence that banks which hold more liquidity
Greek banking profitability: recent developments
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rate of return on equity
T a b l e  7
Persistence of profitability
* implies significant at 5% level of significance.
Source: Own calculations using sample collected (see text).
1982-2003 0.54* 0.65* 0.52*
1983-2003 0.53* 0.65* 0.51*
1984-2003 0.53* 0.64* 0.49*
1985-2003 0.50* 0.62* 0.48*
1986-2003 0.48* 0.62* 0.47*
1987-2003 0.46* 0.61* 0.45*
1988-2003 0.44* 0.60* 0.42*
1989-2003 0.41* 0.57* 0.39*
1990-2003 0.36* 0.54* 0.34*
1991-2003 0.35* 0.56* 0.28*
1992-2003 0.34* 0.57* 0.23*
1993-2003 0.33* 0.57* 0.21*
1994-2003 0.32* 0.54* 0.18*
1995-2003 0.29* 0.47* 0.24*
1996-2003 0.27* 0.46* 0.08
1997-2003 0.25* 0.33* 0.18
rate of return on assets
The coefficient on lagged profitability (‚) as measured by:
rate of return on assets 
(incl. OBS business)
Date of regression
it = ·i + ‚i,t–1 + ™ÁtTt
9 These conclusions are reached on a sample period of 1993-
1998 in these papers; the exception is Kamberoglou et al. (2004)
who have data from 1993-1999.
or capital sacrifice profitability. On the contrary,
the effects of liquidity and own capital are gener-
ally positive and, in many cases, significant. The
elasticities suggest a smaller effect than in the
results for the period up to 1998.
Turning now to market characteristics. One of the
important debates in the industrial organisation lit-
erature is the extent to which profitability is
affected by market power. The structure, conduct
and performance literature argues that concentra-
tion (structure) should raise profits (performance)
since banks in concentrated markets can raise
prices and limit quantities (conduct). Contestable
market theory, on the other hand, argues that con-
centration, in and of itself, need not imply a non-
competitive market. What matters is ease of entry:
low-cost entry constrains incumbents to act as if
the market were competitive. Since the Greek
banking market is highly concentrated and, as we
noted in the previous section, there has been a rise
in concentration in recent years, clearly some test
of these hypotheses is necessary.
A positive relationship between concentration and
profits is equally consistent with other hypothe-
ses. The efficient structures hypothesis which is
consistent with contestable market theory holds
that concentration may reflect firm-specific effi-
ciencies. That is, firms in concentrated markets
may earn higher profits simply because they are
more efficient and not because they are exploiting
the market power that concentration brings. Since
more efficient firms might be expected to capture
a higher market share, one way of distinguishing
between market power and efficient structure
theories is to include both market share and con-
centration in any regression explaining profitabil-
ity. If, controlling for market share, concentration
continues to have a positive impact on profitabil-
ity, then this is evidence in favour of the structure,
conduct and performance hypothesis. It suggests
that firms are using market power (as reflected by
high concentration) to raise profits even when we
take into account the fact that firms with higher
market share may be in that position because they
are more efficient.
As with the previous results, and in contrast to the
results of Mamatzakis and Remoundos (2003) and
Athanasoglou et al. (2004), the results for the period
1993-2003 suggest that market concentration does
positively affect profitability even if the effect is sig-
nificant in the return on equity equation only.
Moreover, the results for concentration hold even
with the inclusion of market share. This is not con-
sistent with the efficient structures hypothesis. The
fact that concentration is not significant in either
the return on total assets or the return on total
assets plus OBS business may reflect expense pref-
erence behaviour. That is, bank management might
prefer to spend the rents accruing from market
power on higher expenditure rather than allowing
them to be reflected in higher profits. This could
take the form of managers facing pressure from
workers who want to capture the rents in the form
of higher wages. A test of this hypothesis is con-
ducted by rerunning equation (1) and replacing the
dependent variable by value added (that is profits
plus staff costs). If the effect of concentration
becomes more positive, then this provides evi-
dence of expense preference behaviour. The results
(not reported here) provide no evidence of this, as
was the case with the period 1993-1998.
Finally, there is the risk aversion theory. This
states that banks with market power choose to
take less risk rather than higher profits. If we
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replace the dependent variable by value added
plus provisions (an indicator, albeit imperfect,
of risk), then support for the hypothesis implies
a negative impact of concentration – that is,
concentration lowers not only returns and profits
but also provisions, reflecting the lower risk
adopted. In the earlier paper, we found evi-
dence supporting this theory. The results up to
2003 (again not reported) provide support for
this. In the return on assets equation, concen-
tration is negative and becomes more so when
we switch the dependent variable to value
added plus provisions. In the return on assets
including OBS business, the impact of concen-
tration moves from being positive and insignifi-
cant to being negative and insignificant. Finally,
in the return on equity equation the positive and
significant effect of concentration is again
reversed. This provides support for the idea that
banks in Greece continue to prefer to exploit
market power to reduce risk rather than to take
higher profits.
3. Concluding comments
The purpose of this paper has been to update the
results of our earlier work (Eichengreen and
Gibson, 2001) using data for Greek banks that
extend to 2003 rather than 1998. Four main con-
clusions come out of the new results. First, it is
now clear that the level of concentration in the
Greek banking system reached its lowest level in
the mid-1990s and has subsequently risen
slightly. The effect on competition, however, is
not entirely clear. Although rising concentration
would usually be associated with reduced compe-
tition, we have to take into account that at the
same time the dominance of the bank with the
largest market share has been reduced, whilst a
number of other banks have significantly
increased their market share allowing them to
have an impact on the market. The results of the
econometric analysis provide evidence in support
of the structure, conduct and performance
hypothesis rather than the contestable markets
theory, since there is evidence that concentration
is positively related to profitability (even when
market shares are included in the equation). In
addition, higher market shares increase profitabil-
ity. However, there is also evidence that banks in
Greece use market power to reduce risk and not
just to increase profits. These results are in line
with those from the previous paper.
Second, it appears that the period of rapid struc-
tural change which followed in the footsteps of
liberalisation has now come to an end. Support
for this comes from the fact that profitability is
now more persistent. The coefficient on lagged
profitability has changed from being negative,
although not less than –1 (and in some cases sig-
nificant), suggesting that shocks imply a return to
long-run levels of profitability in an oscillating
fashion, to being positive (although not always
significantly so).
Third, there is some evidence that during the
period examined banks were not able to raise
their profitability by increasing their size alone.
Whilst the relationship between profitability and
size is still non-linear and bell-shaped, the turn-
ing point is much closer to the smallest bank size
in the sample. This suggests that the part of the
size-profitability relationship that is important for
the Greek banking system is the downward-slop-
ing part of the curve – that is increasing size,
other things held constant, is not a way of
Greek banking profitability: recent developments
ECONOMIC BULLETIN, 24   1/05 23
improving profitability. This could be interpreted
as implying that banks have not benefited from
economies of scale. To some extent, given the
small size of Greek banks, this is a surprising
result. However, growing bigger is only a neces-
sary condition for reaping economies of scale; it
is not sufficient. Moreover, it should not be for-
gotten that growing bigger offers opportunities
for reaping economies of scope which we have
not attempted to measure here.
Finally, the differences between publicly- and pri-
vately-owned banks have tended to disappear, with
the characteristics of publicly-owned banks con-
verging on those of the privately-owned ones. This,
together with the insignificance of the dummy for
ownership in the regressions, suggests that pub-
licly-owned banks are operating more like their pri-
vately-owned counterparts in line with the various
administrative changes which have accompanied
liberalisation of the financial system.
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1. Introduction
Over the last two decades, the banking sector has
witnessed a large number of mergers and acquisi-
tions1 (M&As). The major factors behind M&As
were technological advances, globalisation of
financial markets and enhanced supervision of
credit systems. Additionally the creation of a sin-
gle financial market in the European Union (EU)
and the introduction of the euro facilitated to a
large extent bank mergers and acquisitions.
In Greece, the phenomenon of bank M&As was
more intense in the second half of the 1990s. In
addition to the factors already noted above,
increased M&A activity in Greece in this particu-
lar period is attributed to entry into the euro area,
domestic banks’ desire to fend off potential hos-
tile takeover bids from other EU banks and to pro-
tect themselves against increased non-systematic
risk, as well as to the privatisation of a number of
state-controlled banks.2
According to the relevant literature,3 benefits aris-
ing from M&As fall into two main categories:
ñ firstly, benefits arising for the management
team of such banks (e.g. salary protection and
greater prestige) and
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1 For a definition of the terms “merger” and “acquisition” see
Athanosoglou and Brissimis (2004).
2 For a more detailed presentation of developments within the
Greek banking system during this period, see Hondroyiannis et al.
(1999), Gibson and Demenagas (2002).
3 See Amihud and Miller (1998), Berger et al. (1999), Voloudakis
(2002) and Athanasoglou and Brissimis (2004).
ñ secondly, benefits for shareholders, who
expect to maximise the value of their stocks
through M&As.
The empirical methods used to analyse the effects
of bank M&As appear to fall into two categories:
(a) those evaluating the effect of M&As on bank
cost and/or profit efficiency and
(b) those attempting to evaluate the stock market
reaction to announcements concerning the
bank M&As under examination, on condition,
of course, that the shares of the banks in ques-
tion are listed on the stock market.
This study looks at the effect of announcing an
intention to proceed with an M&A between Greek
banks on the stock price of the acquiring bank and
the bank being acquired (target bank).4 In order to
assess any implied benefits, the “event study
analysis” method has been used (see Rhoades,
1994, Pilloff and Santomero, 1998, for an
overview of the applications of this method to the
banking sector).5 This method involves examining
the “abnormal returns”6 (and their statistical sig-
nificance) which the shares of both the acquiring
bank and the target bank may exhibit before and
after the date of the announcement of an intended
M&A.
We examine announcements made in the two-
year period 1998-1999 concerning seven out of
the total number of eight bank M&As originally
examined in the Athanasoglou and Brissimis study
(2004), which drew conclusions concerning the
impact of M&As on banks’ cost and profit effi-
ciency and on the exploitation of economies of
scale. One of the eight cases could not be studied,
as the shares of the banks involved were not listed
on the Athens Exchange.
Selecting this particular sample, which involves
M&As among Greek banks, makes it possible for
us to draw a link between abnormal returns and
changes which occurred in cost and profit effi-
ciency. In other words, we will examine whether it
is possible for the stock market to forecast changes
in the performance of banks as a result of M&As as
well as to distinguish M&As which will ultimately
lead to improved performance from those which
will fail to produce any benefit. We will also exam-
ine the efficiency of the Greek stock market in its
semi-strong form.7 In this direction, we analyse the
time required for the content of the announcement
of an M&A to be incorporated into share prices.
In Part 2, the theoretical framework underlying
the effect of the announcement of an M&A on
stock returns is presented in more detail and a
brief overview is given of relevant material which
has been published internationally. In Part 3, the
methodology used to analyse the impact is pre-
sented, while the analysis of data from the sample
is looked at in Part 4. In Part 5, the empirical evi-
dence is interpreted and evaluated and, finally, in
Part 6, the study is completed with a presentation
of the conclusions, summarised as follows:
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4 The terms “acquiring bank” and “target bank” are also used in
cases where the M&A involves the merger of two institutions.
5 Note that the event study analysis method was originally devel-
oped by Fama et al. (1969).
6 Abnormal returns are those which are not interpreted using an
asset pricing model. See also Part 3 for a detailed explanation.
7 A stock market is considered efficient in its semi-strong form
when share prices incorporate directly and fully all publicly avail-
able information, i.e. all events which investors may be informed
about from published news reports and data. For further informa-
tion concerning the forms of an efficient market, see Thomadakis
and Xanthakis (1990).
ñ Firstly, the cumulative average abnormal
return of the acquiring banks is higher than
that of the target banks and lasts longer.
ñ Secondly, concerning the results obtained by
Athanasoglou and Brissimis (2004), it appears
that, with two exceptions, investors dis-
counted the positive effect of M&As on bank
cost and profit efficiency.
ñ Thirdly, there is evidence of non-effective
reaction of the stock market to announced
M&As, as abnormal returns are observed for
several days following the announcement
date, especially as regards acquiring banks.
2. The reaction of the stock market to
announcements of bank M&As: 
a theoretical approach and an overview 
of the literature
2.1 Theoretical approach
As noted above, one important factor behind
greater bank concentration via M&As is the max-
imisation of their stock price. Any announcement
of an intended M&A arouses considerable interest
on the part of the banks’ shareholders as it gives
them an opportunity to check the validity of the
two following hypotheses:
Firstly, “the information hypothesis”, according to
which the management of the bank which
announces an intention to go ahead with the
acquisition of another bank (target bank) may be
aware that the book value or stock market value
of the target bank is underestimated.
Secondly, “the inefficient management hypothe-
sis”, according to which, following the announce-
ment of the M&A, the management of the target
bank may be obliged to improve the operation of
the bank in order to make it more efficient and
thereby possibly prevent the takeover.
However, an intended M&A does not necessarily
lead to the maximisation of the value of the new
bank which will come into existence. If the utility
function of the management of the acquiring bank
is increasing proportionately to the scale of the
bank, it is possible that the management in ques-
tion will proceed with the M&A simply to derive
the greatest possible personal benefit without tak-
ing into account the total cost involved in acquir-
ing the target bank, which may be far higher than
the value of the target bank itself. A similar case
arises when the management of the acquiring
bank overestimates its own ability to identify
undervalued target banks, thus eventually paying
a relatively high price (“hubris hypothesis”, see
Roll, 1986).
According to the two hypotheses above, any
announcement of an intended M&A can be
expected to cause the following changes to take
place in share prices:
(a) Acquiring banks’ shares:
The reaction is positive when the M&A
involves banks which provide similar services
and/or are active in the same market. The
reaction is negative or non-existent when it is
perceived that the M&A serves only the per-
sonal interests of the management of the
acquiring bank rather than the interests of the
shareholders.
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(b) Target banks’ shares:
The reaction is positive, as either it is felt that
the target bank’s share price is undervalued or
that the management of the target bank was
ineffective and that, therefore, the acquisition
will result in efforts to improve the operation
and organisational structure of the bank,
which will in turn lead to improved perfor-
mance.
Researchers looking into how the stock market
reacts to announcements of M&As consider that
this reaction is a major indication of how much
the M&A is expected to affect the overall effi-
ciency of the banks involved. In other words, they
attempt to analyse whether there are any possible
returns on bank shares as a result of the
announcement of an intended M&A. The hypoth-
esis tested is that these returns, as they develop
around the announcement date, can explain the
increased stock market value of the banks which
will come into existence as a result of an M&A
compared to the total stock market value of the
individual banks involved in the M&A.
2.2 An overview of the relevant literature
Empirical research into the impact of the
announcement of a bank M&A on stock prices has
concentrated mainly on bank M&As in the USA,
while it is relatively limited as far as the European
banking system is concerned. The general conclu-
sion drawn from analysing events in the USA is
that positive abnormal returns are observed in the
case of target banks’ shares, while the results for
acquiring banks are mixed. In general, despite the
benefits which theoretically should arise from an
M&A and the partial transfer, as observed by sev-
eral researchers, of wealth from the shareholders
of the acquiring bank to the shareholders of the
target bank, it appears that, in total, stock returns
in the USA are not affected by the announcement
of an M&A, as acquiring banks show a loss on
average which offsets the profits of target banks’
shares (see Piloff and Santomero, 1998). By con-
trast, in the EU, abnormal returns are observed
chiefly in the case of target banks but also, to a
lesser extent, in the case of acquiring banks.
The empirical results8 detailed in international lit-
erature may be summarised as follows:
(a) Acquiring banks
Many studies find that, following M&A
announcements in the USA, stock prices of
acquiring banks show positive but low abnor-
mal returns before the announcement for a
period of ten days or less (see Pettway and
Trifts, 1985, James and Wier, 1987, Bertin et
al., 1989). By contrast, in another case, abnor-
mal returns appear to be negative for a period
of four days before the announcement (see
Houston and Ryngaert, 1994).9 The results are
also contradictory in cases where the abnor-
mal returns cover both the period before and
after the announcement date. Specifically, in
some studies a positive abnormal return is
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8 All results reported in this part are statistically significant.
9 In studies based on weekly data, negative abnormal returns
were observed for a period of 4 to 20 weeks after the announce-
ment date (see Wall and Gup, 1989, Trifts and Scanlon, 1987),
while in studies carried out using monthly data, negative abnor-
mal returns were noted for a period of up to 36 months following
the announcement date (see Madura and Wiant, 1994). In these
cases, i.e. in cases where the abnormal returns continue for a rel-
atively long period following announcement date, a possible
cause is the inefficient operation of the stock market, or the fact
that investors gradually change their expectations because the
M&As appear to have brought about fewer benefits than had ini-
tially been discounted at the announcement date (see Piloff and
Santomero, 1998).
observed on the announcement date and on
both the day before or the day after (see Desai
and Stover, 1985, Cornett and De, 1991),10
while other studies report negative abnormal
returns for a period of one day before the
announcement to one day after the announce-
ment (see Kaen and Tehranian, 1989) and for
a period of five days before and after the
announcement date (see Baradwaj et al.,
1990, 1992). Finally, on another occasion,
abnormal returns varied from positive to neg-
ative depending on the period when the analy-
sis was carried out (see Dubofsky and Frazer,
1989).
(b) Target banks
Most researchers find that the stock market
reaction to M&A announcements in the USA
was positive for target banks’ shares for a
period of 15 days before and after the
announcement date (see Hannan and Wolken,
1989, Cornett and De, 1991).11 In another
case of M&A, positive abnormal returns are
only noted during the four days preceding the
announcement (see Houston and Ryngaert,
1994).12 Moreover, in instances where abnor-
mal returns are pinpointed for shares of both
the acquiring and the target banks, the latter
appear to benefit more than the former (see
Zhang, 1995, Becher, 2000).
Finally, in contrast to what was observed in the
USA, M&A announcements in the EU caused the
stock market value of both the target and the
acquiring bank to rise, as positive abnormal
returns were observed which lasted for a period
of 20 days before until 20 days after the
announcement date (see Cybo-Ottone and Murgia,
2002).13
Overall, according to the empirical findings,
investors in the USA felt that M&As favoured the
management of the acquiring banks more than the
shareholders, while, by contrast, EU investors felt
M&As were beneficial for shareholders, given the
possible benefits of economies of scale and scope.
On almost every occasion, target banks demon-
strated positive abnormal returns. This was so
because investors felt that M&As would bring ben-
efits in terms of greater operating efficiency on the
part of the new banks coming into existence (for the
reasons noted above) as well as because it was felt
that the new management would operate more effi-
ciently compared with the management of the tar-
get banks. Moreover, it was also observed that
share prices of acquiring and target banks react con-
siderably earlier than the M&A announcement date,
indicating the dispersion of rumours or “inside
information” about the M&A through the stock
market before the official announcement. Finally, it
appears that investors did not fully discount the
future impact of M&As on the date of the announce-
ment, as abnormal returns are evident for a period
after this date. This is true for both acquiring and
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10 Cornett and De (1991), however, observe that the positive
abnormal return for acquiring banks became gradually negative
for a period of up to 15 days from the announcement date.
11 Cornett and De (1991) also note that the cumulative average
abnormal returns following the announcement date remain posi-
tive for a period of up to 15 days following the announcement
date, despite the occurrence of negative abnormal returns in the
same period, mainly due to the systematic appearance of positive
abnormal returns up to the announcement date.
12 In studies which use weekly data, positive abnormal returns
extend for a period beginning 40 weeks prior to the announce-
ment date and continuing for 30 weeks after this date (see Trifts
and Scanlon, 1987, Neely, 1987, De Cossio et al., 1988, and
Hawawini and Swary, 1990). Trifts and Scanlon (1987) in particu-
lar observed that acquiring banks presented positive cumulative
abnormal returns for the period beginning 40 weeks before the
announcement date and continuing up to 20 weeks after the date.
However, for the separate 20-week period following the
announcement date, the results were statistically insignificant.
13 The study relates to M&As between companies of the financial
sector, of which at least one was a bank.
target banks and provides evidence of an inefficient
reaction on the part of the stock market.14
3. Methodology: event study analysis
Using the methodology known as event study
analysis,15 any abnormal returns which the share
price may demonstrate as a result of specific
events or news, such as the announcement of
M&As, are examined. A key supposition underly-
ing this method is the hypothesis of stock market
efficiency, i.e. that stock market prices fully and
immediately incorporate investors’ expectations,
which are based on all available information. As a
result, the announcement of an event leads to a
rapid adjustment of the stock price connected
with this event.
According to event study methodology, expected
normal returns from the share within a period of
[t0±ti] days are considered in relation to the
announcement date (t0). The difference between
actual and expected returns represents the abnor-
mal returns.
To estimate the expected returns, an asset pricing
model is used such as the market model. Based
on this, there is a linear relationship between the
return on a share16 i and the market portfolio
return m, according to equation (1):
Rit = ·i + ‚i Rmt + Âit (1)
where:
Rit = the expected return of share i at time (date) t
Rmt = the return of the market portfolio m at time
(date) t
·i, ‚i = the coefficients of the model
Âit = statistical margin of error for which the
expected value ∂(Âit) = 0 and the variation
Var (Âit) = Û2Âi
Econometric estimation of equation (1) and, by
extension, of the expected returns of share i is
usually carried out using the classic Ordinary
Least Squares (OLS) method for a specific
period.17
The estimated coefficients in equation (1) are used
to calculate the expected returns of each bank
share, while the abnormal returns are calculated
as the difference between the expected returns
and actual returns during the period of [t1, t2] days
before and after the announcement date (t0),
according to the relationship (2):
ARit = Rit — (·^i + ‚^i Rmt) (2)
where:
ARit = the abnormal return of share i on day t
·^, ‚^ = estimates of coefficients ·i + ‚i.
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14 See footnote 7.
15 For a more detailed presentation of the event study methodol-
ogy, see Dodd and Warner (1983), Campbell et al. (1997).
16 The returns (Rt) on shares and on the market price index are
calculated as follows: Rt=ln(Pt /Pt-1), where Pt is the closing price
of the share (or the index) on day t.
17 The Ordinary Least Squares method is widely used in empiri-
cal event study research to evaluate the market model (see
Rhoades, 1994). For an unbiased evaluation of the parameters of
the model, we assume that the data follow the usual distribution
and are distributed independently and identically (Independent
and Identical Distribution, IID). In the event that this assumption
is not valid, the evaluation of the market model’s coefficients will
be biased and the results will be asymptotic. However, some vio-
lation of the above assumption does not have any particularly neg-
ative effect when carrying out event study research (see Brown
and Warner, 1985, Campbell et al., 1997), as statistical tests
approach their distributions asymptotically.
We assume that ARit~¡ [0,Var(ARit)] with
Var(ARit) ≈ Û2Âi in case equation (1) is estimated
over a relatively long period. So, the statistical sig-
nificance of the abnormal returns may be checked
via an estimation of the standard abnormal return
SARit which is defined by relationship (3):
SARit =    
ARit
√Var(∞Rit) (3)
Similarly, we can check the statistical significance
of the average abnormal return of a number N of
events (AARt) through relationship (4).
SAARt =       
AARt
√Var(AARt) (4)
where:
AARt = 
1—
N∑
N
i=1
ARit and Var(AARt) = 1——N2 ∑
N
i=1
Û2Âi
It is noted that, while calculating abnormal returns
provides an indication of the impact of the event
under examination on share prices, this indication
refers only to individual time points. To investigate
the real, ongoing impact of an event on share
prices, abnormal returns must be calculated cumu-
latively for the full period of [t1, t2] days for each
share, in accordance with relationship (5):
CARi,[t1,t2] = ∑
t2
t=t1
ARit (5)
where:
CARi,[t1,t2] = cumulative abnormal return for the
period [t1, t2].
In addition, concerning the variation in CARi,[t1,t2] it
is true that:
Var (CARi,[t1,t2]) =(t2—t1+1) Û
2
Âi
To check the statistical significance of CAR, ratio
(6) is used:
SCAR[t1,t2] =      
CAR[t1,t2]
√Var(CAR[t1,t2]) (6)
As in the case of average abnormal return, we can
check the statistical significance of the cumulative
average abnormal return (CAAR) using the rela-
tionship (7):
SCAAR[t1,t2] =         
C∞AR[t1,t2]
√Var(CAAR[t1,t2]) (7)
where:
CAAR[t1,t2] = 
1—
N∑
N
i=1
CARi[t1,t2] and
Var(CAAR[t1,t2]) = 1——N2 ∑
N
i=1
Û2i , [t1,t2]
In each case of statistical hypotheses tests, the
critical values were obtained by the t-student dis-
tribution at 5% level of significance.
In the literature, the calculation period of the
cumulative abnormal returns is usually between
10 and 50 days before and after the announce-
ment date. In this study, the time period [t1, t2] is
determined as [–20, +20], i.e. 20 days before and
20 days after the announcement date t0, while
intermediate periods of time are used to validate
the results.
4. Data analysis
As mentioned previously, this study examines the
impact of announcing an intended M&A involving
Greek banks listed on the stock market during the
period 1998-1999. These announcements include
The effect of merger and acquisition announcement on Greek bank stock returns
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neither those concerning co-operation between
Greek and foreign banks nor those concerning the
purchase of foreign branches.
In the method which we have selected, the date
of the M&A announcement to the daily press is of
considerable significance. The announcement
date is taken to be either the date on which a bank
or banks expressed through the press their inter-
est in an M&A or the date on which a relevant
announcement was published by the Board of
Directors of the banks involved, thus bringing the
potential M&A to the attention of investors.
Announcement dates were retrieved from the
financial newspaper “Naftemporiki” or from
announcements by the Athens Exchange (Athex).
As for share prices, daily prices are usually used in
international literature to estimate the coefficients
of the market model, with the exception of certain
studies which use weekly or monthly prices for
the period preceding the announcement date (see
Lobue, 1984, Neely, 1987, De and Duplichan,
1987, Trifts and Scanlon, 1987, Wall and Gup,
1989, Hawawini and Swary, 1990), while, in other
studies, prices in the period following the
announcement date are also used (see James and
Wier, 1987, Trifts and Scanlon, 1987, Baradwaj et
al., 1992). One exception was the study by
Cornett and De (1991), where share prices in the
period following the announcement of an
intended M&A were used exclusively.
In this study, a comparatively long time period
was used in order to assess the coefficients of
equation (1), so that they approach their real,
long-term values, and to avoid any possible bias
in their estimation from systematically positive
returns, especially in the period before and after
the announcement date. To estimate the normal
returns, daily closing prices were used for the
period 1.1.1996-31.12.2003. However, note that
for the shares of some of the banks examined,
data were not available for the full period, either
because banks were listed on the stock market
after 1.1.1996 or because the M&A took place
before 31.12.2003 and, as a result, the target
bank’s share ceased to be tradable on the stock
market. Finally, for the market portfolio m, the
Athex Composite Index closing prices were used.
For reasons already noted above, the sample of
M&As studied here is the same as the one used
by Athanasoglou and Brissimis (2004).18 Out of
the eight cases (A-H) in their study, case A was
excluded, as it involved an M&A between banks
not listed on the stock market and thus it was
not possible to examine them in this study. The
distinction between acquiring and target banks
was drawn on the basis of the ranking of Table 119
in Athanasoglou and Brissimis (2004). The total
of the seven cases examined includes six acquir-
ing banks, one of which participated in two
M&As (cases B and D). There were eight target
banks, while in case G, in order to make the
results comparable with those of Athanasoglou
and Brissimis (2004), two target banks20 were
examined together. However, in cases B, C and
D, target banks’ shares were not listed on the
Athex, and therefore only five remaining banks
were examined.
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18 For more details, see Part 4.1.3 and Table 9, Athanasoglou and
Brissimis (2004).
19 In that table, the distinction is drawn according to the cor-
responding Government Gazettes in which the announcement
of each M&A was published.
20 In this case, the average results of the two target banks which
took part in the M&As were examined.
5. Empirical results
5.1. Evaluation of daily abnormal returns
Chart 1 and Table 1 show the average daily annual
abnormal return [AARt, relationship (4)] for all
cases of M&As both for acquiring and for target
banks. The examination of these returns shows
that there is a clear differentiation between the
returns achieved by the two groups of banks. In
more detail, for most days within the period
before and for eight days after the announcement
date, acquiring banks show a positive and statisti-
cally significant average abnormal return, which
thereafter demonstrates non-systematic develop-
ment (see Table 1). Apart from cases B and D,21
these banks demonstrate positive (negative) and
significantly lower (higher) average abnormal
returns, while the number of statistically signifi-
cant returns is considerably smaller than the cor-
responding number for all acquiring banks, even
though the pattern of the daily development of
these returns did not change during the period
under examination in comparison with that of all
the cases in total. In addition, both for the total
number of cases examined and for the total
excluding cases B and D, a considerable number
of negative abnormal returns are noted from the
sixth day after the announcement date, in contrast
with the very positive abnormal returns achieved
during the period preceding the announcement
date.
In the case of the target banks, positive and sta-
tistically significant abnormal returns are
observed during the period of two days before
and two days after the announcement date, fol-
lowed by negative abnormal returns which con-
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21 The share prices of the banks in cases B and D demonstrated
exceptionally marked fluctuations, especially during the period
before the date of the M&A announcement [–20, 0].
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T a b l e  1
Average daily abnormal stock returns of acquiring and target banks
(Percentages)
Note: Numbers in bold denote statistical significance at 5% level of significance. In the first column, the days before the announcement date (0) are indicated with a
negative sign. 
–20 1.1 0.4 –0.9
–19 –0.7 –0.3 0.7
–18 –0.5 1.1 0.6
–17 2.4 1.0 0.1
–16 2.4 0.9 –0.8
–15 0.6 –0.6 0.0
–14 3.5 2.7 –0.2
–13 0.5 1.1 –0.5
–12 2.3 1.8 –0.1
–11 1.4 0.5 0.9
–10 –0.9 0.6 0.5
–9 0.2 –1.7 1.3
–8 3.6 2.5 1.2
–7 2.4 0.9 1.0
–6 3.1 1.6 –0.1
–5 1.6 1.6 –0.2
–4 3.0 2.5 –0.3
–3 2.3 0.8 –1.8
–2 1.4 1.0 1.5
–1 2.5 1.1 1.1
0 1.8 0.1 3.1
1 3.9 2.7 2.3
2 2.9 1.5 1.9
3 1.4 –0.2 –2.8
4 2.9 1.2 –1.2
5 2.4 0.9 –2.0
6 –1.0 –0.9 –2.5
7 3.0 1.6 –1.1
8 1.3 1.1 0.7
9 –0.8 –1.8 –0.1
10 1.1 0.9 –1.5
11 0.3 0.3 0.2
12 –1.0 –2.1 1.8
13 0.3 –0.6 1.1
14 0.5 1.2 0.2
15 2.0 1.3 2.7
16 –1.7 –1.0 0.2
17 –2.5 –1.8 –1.1
18 –1.9 –2.4 1.4
19 0.5 1.4 1.5
20 0.7 2.1 1.2
Target
Banks
Acquiring excluding cases 
B and DAcquiringDays
tinue up to the tenth day after the announcement
(with statistically significant abnormal returns on
the 3rd, 5th, 6th and 10th day), while thereafter
these returns become positive (with statistically
significant those on the 12th, 15th, 18th and 19th
day).
On the day of the announcement, acquiring banks
noted an average (statistically significant) abnor-
mal return of 1.8% (0.1%, and statistically insignif-
icant, excluding cases B and D), which is
markedly lower than that of the target banks,
whose shares showed a corresponding (and sta-
tistically significant) return of 3.1%. These results,
excluding cases B and D, are in line with similar
studies for US banks, where the abnormal return
for acquiring banks is either negative, or positive
(statistically insignificant). Concerning target
banks, the abnormal return on the announcement
date observed in this study is noticeably lower
than that noted in other studies.22
5.2 Evaluation of cumulative abnormal returns
As already noted, the continuing impact of the
M&A announcement on banks’ share prices is evi-
dent from the cumulative abnormal return [CAR1,
relationship (5)] which is observed for a period
before and after the announcement date. In gen-
eral, an examination of Chart 2 shows that the
cumulative average abnormal return for acquiring
banks is significantly higher than that of target
banks and lasts for a longer time. This conclusion
is still true even if cases B and D are excluded
from the group of acquiring banks.
More specifically, the cumulative average abnormal
return of shares of acquiring banks is positive and
statistically significant for 17 days before the
The effect of merger and acquisition announcement on Greek bank stock returns
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22 For example, note that Cornett and De (1991) estimate an
abnormal return of 6.1% for target banks in the US equivalent on
the date of the announcement.
announcement date of the merger and continues to
rise up to 8 days after that date, when it achieves
its highest price (50.7%), while it fluctuates slightly
thereafter (see Chart 2 and Table 2).
This return reduces by approximately a half
(26.3%) when cases B and D are excluded from
the group of acquiring banks (see Chart 2 and
Table 2), as in these cases the abnormal returns
of banks were exceptionally high and unex-
pected on the basis of their cost and profit effi-
ciency (see Table 3). In contrast, for shares of
target banks, the positive and statistically signif-
icant cumulative average abnormal return lasts
for a relatively shorter period [–10,2] and
reaches 11.5% with relatively sharp fluctuations.
It should be remembered that in international
literature the corresponding time period for
both categories of banks is shorter than or equal
to 20 days.
In addition, the cumulative average abnormal
returns which shareholders potentially achieved,
as calculated for various time intervals within the
period [–20, 20], are shown in Table 2. Specifically
for the whole period under examination [–20, 20],
the cumulative average abnormal return of shares
of acquiring banks (48.2%) was approximately five
times that of target banks. However, this impor-
tant differentiation between the returns of the two
groups of banks is chiefly evident in the period
before the announcement (33.8% compared with
7.3%) and, to a lesser extent, in the period after
the announcement (16.1% compared with 5.7%).
If cases B and D are excluded from the total, this
difference is reduced significantly for the period
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T a b l e  2
Cumulative average abnormal stock returns1 of acquiring and target banks at different day intervals
(Percentages)
Target
Banks
Note: Numbers in bold denote statistical significance at 5% level of significance. 
1 Returns are calculated as the average of the cumulative abnormal returns for each bank category.
[–20, –15] 5.3 2.4 –0.1
[–15, –10] 7.4 6.2 0.7
[–10, –5] 9.9 5.5 3.7
[–5, 0] 12.5 7.2 3.4
[0, 5] 15.2 6.3 1.3
[5, 10] 6.0 1.8 –6.6
[10, 15] 3.2 1.0 4.5
[15, 20] –2.9 –0.3 5.7
[–17, 8] 50.7 26.3 2.0
[–10, 2] 27.7 15.3 11.5
[–1, 1] 8.1 4.0 6.5
[–20, 0] 33.8 19.7 7.3
[0, 20] 16.1 5.6 5.7
[–20, 20] 48.2 25.1 10.0
Acquiring excluding cases 
B and DAcquiring
Day intervals  
[from (t1)-to (t2)]
before the announcement (19.7% compared with
7.3%), as well as for the whole period under
examination (25.1% compared with 5.7%), while
in the period after the announcement date this dif-
ference no longer exists. Note that the cumulative
average abnormal return for acquiring banks
exceeds in general that of target banks, except
from certain specific time intervals.
This positive effect for acquiring banks is attrib-
uted, on the one hand, to the fact that banks
which participated in M&As were active in the
same market offering similar products and, on the
other hand, to the expectations of the sharehold-
ers that the M&A will benefit the value of their
shares. It is noted that the specific findings of this
study are in accordance with corresponding find-
ings for the EU; however, they are higher (lower)
for acquiring (target) banks and their differences
are particularly marked in the case of acquiring
banks.
The results for the cumulative abnormal returns are
analysed further and their overall statistical signifi-
cance is examined. More specifically, Charts 3 and
4 show the number of positive and negative (statis-
tically significant) cumulative abnormal returns for
the categories of acquiring and target banks as a
percentage of the total number of M&As. These
positive returns for acquiring banks reach their
highest percentage (approximately 75%) in the
period [–1, 1]. This percentage falls successively in
the five-day period before and after the announce-
ment date, with the exception of the first and last
five-day periods [–20, –15] and [15, 20], when the
percentage remains stable or rises, respectively. By
contrast, negative returns are at a low percentage,
mainly during the period after the announcement
date. As for target banks, the period [–1, 1] exhibits
the highest concentration of positive returns (80%
approximately), while there is a much lower per-
centage of positive and negative returns in the rest
of the periods under examination.
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T a b l e  3
Cumulative average abnormal stock returns per M&A case at different day intervals
(Percentages)
∏
M&A cases1
Note: Numbers in bold denote statistical significance at 5% level of significance.
1 For these cases see also Table 9 in Athanasoglou and Brissimis (2004).
[–20, –15] 6.7 13.6 20.8 –2.3 6.5 –4.9 5.7
[–15, –10] 7.7 34.8 14.5 –2.3 1.8 –1.3 6.1
[–10, –5] 14.8 17.9 31.2 –1.5 –3.9 –4.7 5.1
[–5, 0] 11.1 23.3 46.1 –0.5 –0.9 7.3 5.0
[0, 5] 43.3 –14.8 41.1 7.0 1.1 9.7 1.9
[5, 10] 45.0 0.2 –7.8 0.2 –8.4 2.4 –7.5
[10, 15] 21.8 –5.8 –2.4 –1.2 –3.9 13.5 –4.7
[15, 20] –10.8 –25.2 –10.5 13.5 4.8 4.9 –2.2
[–1, 1] 17.4 –12.5 23.9 11.3 –2.5 7.6 10.4
[–20, 0] 53.3 78.2 99.3 –5.1 15.4 4.3 19.3
[0, 20] 79.5 –56.8 15.6 21.8 –8.7 25.9 –5.5
[–20, 20] 126.8 28.5 107.8 12.8 5.4 28.7 10.6
GF∂DCµ
Day intervals  
[from (t1) to (t2)]
Therefore, both for target banks and especially for
acquiring banks, information is disseminated
throughout the stock market considerably earlier
than the official announcement date. This indi-
cates either rumour dispersion concerning M&As
or that inside information is exploited in carrying
out transactions, a phenomenon which, as previ-
ously mentioned, can be observed in other cases
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of M&As involving banks in the USA and the EU,
albeit to a comparatively lesser extent. Moreover,
it can be seen that the impact of announcing
M&As is not fully discounted on the announce-
ment date, especially in the case of acquiring
banks, while cumulative abnormal returns remain
statistically significant for a period following the
announcement, thus indicating a possible viola-
tion of the efficient market hypothesis in its semi-
strong form. It should be noted, however, that the
length of this period is reduced sharply for acquir-
ing banks when cases B and D are excluded (see
Table 2).
5.3 Analysis of individual cases of bank M&As on
the basis of abnormal stock returns
The fact that the sample being examined is small
represents a disadvantage for this study and
makes it more difficult to formulate more general
conclusions. It does, however, make it possible to
evaluate each M&A separately and compare it
with the corresponding results of the Athanasoglou
and Brissimis study (2004) regarding the effects of
the same individual cases of M&As on banks’ cost
and profit efficiency. Table 3 shows the cumula-
tive average abnormal returns over different time
intervals for each case of M&As for the period
[–20, 20]. It is clear that cases B and D present
exceptionally high (and statistically significant)
returns (126.8% and 107.8% respectively),
although the performance in both cases is nega-
tive as far as profit efficiency is concerned, while
improved cost efficiency is only achieved in case
B.23 The abnormal return achieved in case D con-
cerns almost exclusively the period before the
announcement date, indicating the effect of
intense rumour dispersion or abuse of inside
information. In case B, a high return was achieved
both before and after the M&A announcement
date. As a result, in addition to what has previ-
ously been noted for case D, it appears that in
case B the efficient market hypothesis in its semi-
strong form is violated. However, with the excep-
tion of these two cases of M&As, in all other cases
conclusions are in line with those drawn by
Athanasoglou and Brissimis (2004). More analyti-
cally, out of the rest of individual cases of M&As
(C, E, F, G and H), G and C, which also report the
best performance in the Athanasoglou and
Brissimis study (2004), have achieved the largest
increase in stock market value, while cases E, H
and F follow. Therefore, it appears that positive
abnormal stock returns in these cases reflect
investors’ expectations of a corresponding improve-
ment in cost and profit efficiency of the banks
which participated in the M&As.
6. Conclusions
In this study, we have examined the impact of
announcing M&As among Greek commercial
banks on their stock prices during the two-year
period 1998-1999. In this direction, we used the
“event study” analysis method using a sample of
announcements concerning imminent M&As, which
was the same as the one used by Athanasoglou and
Brissimis (2004).
According to the results, both acquiring and target
banks reported particularly high positive abnor-
mal returns during the period under examination.
This is true even after the exclusion of two cases
of M&As, which experienced exceptionally high
The effect of merger and acquisition announcement on Greek bank stock returns
ECONOMIC BULLETIN, 24   1/05 41
23 See Athanasoglou and Brissimis (2004).
returns. More particularly, acquiring banks
showed significantly higher cumulative abnormal
returns than those of target banks, which also
lasted for a longer period of time. When the two
previously noted extreme cases are excluded from
acquiring banks, this relationship continues to
hold in general; however, the difference in the
level of returns between the two bank categories
is considerably reduced.
Abnormal returns mainly of the acquiring as well
as of target banks are more evident in the period
before the announcement date, thus indicating
either a rumour dispersion effect or abuse of
inside information in the pre-announcement
period. The efficient market hypothesis in its
semi-strong form seems to be violated during the
period under examination, as abnormal returns,
particularly of acquiring banks, remain evident for
several days after the announcement date.
However, this phenomenon is less marked after
the exclusion of the two extreme cases.
During the examination of individual cases of
M&As, the cases which, according to Athanasoglou
and Brissimis (2004), showed the greatest improve-
ment in cost and profit efficiency presented the
highest returns in this survey as well (with the
exception of the two cases noted previously).
These returns are thought to reflect investors’
expectations of improved performance of the
banks involved in M&As.
The findings of this study appear to be in line with
those concerning the banking system in the USA
as far as target banks are concerned. In addition,
they are in line with associated results for both
acquiring and target banks in the European Union,
even though in the case of Greek banks, returns
reach relatively higher levels for acquiring banks
and lower ones for target banks.
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1. Introduction
Although issues relating to the distribution and
redistribution of production and income have
always been at the very epicentre of economists’
interest, only a few empirical studies have ever
been conducted in this area. This is chiefly
because it is impossible to approach these issues
objectively, since every approach as a rule involves
controversial and subjective judgements that are
inextricably linked to the political and social con-
ditions holding for a given time and place.
Moreover, any discussion of distribution issues
will almost invariably provoke a reaction from
social groups and can lead to social and political
unrest that may sometimes turn to violence.
Generally speaking, income can be redistributed
between different social groups in both direct and
indirect ways. Direct redistribution is usually
noticed by social groups (though its true magni-
tude may not be), initially leads to reactions, these
reactions gradually weaken and, eventually, redist-
ribution is “accepted” to some extent. Direct redist-
ribution would include, for example, an increase
or decrease in the tax rates for different social
groups, an increase in the income of other groups,
and workers’ incomes increasing at different rates.1
Indirect income redistribution can take many
forms and dimensions, which are not usually per-
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* The views expressed in this article are the authors’ own and do
not necessarily reflect those of the Bank of Greece. We would like
to thank Heather Gibson and Vassilios Droukopoulos, Christos
Papatheodorou, Isaac Sabethai, Platonas Tinios and Panos
Tsakloglou for their helpful comments and suggestions.
1 For 2000-2003, the cumulative increase in real earnings was
9.6% for the economy as a whole (or 10.7% for the average wage
earner), as opposed to just 4.2% for workers receiving the mini-
mum wage laid down by the National Collective Labour
Agreement (see Bank of Greece, 2004).
ceived by social groups and which do not tend to
be subject to negotiation. This paper aims to focus
on one such indirect means of income redistribu-
tion: the redistributional effects of price changes
in Greece over the last five years. These effects
arise because the prices of different goods and
services have not fluctuated uniformly and differ-
ent population groups have quite different con-
sumption patterns. Our research indicates that
this redistribution has acquired noteworthy
dimensions over the past five years and that it has
functioned to the detriment of vulnerable social
groups, such as the unemployed, those with low
income and —to a lesser extent— pensioners and
people with a relatively low educational level. It
has also had a negative effect on various social
indices, such as the poverty rate, the poverty gap
and economic inequality, since the above social
groups face a high risk of poverty and financial
insecurity.
This paper will attempt to answer specific ques-
tions, including the extent to which price changes
serve to alter income distribution, and indeed to
the detriment of vulnerable social groups such as
the poor, pensioners and the elderly; the extent to
which this redistribution has worsened a range of
social indices, such as those referring to inequal-
ity, the poverty rate and the poverty gap; and how
incomes policy can take the indirect redistributive
effect of prices into account. Section 2 of this
paper will detail the statistical data used in this
paper, along with some methodological issues
required for the analysis. Section 3, which pre-
sents our empirical findings, is followed by some
conclusions.2
2. Methodological approach
2.1 The Consumer Price Index3
The Consumer Price Index (CPI) is a statistical
measure that records fluctuations in the general
price level for goods and services consumed by
households. In other words, it determines the
impact of changes in retail prices on the amount
households spend on the purchase of a specific
basket of goods and services. The CPI therefore
reflects price changes for a defined, in terms of
quantity and quality, set of goods and services
purchased by households over a given period of
time. An index of this kind is of particular use
when, for example, evaluating the purchasing
power of money, calculating real wages, deflating
macroeconomic statistics, readjusting rents (Law
2741/1999) and automatically bringing salaries
and other contractual obligations into line with
the cost of living index. Moreover, after the
Maastricht Treaty, price stability has been one of
the convergence criteria Member States must meet
in order to participate in Stage Three of EMU. Thus,
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2 The redistributional impact of inflation in Greece has not been
studied extensively. Adopting a similar analysis to that adopted in
this paper, Livada (1990) examines the issue for 1981-87, while
more recent studies by Professor D. Tserkezos published in peri-
odicals and the daily press (Oikonomikos Tachydromos 2003:
n. 14, n. 34 and 2001: n. 35, To Vima: 28 November 2004, 16
May 2004, 18 May 2003, 3 February 2002, 16 September 2001,
Kathimerini: 30 April 2004) have addressed the same issue.
Turning to the international literature, a number of studies –
chiefly on the USA, but also more recently on the UK – have
addressed the problem of the unequal effect of inflation on differ-
ent population groups (Amble and Stewart, 1994, Berndt et al.,
1997, Bils and Klenow, 2001, Garner et al., 1996, Hagemann,
1982, Hamilton, 2001, Hobijn and Lagakos, 2003a, 2003b, Lebow
and Rudd, 2003, Michael, 1979, Pollak, 1980.
3 The literature dealing with methodological and other problems
relating to the calculation and revision of the CPI is particularly
extensive (inter alia, see Rossi, 2001, Triplett, 2001, and Greenless
and Mason, 1996.
Member States calculate their Harmonised Indices
of Consumer Prices (HICPs) for the sole purpose
of providing data for international comparisons of
inflation.4
In Greece, the CPI is calculated and published on
a monthly basis by the National Statistical Service
of Greece (NSSG).5 The index is revised at regu-
lar intervals, given that the composition of house-
holds’ consumption (the consumption pattern)
and living conditions change over time as a result
of social and economic developments and tech-
nological progress. The weights, in particular, are
re-assessed and the sample of items included in
the index is kept in line with the most up-to-date
consumption pattern. With this in mind, the
NSSG conducts a Household Budget Survey
(HBS) every 5-7 years using a nationwide sample
of households. HBSs provide a highly detailed
record of households’ consumption expenditure
(the most recent HBS included 725 goods).6 The
weights for the different goods and services con-
sumed by households are compiled on the basis
of the results of these surveys and then used to
estimate the overall CPI. The most recent review
of the CPI (base year: 1999=100) was based on
the results of the last available HBS (1998/99).
Moreover, this revision extended the range of the
index from urban areas only to the entire coun-
try.7 Three observations need to be made on the
way in which the NSSG estimates the CPI: firstly,
the weights for the individual CPIs are compiled
on the basis of households’ monetary expendi-
ture, meaning that their imputed expenditure is
not taken into account (the most recent HBS,
1998/99, found imputed expenditure to account
for some 16% of total expenditure). Secondly,
household expenditure on few goods was not
included in the analysis (drugs, prostitution etc.),
while the weight of certain other goods and ser-
vices (electrical power consumption etc.) was,
for the sake of greater reliability, evaluated on the
basis of data from other sources. Thirdly, the sta-
tistical sample included only private households
and took into account neither collective resi-
dences (hospitals, old people’s homes, orphan-
ages etc.) nor expenditure by foreign visitors in
Greece.
The NSSG uses the following variation of the
Laspeyres equation to calculate the CPI:
It = ∑
k
i=1
wIi t (1)
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4 The HICP was created to address the need for the comparable
price data required to chart inflation in EU Member States.
Moreover, the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) Treaty pre-
supposed not only reliable indices that could be compared
between Member States, but also reliable indices for the euro area
as a whole. The HICP records changes in consumer prices
throughout a state and relates conceptually “to households’ mon-
etary consumption expenditure”, meaning that it includes every
exchange of money for consumer goods and services. Monthly
data relating to both the overall index and its components are
available starting in 1995.
5 In Greece, the CPI has being compiled since 1924. Over the
years, it has taken various forms and been assigned various labels,
including the “Cost of Living Index”, by the National Bank of
Greece, 1924-31; the “Cost of Living Price Index” by the General
Statistical Service of the Ministry of Commerce, 1931-38; the
“Cost of Living Price Index for Athens” by the Bank of Greece,
1938-1959; and the “Consumer Price Index for the Greek Urban
Areas” by the National Statistical Service of Greece, 1959-2000.
For a detailed account of the CPI as it has been compiled in
Greece, see NSSG (2002).
6 The five most recent HBSs covered all over the country private
households, irrespective of size, composition and financial or
social situation, using the multistage stratified area sampling
method. The most recent HBS was conducted between November
1998 and October 1999 and included a sample of 6,258 house-
holds (sampling fraction 2/1000). The previous HBSs were con-
ducted in: January-December 1974 (310 goods), November 1981-
October 1982 (386 goods), November 1987-October 1988 (495
goods) and October 1993-September 1994 (600 goods). A further
HBS has been underway since February 2004. Covering some
6,500 households, the survey is expected to end in January 2005.
7 Until 2000, the CPI for Greece had covered only urban areas,
since the level of self-consumption in semi-urban and rural areas
was especially significant, and purchases relatively low. Both
these reasons do not apply in recent years.
where It and Iit are, respectively and for the period
(month) t, the overall CPI and the individual prices
indices of the items i (=1,2,...k) in the “consumer
basket”. The weights, wi, for each of the indices
are equal to the share of the households’ total
monetary expenditure accounted for by these
items in the base year (in line with the HBS).8
2.2 Definitions and data
The present analysis rests on the fact that differ-
ent social groups display considerably differenti-
ated consumption patterns with different weights
for individual expenditures. For example, empiri-
cal studies reveal, and economic theory tells us,
that as a population’s standard of living improves,
the share of its expenditure accounted for by
essential goods (food, housing, etc.) will fall and
the corresponding share for luxury goods will rise.
Engel’s law predicts that the percentage of income
spent on food will fall as an individual’s income
increases, and this is equally true for different
income groups, for countries with different
degrees of economic development, and over time.
Thus, relatively poorer population groups spend a
larger share of their income than other groups on
food and essential goods and a smaller share on
recreation, health, education etc. In other words,
their income elasticity of demand for food is less
than one. The opposite is true of recreation ser-
vices.
This paper utilised primary data from the most
recent HBS, which was conducted between
November 1998 and October 1999, and recalcu-
lated the share of total expenditure accounted for
by various consumer products in the case of dif-
ferent population groups. In other words, we
decomposed the aggregate consumption pattern
used by the NSSG to weight the individual prices
that together form the overall CPI and we esti-
mated the different consumption patterns of the
various population groups. In doing so, we calcu-
lated weights for each group of households,
depending on the educational level of household
heads, the degree of urbanisation of the area in
which they reside, their professional characteris-
tics, their financial situation (poor and non-poor,
their expenditure quartile) etc. These weights
were then used to calculate the CPI for each
group. In mathematical terms, the CPI for house-
hold group g (I gt ) was calculated on the basis of
the formula:
I gt = ∑
K
i=1
w gt Ii t (2)
where w gt is the aggregate expenditure share of
item i for the households in group g in the base
period, i.e. it is the weight for index I gt for house-
hold group g.
Similarly, the inflation ( gt ) faced by group g
households in period t compared with period t–1,
i.e. the percentage change from period t–1 to
period t in the level of prices experienced by the
group, can be calculated using the formula:
 gt = 100
 π
g
t

π gt–1
– 1 (3)
When ranking households and estimating
inequality and poverty indices, households’ total
consumption expenditure was taken to reflect
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8 The individual price indices for each item i, Iit, are calculated as
weighted averages (weighted in terms of the population of the
greater geographical area represented by each city) of the individual
indices for the cities where sampling takes place. The latter indices
are calculated as the geometric average mean of the prices in all the
sampling sources in each city for the specific item (see NSSG, 2001).
their welfare level.9 It should be noted that, with
this in mind, we included both the value of house-
holds’ purchases and their imputed expenditure
(self-production consumption, payment in kind,
imputed rents etc.) in our definition of consump-
tion expenditure.10 Another two important issues
were taken into account solely and exclusively
when ranking households on the basis of their
financial situation or welfare level and calculating
social indices (Section 3.4). The first relates to the
existence of economies of scale in household
consumption and the second to the fact that
adults have different needs from children.11
3. Empirical results
3.1 Differences in consumption patterns
Based on the methodology described, the most
significant difference in the inflation faced by dif-
ferent population groups will stem from differ-
ences in the consumption patterns (expenditure
shares of individual consumer goods and ser-
vices) of the households of which these groups
are comprised. It would therefore facilitate our
later analysis to record at this point the most sig-
nificant differences observed in the contents of
the baskets of goods of different population
groups. Consequently, Table 1 sorts the popula-
tion into groups on the basis of demographic, pro-
fessional and other –chiefly economic– features.
These sorting criteria were selected on the basis
that they appeared to be the most interesting of
those included in the study, based on the primary
data in the most recent HBS.
Table 1 presents the consumption shares of the 12
main groups of items included in the COICOP
classification used by the NSSG, as these were
estimated on the basis of the results of the
1998/99 HBS for each population group. In the
table’s first section, the population is sorted into
five educational groups on the basis of the house-
hold head’s educational level. The data indicate
that the consumption expenditure breakdown dif-
fers significantly between households in relation to
educational level. And one can indeed make out an
inverse relationship between educational level and
a household’s expenditure share both on food and
alcoholic beverages/tobacco, and a direct correla-
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9 This was done both for theoretical reasons —consumption
expenditure is considered a better indicator of households’ per-
manent income than their current income— and because the
NSSG consider HBS income data less reliable than the corre-
sponding consumption expenditure data. For a comparative analy-
sis of income and consumption data in earlier HBSs and the cor-
responding National Accounts data, see Kanellopoulos (1986) and
Sarris and Zografakis (1993).
10 Moreover, various corrections were made to the primary HBS
data with a view to achieving a better proxy of the population’s
welfare level. Thus, household expenditure was expressed at con-
stant average 1999 prices (since the survey took place over one
year, during which prices increased by some 2.6%); a very small
number of households (54 out of 6,276) were excluded from the
initial sample due to incomplete or unreliable data, while the orig-
inal sample was made more representative by being re-weighted
in line with the Labour Force Survey results for 1999. Finally, the
imputed values of the services provided by private vehicles were
estimated and added to consumption expenditure (similarly,
expenditure on the purchase of private vehicles was removed
from consumption expenditure).
11 Essentially, this related to the selection of the so-called “fam-
ily equivalence scales”, which take into account both consump-
tion economies of scale and the different needs of adults and chil-
dren. The distributions used to rank households are distributions
of equivalent consumption expenditure per capita. These are cal-
culated by dividing the expenditure of every household by the
number of equivalent adults in it; the resulting ratio was then
applied to every member of the household. The Eurostat family
equivalence scales were used to calculate the number of equiva-
lent adults for each household, whereby the head of the house-
hold is assigned a weighting of 1.0, other members of the house-
hold aged 13 and over a weighting of 0.5 and children under 13 a
weighting of 0.3. Compared to other equivalence scales used in
similar empirical studies, the Eurostat scales suppose moderate
consumption economies of scale (Hagenaars et al., 1994). For a
detailed treatment of these issues, see Mitrakos (2003, 2004) and
Papatheodorou (2004).
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tion between educational level and expenditure on
transport, recreation and education. For house-
holds whose head has not completed primary edu-
cation, the share of food and alcoholic bever-
ages/tobacco (26.5% and 4.7% respectively) is
almost double that for households whose head is
a university graduate (13.8% and 2.4%). A similar
correlation, though less marked, can be seen in
the shares of housing and health. In contrast, as
the educational level of a population improves, the
share of transport, recreation and education dis-
plays a marked increase. The second part of Table
1 groups households in accordance with the
degree of urbanisation of their place of residence.
Households are thus presented as urban, semi-
urban or rural. It is clear that the degree of urban-
isation correlates positively with the share of
household expenditure on housing, recreation,
education, communications, and miscellaneous
goods and services, while it correlates negatively
with the corresponding shares for food, alcoholic
beverages/tobacco, and hotels/restaurants.
Table 1 then goes on to divide households in
terms of the employment status of their heads,
applying criteria relating to their profession, posi-
tion in employment, the sector of economic activ-
ity in which they are employed and a combination
of the above factors. The data reveal that workers
in the primary sector, pensioners and the unem-
ployed spend a particularly large share of their
expenditure on food. With the exception of pen-
sioners, the same population groups also display
a particularly large share of expenditure on alcoholic
beverages/tobacco. Thus, the consumption share of
alcoholic beverages/tobacco is 6.1% for the unem-
ployed, compared with 3.9% for the population as
a whole. In the case of agricultural workers, the
large shares of food and alcoholic beverages/
tobacco are offset by the relatively small shares of
education, recreation, housing, health and consu-
mer durables. In the case of the unemployed, they
are chiefly offset by the smaller shares of tran-
sport, education, recreation, hotels/restaurants and
consumer durables. Similarly, the relatively large
share of consumption expenditure on food and
health in the case of pensioners is offset by the
smaller shares of education, recreation, transport,
alcoholic beverages/tobacco and clothing/footwear.
In the case of senior officials and the self-employed,
the significantly smaller shares of food and alco-
holic beverages/tobacco are chiefly offset by the
relatively large shares of education and recreation.
The final section of Table 1 groups households
included in the HBS in accordance with their eco-
nomic situation or “welfare level” (approximated
by the distribution of equivalent expenditure per
capita as defined in Section 2.2). Thus, the HBS
households are ranked from poorest to richest
and then sorted into four quartiles, as well as into
poor and not poor – the poverty threshold used
equates to 60% of the median of the equivalent
expenditure per capita of the population as a
whole (the Eurostat definition). Sorted in this way,
it is clear that household consumption patterns
differ significantly according to households’ eco-
nomic situation and standard of living. The share
of food, alcoholic beverages/tobacco and housing
increases monotonically as we move from the
richest to the poorest consumption expenditure
quartile, while the shares of all services (excluding
communications), consumer durables and cloth-
ing/footwear fall steadily (see Chart 1). Finally, in
terms of poor and not poor households, the share
of food, alcoholic beverages/tobacco and housing
in poor households is almost double that of not
poor households, while the share of clothing/
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footwear, consumer durables, transport, recre-
ation, education, hotels/restaurants and miscella-
neous services is considerably smaller in the case
of poor, compared with not poor households.
3.2 Estimates of the inflation faced by different
population groups
This study began by focusing on the consumption
patterns (consumer shares) of the different popu-
lation groups selected. It then moved on to esti-
mate both the monthly CPI for each group of
households and its average annual changes in
accordance with equations (2) and (3) in Section 2.2.
It should be noted that the consumption pattern
for each group of households was calculated
using the detailed results of the 1998/99 HBS
(725 goods and services) and was assumed to
remain stable throughout the period under exam-
ination; the monthly CPI (for each good and ser-
vice) available from the NSSG covered the period
from January 1999 until December 2004, while
the annual changes in these indices (inflation)
covered the period from 2000 to 2004. The CPI
for each population group was calculated on the
basis of the consumption patterns of the various
groups of households and of changes in the price
of each good and service over time. These values
are listed for each year in Table 2, which also
shows the difference between the inflation faced
by each population group and average aggregate
inflation to facilitate comparative analysis. A neg-
ative (or positive) difference for a given popula-
tion group means that, during the period in ques-
tion, the particular group faced lower (or higher)
inflation than the population as a whole, chiefly
due to differences in its consumption pattern.
The first line of Table 2 lists average annual infla-
tion for the given period on the basis of the results
of the study. Note that these values accord with
the official inflation figures published by the
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NSSG, except for 2000, when official inflation
stood at 3.2% compared with an estimated 2.7%
in our study. This difference arose because, the
detailed results of the HBS of 1998/99 not yet
being available, the NSSG calculated inflation for
2000 on the basis of the basket of goods exam-
ined by the previous HBS in 1993/94. Moreover,
until its most recent revision (1999=100), the CPI
employed by the NSSG included only urban
households, as a consequence of which the NSSG
slightly overestimated the official inflation figures
for 2000 during a particularly critical period in
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T a b l e  2
Additional inflation (in excess of average inflation for the total population) faced by population groups
(Percentage points)
Source:  Calculations based on primary HBS data of 1998/99 and on the CPI (NSSG).
Inflation (%) in the total population 2.68 3.44 3.63 3.53 2.90
Educational level of household head
— University graduate –0.04 –0.17 –0.12 0.02 0.14
— Upper secondary education completed –0.04 –0.04 –0.05 –0.04 0.04
— Lower secondary education completed –0.04 0.08 0.05 –0.01 0.02
— Primary education completed 0.00 0.08 0.08 0.00 –0.10
— Primary education not completed 0.33 0.17 0.21 0.19 –0.15
Region of residence
— Urban areas –0.02 –0.03 0.01 0.02 0.05
— Semi-urban areas 0.12 –0.05 –0.09 –0.04 –0.11
— Rural areas 0.01 0.07 –0.01 –0.06 –0.09
Status in employment
— Employee –0.01 –0.02 –0.02 –0.04 0.09
— Self-employed –0.08 0.02 –0.03 –0.08 0.02
— Employer –0.06 –0.18 –0.14 –0.04 0.14
Sector of activity
— Primary sector –0.11 0.11 –0.01 –0.12 –0.08
— Secondary sector –0.04 0.00 –0.01 –0.03 0.09
— Tertiary sector –0.01 –0.06 –0.05 –0.05 0.10
Occupational status
— Non-agricultural employer 0.08 –0.17 –0.09 0.03 0.20
— Senior official or manager –0.11 –0.15 –0.13 –0.08 0.11
— Non-agricultural self-employed –0.17 0.08 –0.01 –0.10 –0.03
— Agricultural worker –0.11 0.10 –0.02 –0.12 –0.08
— Salaried worker in the private sector 0.06 0.12 0.10 0.00 0.05
— Salaried employee in the private sector –0.04 –0.06 –0.04 –0.06 0.12
— Salaried worker in the public sector 0.04 0.01 –0.07 –0.11 0.05
— Salaried employee in the public sector –0.06 –0.16 –0.14 –0.04 0.10
— Unemployed 0.10 0.25 0.26 0.09 0.03
— Pensioner 0.18 0.03 0.10 0.19 –0.16
— Other professional status –0.19 0.05 0.01 0.03 –0.10
Distribution of consumption expenditure
— Poor households 0.09 0.49 0.40 0.30 –0.32
— Not poor households 0.00 –0.05 –0.03 –0.01 0.03
Quartiles of consumption expenditure
— 1st (poorest) 0.45 0.46 0.39 0.34 –0.27
— 2nd 0.54 0.19 0.22 0.21 –0.14
— 3rd 0.30 0.02 0.05 0.07 0.02
— 4th (richest) –0.42 –0.19 –0.18 –0.16 0.11
2000Classification criterion: 2001 2002 2003 2004
which the primary goal of Greek economic policy
was to fulfil the criteria for participation in the
euro area.12
We can draw certain conclusions from the data in
Table 2. Firstly, households whose head is rela-
tively less educated generally face higher inflation,
both compared with average inflation for the pop-
ulation as a whole, and —more importantly—
compared with population groups with a rela-
tively higher educational level. Indeed, with the
exception of 2000, households whose head had
not completed primary education faced inflation
0.19-0.33 percentage point higher than the aver-
age, while households whose heads were high
school graduates or degree-holders faced a dis-
cernibly lower level of inflation. Secondly, there
does not appear to be a permanent and significant
difference in the inflation faced by households
residing in areas with a different degree of urban-
isation. While urban households faced slightly
lower inflation than to the population as a whole
—and especially rural households— during the
first two years of the study period (2000-01),
exactly the opposite was true for the years that
followed (2002-04). It should, however, be noted
that the present analysis reveals households in
semi-urban areas to be better off in terms of infla-
tion, because they have faced below-average
inflation since 2000. Thirdly, although the occu-
pational features of those in employment do not
appear to be linked to a clearly differentiated infla-
tionary situation, pensioners and the unemployed
faced consistently and markedly higher inflation
(except in 2004). The additional inflationary bur-
den borne by the unemployed approached
(cumulatively, 2001-2004) one percentage point.
In contrast, the inflation faced by other population
groups, such as salaried employees, the self-
employed and those employed in the secondary
or the tertiary sector, does not seem to have devi-
ated significantly from average inflation.
Finally, these results make it clear that inflation
was higher than average for the financially weaker
and poorer sections of the population throughout
the four-year study period (2000-2003). Indeed,
prices increased by approximately half a percent-
age point more per annum for the lowest quartile
of consumption expenditure and for the poor (as
defined by Eurostat) than for the population as a
whole. Moreover, this difference is significantly
larger if comparisons are made between quartiles
rather than with average inflation. Thus, the dif-
ference between the average annual inflation
faced by the 1st (poorest) and the 4th (richest)
consumption expenditure quartiles reached 0.87
percentage point in 2000 and fluctuated between
0.65 and 0.50 percentage point over the next
three years before becoming negative (–0.38
point) in 2004 (see Chart 2).
To sum up, these results indicate that the way in
which the prices of individual goods and services
changed between early 2000 and 2004, combined
with each population group’s differentiated con-
sumption pattern, brought about a significant
redistribution to the detriment of the vulnerable
and economically weaker social groups, such as
people with a relatively low educational level,
pensioners, the unemployed and, above all, the
poorest sections of the population (see Chart 3).
The additional inflationary burden faced by these
groups would seem to come about mainly during
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12 In March 2000, an average annual rate of increase of 2% for
the Greek HICP —not the overall CPI— made it possible for
Greece to satisfy the convergence criterion relating to inflation.
periods of high inflation (e.g. May-June 2001,
December 2001-April 2002, May 2003-August
2003), which is to say in periods when the aggre-
gate price level was rising relatively rapidly.
During such periods, households in the above
groups seem to be more vulnerable to additional
price increases, as a consequence of which they
face inflation up to 35% above the average. That
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said, as the next section will examine in detail,
after the first quarter of 2004 the significant fall in
the price of food, which makes up a relatively
large part of the basket of goods of the economi-
cally weaker groups, led to their suffering less
inflation than the population as a whole.13
This last conclusion is especially important, given
that, as a series of studies on Greece have
revealed, the population groups hit by higher than
average inflation are the most important poverty
cores.14 Consequently, the redistribution brought
about by the way in which prices changed during
the period in question provides economic and
social policy makers with a further reason for
intervening to protect the groups hit by higher
inflation from an additional loss of purchasing
power.15
3.3 Inflationary burden by category of expenditure
We have already noted that, in line with this
study’s methodology, any additional inflationary
burden faced by a particular group of households
can be interpreted chiefly in terms of the different
structure of that group’s goodsbasket, but also by
differences in the way individual prices change.
Indeed, combining the results of the two previous
tables would allow us to argue that the relatively
high share of food in the consumption expendi-
ture of households with a low educational level,
pensioners, the unemployed and relatively poor
sections of the population can explain at least part
of their additional inflationary burden, to the
extent, of course, that the CPI for food changes
more rapidly than the overall CPI. The link
between additional inflationary burdens, con-
sumption patterns and the rate of change in indi-
vidual indices is examined below.
As we stressed above, groups facing higher infla-
tion —e.g. households whose head has not com-
pleted primary education, pensioners and, above
all, the unemployed and economically weak— are
also the most significant cores of poverty. Which
is why this section will examine the relationship
between inflationary burdens, consumption pat-
terns and poverty. Table 3 presents the inflation
and consumption pattern of the population as a
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13 Something similar occurred in January 2003, when the CPI for
food fell significantly in relation to January 2002, chiefly due to a
32.8% and 29.2% fall in the price of fresh vegetables and potatoes
respectively. This fall was, to some extent, a result of the very
large increases that took place in January 2002 as a result of
unfavourable weather conditions – a rise of 88.8% for fresh veg-
etables and 61.8% for potatoes compared with January 2001 (base
effect). The CPI for food increased from 103.8% in January 2001
to 117.1% in January 2002.
14 See Kanellopoulos (1986), Tsakloglou (1990), Sarris and Zogra-
fakis (1993), Papatheodorou (1997), Tsakloglou and Panopoulou
(1998), Mitrakos, Panopoulou and Tsakloglou (2001), Lyberaki
and Tinios (2002), Mitrakos and Tsakloglou (2003), Ministry of
Labour and Social Security (2003), Karamesini (2004), Papathe-
odorou and Petmezidou (2004).
15 Livada (1990), who utilised data from the 1981/82 HBS,
comes to the same conclusion for 1981-87 in terms of the exis-
tence of a systematic inflationary bias in Greece against pension-
ers, the elderly and households whose head has a relatively low
educational level. However, Livada’s study differs from the pre-
sent paper in noting an additional inflationary burden on higher-
income groups and on small families (single-person households
and childless couples). Based on the international literature for the
USA, Hobijn and Lagakos (2003a) note that the annual inflation for
the elderly between 1984 and 2001 was on average 0.38% higher
than that faced by people employed in urban areas (the figure
used by the social security authorities when reviewing benefits).
Amble and Stewart (1994) find also higher inflation for the elderly
between 1987 and 1993, while earlier studies by Hagemann
(1982) for 1967-74 and Michael (1979) for 1972-82 show pen-
sioners —usually along with the lowest income groups and
groups with a relatively low educational level— facing a continu-
ally heavier inflationary burden. In contrast, Garner et al. (1996)
conclude that the poor faced almost the same inflation as the pop-
ulation as a whole (although slightly higher during 1985-92 and
lower during the two subsequent years). Most of the earlier stud-
ies on the United Kingdom (Fry and Pashardes, 1985, Muellbauer,
1974, Tipping, 1970) conclude that the economically weaker
groups faced higher inflation, while a more recent study by
Crawford and Smith (2002) establishes that during 1976-2000 the
poorest decile of households faced an average annual inflation of
6.8% compared with 7.1% for the richest decile.
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Poor households*
Food & non-alcoholic beverages 33.51 1.79 5.43 5.38 4.83 0.81
Alcoholic beverages & tobacco 5.83 2.82 7.77 7.42 4.27 4.75
Clothing and footwear 5.31 2.08 3.38 3.68 1.99 4.14
Housing 19.05 7.21 3.00 3.54 4.68 4.88
Consumer durables 4.84 1.43 2.82 1.39 1.41 1.21
Health 5.93 2.12 2.00 3.54 3.92 3.41
Transport 7.01 6.04 2.15 1.17 2.80 3.39
Communications 4.48 –10.88 –1.00 –4.68 –4.24 –4.36
Recreation and culture 2.21 0.44 2.94 3.01 1.95 3.70
Education 1.07 3.29 3.53 4.11 4.77 4.57
Hotels, cafés & restaurants 6.36 4.01 4.06 6.94 5.00 3.85
Miscellaneous goods & services 4.38 2.08 3.79 3.40 3.09 2.20
Total 100.00 2.77 3.93 4.03 3.83 2.58
Percentage
shares 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Total population
Food & non-alcoholic beverages 18.51 1.89 5.43 5.33 4.98 0.51
Alcoholic beverages & tobacco 3.90 2.81 7.55 7.24 4.19 4.63
Clothing and footwear 9.91 2.07 3.29 3.56 1.99 4.10
Housing 11.69 7.06 2.64 3.33 4.43 4.80
Consumer durables 8.60 1.32 2.40 1.63 1.96 1.61
Health 7.26 2.99 2.71 4.74 4.31 4.63
Transport 12.91 4.40 1.34 0.76 3.04 3.50
Communications 3.76 –10.80 –0.93 –4.60 –4.19 –4.32
Recreation and culture 4.68 0.99 3.45 3.31 2.88 2.84
Education 2.70 3.15 3.54 3.95 4.49 4.42
Hotels, cafés & restaurants 9.65 4.52 4.61 6.72 4.78 4.25
Miscellaneous goods & services 6.42 2.02 3.92 3.58 3.14 2.24
Total 100.00 2.68 3.44 3.63 3.53 2.90
* The poverty line is defined as the 60% of the consumption's median.
Source:  Calculations based on primary HBS data of 1998/99 and on the CPI (NSSG).
T a b l e  3
Changes in prices of individual groups of items and their contribution to the inflation faced by
the poor
Percentage changes in prices for the total population
Percentage
shares 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Percentage price changes for poor households
Food & non-alcoholic beverages 0.55 0.25 0.82 0.82 0.70 0.18
Alcoholic beverages & tobacco 0.11 0.06 0.16 0.15 0.09 0.10
Clothing and footwear -0.14 -0.10 -0.15 -0.16 -0.09 -0.19
Housing 0.37 0.55 0.26 0.28 0.37 0.37
Consumer durables -0.07 -0.04 -0.07 -0.07 -0.10 -0.08
Health -0.10 -0.09 -0.08 -0.13 -0.08 -0.13
Transport -0.12 -0.14 -0.02 -0.02 -0.20 -0.21
Communications -0.04 -0.08 -0.01 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03
Recreation and culture -0.07 -0.04 -0.10 -0.09 -0.09 -0.05
Education -0.06 -0.05 -0.06 -0.06 -0.07 -0.07
Hotels, cafés & restaurants -0.18 -0.18 -0.19 -0.21 -0.14 -0.17
Miscellaneous goods & services -0.06 -0.04 -0.09 -0.08 -0.07 -0.05
Total 0.31 0.09 0.48 0.39 0.28 -0.34
Average
2000-2004
(percentage
points) 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Contribution of the different rates of price changes to the 
inflation differential between the poor and the total population (percentage
points)
Main groups of goods and services
whole (1st panel) and of the poor (2nd panel) by
the main groups of items for 2000-04.16 The 3rd
panel of Table 3 records the contribution of each
separate category of expenditure to the observed
difference between the inflation faced by the poor
and that faced by the population as a whole. Note
that poverty has been defined on the basis of the
distribution of equivalent consumption expendi-
ture —the poverty threshold being defined as
60% of the median— since the results do not dif-
fer significantly from alternative definitions.
The data in Table 3 point to a fundamental con-
clusion: just three of the 12 groups of goods and
services are responsible for the total additional
inflationary burden on poor households. Thus, the
relatively high share of food (33.51%), alcoholic
beverages/tobacco (5.83%) and housing (19.05%)
in the baskets of goods of poor households, along
with the way in which the prices of these goods
change, account for the additional inflationary
burden on these households. In the case of the
three index strata (goods groups) “food”, “alco-
holic beverages/tobacco”, and “housing” (includ-
ing heating oil), the average annual additional bur-
den for 2001-2003 is estimated at 0.65, 0.11, and
0.37 percentage point, respectively. Indeed, the
same three index strata offset any “inflationary
gains” arising from the other nine. Throughout the
period under examination, the other nine groups
of goods and services typically contributed nega-
tively to the difference in inflation that arose at the
expense of the poor (i.e. they contributed to lower
inflation for the poor than for the population as a
whole).
Having identified the three groups of goods and
services (food, alcoholic beverages/tobacco and
housing) that lead to additional inflation for poor
households, we can examine in more depth the
contribution of these groups both to average infla-
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16 Note that for the purposes of the table, goods and services
have been grouped into just 12 categories and that price changes
are different for the population as a whole (1st panel of the table)
and for the poor (2nd panel of the table). This is because the
study’s analysis was based on some 200 CPIs for individual goods
and services, as a consequence of which each of the 12 groups of
goods and services in the table again represents a different basket
of individual products whose prices change at different rates.
Thus, the average increase for 2000 of the goods included in food
was 1.89% (in relation to the previous year) for the population as
a whole as compared to 1.79% for the poor.
Food & non-alcoholic beverages 0.35 1.01 0.99 0.92 0.10
Alcoholic beverages & tobacco 0.11 0.29 0.28 0.16 0.18
Housing 0.83 0.31 0.39 0.52 0.56
Total of the three above items 1.29 1.61 1.66 1.60 0.84
Contribution to overall inflation 48.1 46.8 45.7 45.3 29.5
Source: Calculations based on primary HBS data of 1998/99 and on the CPI (NSSG).
T a b l e  4
Contribution of "Food & non-alcoholic beverages", "Alcoholic beverages & tobacco" and "Housing" to
overall inflation
(Percentage points)
2000Main groups of goods and services 2001 2002 2003 2004
tion for the population as a whole and to the infla-
tion faced by the specific population groups under
examination. Table 4 presents the contribution of
the three groups of goods and services to average
inflation. The data reveal that, during 2000-03,
food, alcoholic beverages/tobacco and housing
contributed some 1.29-1.66 percentage points
annually to the increase in the overall CPI and
thus contributed some 46% to the country’s final
overall inflation. The smaller contribution of food
during 2004 limited the contribution of the above
three groups as a whole to 0.84 percentage point
(or 29.5% of average inflation). However, the
especially significant contribution of food (26%-
29%) during 2001-03 should be noted. These
results are illustrated in Chart 4.
Tables A1, A2, and A3 in Appendix A present
detailed results for each of the three groups sepa-
rately as well as for every population group
included in the study. These tables once again
illustrate the contribution of different rates of
price change for the three index strata to the infla-
tion differential between individual population
groups and the population as a whole. On the
basis of the data in Table A1, the inflationary bur-
den stemming from food was not evenly distrib-
uted across population groups. These goods create
additional inflation for households whose head
has not completed primary education, house-
holds resident in rural and semi-urban areas,
households whose head works in agriculture or is
a pensioner or unemployed, as well as house-
holds belonging to the groups that consumed the
least. In contrast, the relatively minor contribution
of food to the consumption habits of households
with a higher educational level and standard of liv-
ing, which live in urban areas and whose head
does not work as a farmer or a manual worker,
contributes to their below average cost of living. It
should also be stressed that every previous state-
ment regarding the role of food in inflation for
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separate population groups holds not only for
2001-03, but also for 2000 and 2004, when the
CPI for food changed at a considerably slower rate
than the overall CPI. Consequently, the quite dif-
ferentiated share of food in household expendi-
ture can in itself explain the positive or negative
contribution of this sub-index to the inflation faced
by different population groups.
As we saw in Table 3, throughout 2001-2004 the
CPI for the “alcoholic beverages/tobacco” goods
group changed far more rapidly than the overall
CPI. Thus, despite this sub-index’s relatively minor
contribution to total household expenditure
(3.9%), it still affected overall inflation by a note-
worthy 0.11-0.29 percentage point throughout the
period under examination (see Table 4). That said,
as Table A2 (see Appendix A) makes clear, the
additional inflationary burden arising from “alco-
holic beverages/tobacco” was more significant for
the inflation faced by the unemployed, agricultural
workers and the poorest sections of the popula-
tion, since a higher rate of change in the prices of
these goods is combined with a relatively larger
share. In the case of pensioners, however, the very
small share of alcoholic beverages/tobacco in their
expenditure seems to have prevailed over rapid
increases in the prices of these products, meaning
that the latter had a negative effect on the inflation
faced by this particular population group. In every
other population group —defined by their educa-
tional, geographical, professional, or economic
features— ”alcoholic beverages/tobacco” would
seem to have moved inflation in the same direc-
tion as had food.
The contribution of a different rate of price change
for housing to the inflation differential between
individual population groups and the population
as a whole is detailed in Table A3 (Appendix A).
Except from 2002 and especially 2001, the prices
of goods in the housing group rose more rapidly
than the overall price level, while their share in
total household expenditure rose to 11.7% and
their effect on overall inflation ranged (depending
on the year) between 0.31 and 0.83 percentage
point. Housing accounts for a much higher share
of the total expenditure of the poor (the bottom
two expenditure quartiles), the unemployed and
households whose head has not completed pri-
mary education. It is clear that the same popula-
tion groups bear a heavier inflationary burden
because of their housing expenditure, while the
respective inflationary burden is smaller for
household groups resident in rural areas, those in
the highest quartile of consumption expenditure
and those whose heads work in the primary sec-
tor, because of the relatively smaller share of
housing expenditure in the total expenditure of
these groups.
In conclusion, it is the consumption pattern of each
individual population group that also essentially
determines the rate of change in the average
weighted price of its goodsbasket, i.e. the inflation it
faces. In view of this, Appendix B contains a solution
to a problem relating to the maximisation or min-
imisation of two theoretical consumption patterns
which lead, respectively, to the greatest and the
smallest inflation. These two theoretically evaluated
consumption patterns are then related to the actual
baskets of goods of individual population groups.
The results once again indicate that poor house-
holds and households whose head is unemployed
or educated to a low level employ a consumption
pattern which correlates more closely to that which
leads to the greatest possible inflation. In contrast,
both at the beginning of the period in question and
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in 2004, their consumption pattern was closer to
the theoretical pattern that leads to the smallest
possible inflation. This was chiefly due to the signif-
icantly smaller increase in the prices of food com-
pared with the average increase in the overall CPI
for these years. The exact opposite is true of house-
holds whose head is a degree-holder, company
executive or professional, or is a member of groups
with the highest consumption: during 2001-03,
these households display a consumption pattern
more closely linked to that theoretically leading to
minimum inflation, while in 2000 and 2004 it is
linked to that leading to maximum inflation.
3.4 Prices: the role of the state
Recent years have seen economic policy makers
putting special emphasis on stabilising prices as
part of Greece’s preparation for inclusion in the
euro area and later in view of the rules of the
Stability and Growth Pact. Efforts at reducing
inflation were bolstered partly by reducing indi-
rect taxation on certain goods and services (e.g. a
reduction in the rate of VAT for electricity and the
special consumption tax on fuel and cars) and
partly by controlling prices and by market dereg-
ulation (e.g. in the telecommunications sector).17
This section will examine the extent to which a
state can influence the inflation faced by different
socio-economic groups and in this way improve
the purchasing power of vulnerable groups (by
means of relative prices). However, it is obvious
that economic policy implemented via the price
mechanism may well not have redistributional
issues as its goal. It is usually accepted that it may
be more effective for a state to formulate its pric-
ing policy with a view to limiting or removing
public enterprises’ deficits and then to manage
redistributional issues by increasing income,
through the tax and benefits system etc.
Table 5 presents the average annual price
changes for goods and services whose prices are
to some extent “controlled” —it would perhaps
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17 See Ministry of National Economy (1999), Ch. 2, p. 27: “The
mix of economic policy means followed during the period covered
by the Convergence Programme and especially in the current
year, plus the measures taken in late 1998 and in 1999 with the
reduction of the taxation on fuel, cars, electrical power and the
restraint imposed on Public Power Corporation charges and pub-
lic enterprises’ rates in general, helped reduce inflation”.
a.  Overall inflation: 2.68 3.44 3.63 3.53 2.90
b1. Average annual change in “state-controlled” prices –3.33 2.98 1.04 0.74 0.69
– Difference of the two inflation rates (a–b1) 6.01 0.46 2.59 2.79 2.21
– Contribution of “controlled” prices to overall inflation –0.30 0.27 0.09 0.07 0.06
b2. Average annual change in “state-controlled” prices, excluding
telecommunications 1.85 5.39 4.27 3.31 3.09
– Difference of the two inflation rates (a–b2) 0.83 –1.95 –0.64 0.22 –0.19
– Contribution of “state-controlled” prices, excluding
telecommunications, to overall inflation 0.10 0.28 0.22 0.17 0.16
Source: Calculations based on primary HBS data of 1998/99 and the CPI (NSSG).
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Contribution of “state-controlled” prices of goods and services to overall inflation
(Percentage points)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
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be better to say they are directly affected— by the
state, and the contribution of this sub-index to
overall inflation. This group comprises services
offered by public enterprises (electricity, telecom-
munications, water, natural gas), transport (city
transport, trains, aeroplanes), council taxes and
the mandatory contribution to state television,
plus expenditure on care in state hospitals. The
first row of Table 2, which lists inflation for the
population as a whole, has been appended to
Table 5. These data reveal that the average annual
change in prices “controlled” by the state is sig-
nificantly lower than the average annual change
in prices as a whole throughout the period under
examination. This difference was particularly sig-
nificant in 2000, when it was as high as six per-
centage points. To some extent, this can be attrib-
uted to Greece’s attempts to satisfy the require-
ments for inclusion in the euro area. The differ-
ence was significantly smaller during the first year
of euro area membership (2001), but rose again
during 2002-04. However, the considerable
decrease in telecommunications prices after the
deregulation of the market was to play a key role
in creating this difference throughout the period
under examination. The data in Table 5 reveal that
the average annual change in prices for the
remaining “state-controlled” goods and services
(i.e. not including telecommunications) is higher
than average inflation for the population as a
whole in three of the five years under examina-
tion. This divergence was particularly significant
in 2001, when it reached 1.95 percentage points.
It would therefore seem that economic policy
during this period, chiefly the deregulation of the
telecommunications market, played a part in con-
straining the general rate of inflation and, to some
extent, allowing Greece to satisfy the criteria for
participation in Stage Three of EMU.
The favourable course of inflation for “state-con-
trolled” goods and services, including telecommu-
nications, resulted, as was natural, in the relatively
limited contribution of these prices to overall infla-
tion. In fact they contributed no more than 0.1 per-
centage point during 2002-2004, though this fig-
ure was larger during the first year of Greece’s par-
ticipation in the third stage of the monetary union
(0.27 percentage point) and negative (–0.30 per-
centage point) in the preceding year. Nevertheless,
if we once again exclude telecommunications from
the above goods and services, on the grounds that
the significant drop in telecommunications prices
was chiefly due to the deregulation of the market
in question and not to governmental price
restraint, the results are somewhat different. In
fact, excluding telecommunications, the contribu-
tion of the other “public-sector” goods to overall
inflation increased significantly to 0.28 percentage
point in 2001, gradually falling to 0.16 percentage
point during the final year of the period under
examination (2004).
The last observation is of interest, though at this
point it is worth examining the degree to which
the contribution of “state-controlled” prices to the
reduction in inflation helped the economically
weaker and socially vulnerable population groups.
The answer is to be found in the data presented in
Table 6, which lists the additional inflationary bur-
den or relief for different population groups stem-
ming from goods and services whose prices are
“controlled” by the state. The table’s first column
also lists the aggregate share of the goods in ques-
tion in the financial expenditure of each popula-
tion group. These data reveal that expenditure on
“state-controlled” goods and services accounts
for 8.97% of the consumption expenditure of the
population as a whole. However, this percentage
is not evenly distributed across the various popu-
lation groups. As one might expect, these goods
account for a larger share of the basket of goods
of the economically weaker population groups,
including poor households (where they account
for 13.3%), the two lowest consumer spending
quartiles (13.0% for the first and 10.7% for the
second), the unemployed (10.5%), people who
have not completed primary education (10.2%)
and pensioners (9.8%).
However, the contribution of these “price-con-
trolled” goods to the inflation faced by the afore-
mentioned population groups is usually positive,
in that it slightly increases the inflation faced by
these groups in relation to inflation for the popu-
lation as a whole. This increase is particularly sig-
nificant in the lowest quartile of the consumption
expenditure distribution and for the poor house-
holds group, except 2000 when the average price
level for the goods in question fell by 3.3%. In
contrast, certain economically more powerful
population groups, employers in the main, but
also the self-employed to a lesser degree, enjoyed
a slightly negative contribution to their inflation
from the goods and services whose prices are
“controlled” by the state.18 The effect of this
group of goods and services on the inflation faced
by households with a salaried head —and,
indeed, on most other population groups— has
yet to be studied. It should also be noted that the
previous observations remain unchanged —actu-
ally, they are marginally strengthened— if we
remove telecommunications from the group of
“controlled” goods (see Table 6 for the inflation-
ary contribution of “controlled” goods, respec-
tively including and excluding telecommunica-
tions, for certain population groups). Consequently,
although beneficial in terms of overall inflation,
economic policy, as this was pursued more
through the deregulation of the telecommunica-
tions market rather than through state-fixed or
state-controlled prices for certain goods and ser-
vices, would not seem to have favoured (not that
it set out to) the economically weaker and socially
vulnerable population groups above others.
3.5 The effect of the price mechanism on inequal-
ity and poverty
It should now be clear that the price mechanism
—perhaps it would be better to say the way in
which relevant price changes in combination
with the differentiated consumption pattern of
different population groups— may well function
to the detriment of sensitive groups such as the
poor, pensioners and the unemployed. This sec-
tion will explore the extent to which this redis-
tributional function of prices exerts a negative
effect on different social indices, such as
inequality, the poverty rate and the poverty gap.
The various inequality and poverty indices are
thus estimated and then compared, both before
and after the redistributional effect of the price
mechanism.
In the international literature, the now accepted
approach to measuring the level of inequality or
poverty between the members of a society
attempts to describe the features and the spread of
a distribution and to incorporate them in a simple
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18 This can once again be explained by the different share of the
various goods and services that make up the group whose prices
are “controlled” by the state in the consumption of different pop-
ulation groups, as well as by the different rates of change in the
respective prices of these goods and services. For example, first
quartile households spend 0.80% and 2.53% of their total expen-
diture, respectively, on water and electricity, as opposed to 0.50%
and 1.63%, respectively, for the population as a whole.
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T a b l e  6
Contribution of the different rate of change in “state-controlled” prices to the difference between
overall inflation and that faced by individual population groups
(Percentage points)
Source: Calculations based on primary HBS data of 1998/99 and on the CPI (NSSG).
Educational level of household head
— University graduate 8.5 0.03 –0.02 0.00 –0.01 –0.01
— Upper secondary education completed 8.9 –0.02 –0.02 –0.02 –0.02 –0.02
— Lower secondary education completed 9.2 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
— Primary education completed 9.2 –0.04 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01
— Primary education not completed 10.2 0.01 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.06
— Primary education not completed, excluding
telecommunications 6.6 0.02 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.06
Region of residence
— Urban areas 9.2 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
— Semi-urban areas 8.4 –0.03 –0.04 –0.02 0.00 0.00
— Rural areas 8.3 –0.04 –0.04 –0.03 –0.01 –0.01
Status in employment
— Employee 8.4 0.02 –0.02 –0.01 –0.01 –0.01
— Self-employed 8.9 –0.06 –0.02 –0.03 –0.02 –0.01
— Employer 8.4 –0.08 –0.07 –0.06 –0.04 –0.03
— Employer, excluding telecommunications 4.4 –0.04 –0.06 –0.04 –0.03 –0.02
Sector of activity
— Primary sector 8.3 –0.04 –0.04 –0.03 –0.01 0.00
— Secondary sector 8.8 –0.01 –0.01 –0.01 –0.01 –0.01
— Tertiary sector 8.5 0.00 –0.03 –0.02 –0.02 –0.02
Occupational status
— Non-agricultural employer 8.6 –0.08 –0.06 –0.05 –0.04 –0.03
— Senior official or manager 8.5 –0.05 –0.03 –0.03 –0.03 –0.02
— Non-agricultural self-employed 9.4 –0.07 –0.02 –0.03 –0.01 –0.01
— Agricultural worker 8.3 –0.04 –0.04 –0.03 –0.01 –0.01
— Salaried worker in the private sector 8.9 0.07 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00
— Salaried employee in the private sector 8.4 –0.04 –0.04 –0.04 –0.04 –0.03
— Salaried worker in the public sector 8.1 –0.02 –0.01 –0.01 0.00 0.005
— Salaried employee in the public sector 7.9 0.06 –0.03 0.00 –0.01 –0.01
— Unemployed 10.5 –0.07 0.07 0.03 –0.01 0.01
— Unemployed, excluding telecommunications 6.2 0.02 0.07 0.05 0.02 0.03
— Pensioner 9.8 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04
— Pensioner, excluding telecommunications 6.1 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04
— Other professional status 11.5 –0.02 0.08 0.03 0.03 0.02
Distribution of consumption expenditure
— Poor households 13.3 –0.06 0.18 0.11 0.11 0.12
— Poor houselolds, excluding telecommunications 8.8 0.03 0.19 0.15 0.13 0.14
— Not poor households 8.7 0.00 –0.02 –0.01 –0.01 –0.01
Quartiles of consumption expenditure
— 1st (poorest) 13.0 –0.07 0.16 0.10 0.10 0.11
— 1st (poorest), excluding telecommunications 8.5 0.02 0.17 0.13 0.12 0.13
— 2nd 10.7 –0.06 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.03
— 2nd, excluding telecommunications 6.5 0.00 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.05
— 3rd 9.3 –0.05 –0.01 –0.02 –0.01 –0.01
— 4th (richest) 7.5 0.05 –0.05 –0.03 –0.02 –0.03
Population groups
Percentage
share of
groups in
consumption 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
statistical index.19 In accordance with the definition
proposed by Cowell (1995), an inequality index is
a synoptic measure which illustrates the differ-
ences that can be observed between the incomes
of members of a given population. In other words,
every inequality index attempts to describe and
incorporate the features and range of a distribution
in a simple statistical measure. Nonetheless, an
“ideal” and generally accepted index for inequality
and poverty has yet to emerge. Each index corre-
sponds directly or indirectly to a different function
of societal welfare and is thus susceptible, to a
lesser or greater extent, to different types of trans-
fers. Since no social welfare function can ever be
universally accepted as best, no inequality index
can be universally accepted as superior to all oth-
ers. The form and features of the particular social
welfare function chosen cannot but determine and
lead to the construction of various inequality
indices which, since they are based on different
norms, will not necessarily produce the same
results. Consequently, every attempt to select a
specific inequality index incorporates subjective
judgements, whether directly or indirectly.20 Much
the same is true of poverty indices, although the
need to choose between numerous alternative def-
initions of the poverty threshold leads to additional
subjectivity problems.
Since there can be no general agreement as to the
choice of the most suitable index for measuring
and analysing the degree of inequality and poverty
in a distribution, we judged it best to employ six
inequality indices and three poverty indices in this
section. The inequality indices used are: the Gini
(G) coefficient, the variance of the logarithms (L),
the Theil index (T), the mean logarithmic deviation
(N, also known as the second Theil index) and the
Atkinson index (A) when the inequality aversion
factor is 0.5 and 2. These indices were selected on
the basis of the following criteria: firstly, they sat-
isfy all the requirements considered especially
desirable in the relevant literature (symmetry, inde-
pendence in terms of the mean, independence in
terms of population size, and the transfers princi-
ple). Secondly, they cover a wide range of different
forms of sensitivity in terms of changes in overall
inequality. Thus, the variance of the logarithms, the
mean logarithmic deviation and the Atkinson index
(Â=2) are relatively more sensitive to changes at
the lower end of the distribution, the Theil index
and the Atkinson index (Â=0.5) to changes at the
upper end, and the Gini coefficient to changes in
the vicinity of the median (Lambert, 1999, Cowell,
2000). Thus, a combination of these indices satis-
fies a significant range of preferences with regard to
the degree of response of an index to different
types of change. Thirdly, most of these indices have
features that render them of particular use when
examining the features of inequality.21 Appendix C
lists the relevant equations for estimation and sum-
marises the fundamental features, attributes, par-
ticular sensitivities and the possibility of decom-
posing the six inequality indices selected for use in
this paper.
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19 The literature dealing with the measurement of inequality is
exceptionally extensive. For particularly interesting surveys, see,
inter alia, Atkinson (1970), Sen (1992), Champernowne (1974),
Kakwani (1980), Kanbur (1984), Foster (1985), Jenkins (1991),
Cowell (1995) and Lambert (1999). For the application of these
techniques to Greek data, see Mitrakos (2003).
20 For an extensive treatment of this issue, see, inter alia, Mitrakos
(2003) and Papatheodorou (2004).
21 The indices L, T and N allow the structure of a population’s
inequality to be examined in detail and aggregate inequality to be
decomposed into inequality “between” population groups and
inequality “within” population groups. Moreover, the L index fol-
lows a well-known distribution and can be used to check the sta-
tistical significance of the results of the decomposition analysis.
The G index allows the contribution of particular sources of
income or consumption expenditures to total inequality to be
evaluated, while, finally, the widely used A index reveals the effect
of social preferences regarding inequality aversion.
Finally, the poverty rate (P) and the Foster index
(F), proposed by Foster, Greer and Thorebecke
(1984), are used as poverty indices. In contrast
with the poverty rate, the F index is sensitive both
to the degree of poverty (the poverty gap) and the
distribution of resources among the poor.22
Although it fails to conform with several of the
desired properties of an inequality index (symme-
try, independence in terms of the mean, indepen-
dence in terms of population size and the princi-
ple of transfers between the poor, epicentrality,
monotonicity), it is nonetheless used because it
provides a relatively clear indication of the extent
of poverty in a given population. These properties
are satisfied by F, which was calculated with val-
ues of ·=1 and ·=2 assigned to the “poverty
aversion” parameter in line with the relevant liter-
ature.23 Both P and F are “cumulatively disaggre-
gated”, meaning they measure the contribution of
any given population group to aggregate poverty.
The unit of analysis in this section is the popula-
tion member, while the distribution used is that of
equivalent consumption expenditure per capita
before and after the effect of the price changes.
Following Eurostat practice, the poverty threshold
is set at 60% of the median equivalent consump-
tion expenditure of all households.
Table 7 presents the values of the inequality and
poverty indices before and after the redistribu-
tional effect of the price mechanism. Ceteris
paribus, the manner in which individual prices
fluctuated during 1999-2004 led in itself to a dis-
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T a b l e  7
Estimations of inequality and poverty indices before and after the redistributional impact of the
price mechanism
Source: Calculations based on primary HBS data of 1998/99.
Indices of inequality
Gini coefficient (G) 30.97 31.18 0.68
Variance of logs (L) 31.40 31.86 1.46
Theil index (T) 16.72 16.94 1.32
Mean logarithmic deviation (N) 16.05 16.27 1.37
Atkinson index (A,  Â=0.5) 7.82 7.92 1.28
Atkinson index (A,  Â=2.0) 27.22 27.56 1.25
Indices of poverty
Poverty rate (P) 17.90 18.04 0.78
Foster index (F, ·=1) 4.36 4.44 1.83
Foster index (F, ·=2) 1.57 1.60 1.91
Before the impact 
of prices 
After the impact 
of prices Percentage changeInequality/poverty
22 The two poverty indices, P and F, are calculated on the basis
of the following relationships:
P =
q
—n and F = 
1—n ∑
n
i=1
 z– xiz 
·
where n is the size of the population, q the number of population
members with expenditure below the poverty threshold, z the
poverty threshold, · the poverty aversion parameter and xi a variable
that takes the value z if the expenditure of member i is above the
poverty threshold, and the value of the expenditure if the latter is
below the poverty threshold.
23 The equation given for the F index in the previous footnote
shows that, when ·=1, the index value will give us the poverty
gap, i.e. the average distance of all the poor from the poverty
threshold expressed as a percentage of this threshold. As the
value of · increases, index F will assign greater significance to the
relatively larger distances separating the poor from the poverty
threshold, in this way incorporating a relatively larger social aver-
sion to extreme cases of poverty.
cernible rise in the level of economic inequality in
Greece. The smallest difference in inequality —at
0.7%, roughly half that recorded by the other
indices, which are more sensitive at the extremi-
ties of the distribution— was recorded by the
Gini inequality index, which is most sensitive
around the median. In line with the definition of
poverty used above, 17.9% of Greece’s popula-
tion — some 1.9 million people— were living
below the poverty threshold before the effect of
the price mechanism. For the same distribution,
the poverty gap —i.e. the amount by which the
consumption of all the poor would have to be
increased to reach the level of the poverty thresh-
old, expressed as a percentage of the poverty
threshold (index F, ·=1)— was 4.4%. As
expected, the effect of the price mechanism on
relative poverty was similar to its effect on
inequality. The percentage of the poor and, more
importantly, both indices proposed by Foster et
al. (1984) increased after the price effect.
Moreover, the changes recorded are of greater
magnitude when the F index (·=1) is used
instead of the poverty rate, and still more so as
the parameter expressing social aversion to the
intensity of poverty and the poverty gap
increases. In absolute terms, the relatively small
increase in the poverty rate, of 0.14 percentage
point or 0.8%, equates to an increase in the num-
ber of poor well in excess of 15,000, coupled
with a 1.8% increase in the poverty gap.
Consequently, the price mechanism exerts by
itself a negative influence on the social indices of
inequality and poverty. Ceteris paribus, and in
accordance with the hypotheses underlying the
present study, there would seem to be extremely
strong evidence that the way in which individual
CPIs change, combined with the structure of con-
sumption expenditure of individual population
groups, has increased both inequality and
poverty by 0.7-1.9% over the last five years.
4. Summary and conclusions
This study aimed to highlight the indirect nature
of the redistributional function of the price change
mechanism in Greece between 1999 and 2004.
The study was grounded in the fact that different
socio-economic groups display widely different
consumer patterns, chiefly as a consequence of
the different welfare level they enjoy. Thus, hav-
ing access to the primary data of the most recent
HBS (conducted in 1998/99) —the data on which
the NSSG based its most recent revision of the
overall CPI— we took a new look at the con-
sumption patterns of particularly sensitive popu-
lation groups, such as the unemployed, pension-
ers, farmers and the poor. Combining the con-
sumption patterns of these groups with the way in
which the prices of the various goods and services
which their “household basket” comprised
changed, we were able to estimate the average
annual inflation faced by each population group
and to compare it with the official rate of inflation.
We then identified the groups of goods and ser-
vices that seemed to constitute a greater burden
on those population groups that faced greater
inflation in relation to average inflation, placing an
emphasis on public goods (those produced or
directly controlled by the state) and the role
played by the deregulation of the telecommunica-
tions market. Finally, we investigated the extent to
which the redistributional function of prices
affected various social indices, especially those
relating to inequality and poverty.
Before moving on to our conclusions, we would
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like to point out and clarify the rather restricted
hypotheses that underlie our analysis. First of all,
the analysis was based on the structure of con-
sumption expenditure as this was revealed by the
data in the most recent HBS. Although the chief
aim of the HBS was to collect the data required to
conduct a revision of the official overall CPI, the
validity of our findings presupposes that HBS data
have been reliably recorded, especially with rela-
tion to the population groups we used in our
study (based on educational, geographical, pro-
fessional, familial and other criteria). Moreover,
the HBS sample is made up of private households
and thus excludes by definition such small —but
in all likelihood vulnerable— social groups as the
homeless and individuals resident in institutions,
asylums, etc. It is also likely that immigrants as a
group, especially illegal immigrants, are seriously
under-represented in the HBS sample; given the
number of such immigrants now resident in
Greece, this is a serious omission. Finally, atten-
tion should also be drawn to another two impor-
tant hypotheses on which our study rests. Firstly,
that every household pays the same prices for the
goods it consumes. Although the study utilises
different CPIs calculated by the NSSG for some
200 sub-categories of goods and services, it is
obvious that this hypothesis ignores both the dif-
ferent pricing policies adopted by businesses
(supermarkets, retailers, etc.) for different cus-
tomers and the different levels of information and
access of households to different markets or
points of sale. The second hypothesis assumes
that household consumption patterns do not
change during the period under examination, i.e.
that consumers do not adapt their consumption
habits so as to take into account changes in the
relative prices of goods and services. This is a
grave limitation, as it essentially implies that all
goods are fully complementary among them (or,
in economic theory terms, that they display
Leontief indifference curves). Moreover, it implies
that, despite changes in the relative prices of the
goods households consume, their real incomes
remain unchanged over time.
Having taken the above observations into
account, the analysis gave rise to several interest-
ing conclusions. Firstly, ceteris paribus, the price
mechanism —or the way in which the prices of
individual goods and services change in combina-
tion with the different consumption patterns of
different population groups— itself exerts a signif-
icant redistributional impact, chiefly at the
expense of the economically weaker and vulnera-
ble social groups, such as people with a relatively
low educational level, pensioners, the unem-
ployed and the poorer sections of the population.
The aforementioned groups faced an annual aver-
age inflation considerably above the official over-
all rate of inflation almost throughout the period
of the study. This can well be interpreted as stem-
ming from the different structure of their con-
sumption expenditure, and mostly from the spe-
cial importance therein of food, housing and alco-
holic beverages/tobacco. That said, it should be
noted that between April and December 2004 the
drastic reduction in vegetable prices (from –10%
in April to –28% in July on an annual basis) saw
the inflation faced by the economically weaker
population groups fall to levels below those faced
by the population as a whole.
With reference to the previous conclusion, it
should be noted that the inflation faced by other
large population groups during the period under
examination —chiefly workers, including salaried
employees, workers in the secondary and the ter-
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tiary sector etc.— does not seem to have been
significantly different from the official overall
inflation. We can draw a similar conclusion for the
household groups formed along geographical
lines (urban areas, rural areas etc).
The gentler inflation experienced by goods and
services whose prices are “controlled” by the state
resulted in their having a relatively limited effect
on overall inflation. The significant reduction in the
prices of telecommunications services following
the deregulation of the market in question played
a key role in the above. However, the contribution
of the group of “controlled” goods to the inflation
faced by the economically weaker groups was usu-
ally positive, in the sense that it pushed their infla-
tion slightly above the average for the population
as a whole. In contrast, certain economically more
powerful population groups —employers in the
main, but also, to a lesser degree, the self-
employed— enjoyed a slightly negative contribu-
tion to their inflation from the prices of “state-con-
trolled” goods and services. It should also be
noted that the effect of this sub-index on the infla-
tion faced by households with a salaried head —
and, indeed, on most other population groups—
has yet to be studied. Consequently, although
beneficial in terms of overall inflation, economic
policy, as this was pursued more through the
deregulation of the telecommunications market
rather than through the fixing or controlling of
prices for certain goods and services, would not
seem to have favoured (not that it set out to) the
economically weaker and socially vulnerable pop-
ulation groups above others.
The above observations have made it clear that the
way in which relative prices change, combined
with the structure of consumption expenditure of
individual population groups, may well function to
the detriment of socially sensitive groups such as
the poor, pensioners, the unemployed, the eco-
nomically weaker and, generally speaking, individ-
uals facing a relatively high risk of poverty and
insecurity. Moreover, the study also indicates that
the price mechanism exerts in itself a negative
effect on various social indices. Ceteris paribus and
based on the hypotheses underlying our analysis,
the redistributional impact of prices over the last
five years would indeed seem to have slightly
increased the poverty rate, as well as to have sig-
nificantly worsened —by 0.7% to 1.9%— both the
inequality index and the poverty gap. Therefore,
the price mechanism provides in itself economic
and social policy makers with an additional further
reason for intervening in support of vulnerable
social groups.
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Appendix A
Detailed tables on the contribution of the prices of “food”, “beverages-tobacco” and “housing” to the
additional inflation faced by individual population groups
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T a b l e  ∞1
Contribution of the different rate of change in "Food & non-alcoholic beverages" prices to the
difference between overall inflation and that faced by individual population groups
(Percentage points)
Source: Calculations based on primary HBS data of 1998/99 and on the CPI (NSSG).
Educational level of household head
— University graduate 13.8 –0.08 –0.26 –0.24 –0.20 –0.05
— Upper secondary education completed 17.1 –0.02 –0.07 –0.08 –0.06 –0.02
— Lower secondary education completed 19.0 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.00
— Primary education completed 22.3 0.06 0.21 0.19 0.16 0.05
— Primary education not completed 26.4 0.14 0.40 0.45 0.36 0.09
Region of residence
— Urban areas 17.2 –0.01 –0.07 –0.06 –0.06 –0.03
— Semi-urban areas 20.9 0.03 0.14 0.12 0.11 0.04
— Rural areas 23.0 0.04 0.26 0.18 0.17 0.10
Status in employment
— Employee 16.7 –0.03 –0.09 –0.11 –0.09 0.00
— Self-employed 18.7 –0.01 0.02 –0.03 –0.02 0.04
— Employer 15.0 –0.07 –0.18 –0.18 –0.14 –0.05
Sector of activity
— Primary sector 22.8 0.03 0.27 0.14 0.13 0.14
— Secondary sector 18.1 –0.01 –0.01 –0.05 –0.04 0.02
— Tertiary sector 15.7 –0.05 –0.15 –0.16 –0.13 –0.02
Occupational status
— Non-agricultural employer 14.6 –0.08 –0.20 –0.20 –0.15 –0.06
— Senior official or manager 14.2 –0.08 –0.23 –0.22 –0.19 –0.05
— Non-agricultural self-employed 19.5 0.01 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.05
— Agricultural worker 22.7 0.03 0.26 0.13 0.13 0.14
— Salaried worker in the private sector 20.2 0.00 0.03 0.00 –0.01 0.04
— Salaried employee in the private sector 14.8 –0.06 –0.19 –0.19 –0.16 –0.04
— Salaried worker in the public sector 18.9 0.01 0.12 0.04 0.04 0.04
— Salaried employee in the public sector 14.9 –0.07 –0.20 –0.21 –0.17 –0.01
— Unemployed 20.8 0.04 0.17 0.09 0.08 0.03
— Pensioner 23.0 0.10 0.22 0.29 0.24 –0.02
— Other professional status 19.4 0.03 0.03 0.07 0.04 0.01
Distribution of consumption expenditure
— Poor households 33.5 0.25 0.82 0.82 0.70 0.18
— Not poor households 17.6 –0.02 –0.05 –0.05 –0.05 –0.01
Quartiles of consumption expenditure
— 1st (poorest) 32.7 0.25 0.78 0.76 0.66 0.15
— 2nd 25.4 0.13 0.38 0.38 0.33 0.01
— 3rd 20.2 0.03 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.01
— 4th (richest) 12.7 –0.11 –0.32 –0.32 –0.28 –0.04
Percentage
share of
groups in
consumption 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004Population groups
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T a b l e  ∞2
Contribution of the different rate of change in "Alcoholic beverages & tobacco" prices to the
difference between overall inflation and that faced by individual population groups
(Percentage points)
Source: Calculations based on primary HBS data of 1998/99 and on the CPI (NSSG).
Educational level of household head
— University graduate 2.4 –0.04 –0.13 –0.12 –0.07 –0.08
— Upper secondary education completed 3.8 0.00 –0.01 –0.01 –0.01 –0.01
— Lower secondary education completed 4.9 0.03 0.08 0.08 0.04 0.05
— Primary education completed 5.0 0.03 0.09 0.08 0.05 0.05
— Primary education not completed 4.7 0.02 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.04
Region of residence
— Urban areas 3.7 –0.01 –0.02 –0.02 –0.01 –0.01
— Semi-urban areas 4.1 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
— Rural areas 4.9 0.03 0.08 0.07 0.04 0.05
Status in employment
— Employee 4.0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
— Self-employed 5.0 0.03 0.09 0.08 0.05 0.05
— Employer 3.1 –0.02 –0.06 –0.06 –0.03 –0.04
Sector of activity
— Primary sector 5.8 0.05 0.16 0.15 0.08 0.09
— Secondary sector 4.6 0.02 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.04
— Tertiary sector 3.6 –0.01 –0.02 –0.02 –0.01 –0.01
Occupational status
— Non-agricultural employer 3.0 –0.02 –0.07 –0.06 –0.04 –0.04
— Senior official or manager 3.4 –0.01 –0.03 –0.03 –0.02 –0.02
— Non-agricultural self-employed 5.6 0.05 0.14 0.13 0.07 0.08
— Agricultural worker 5.8 0.05 0.15 0.14 0.08 0.09
— Salaried worker in the private sector 5.4 0.04 0.12 0.11 0.06 0.07
— Salaried employee in the private sector 3.6 –0.01 –0.03 –0.03 –0.01 –0.02
— Salaried worker in the public sector 5.4 0.04 0.11 0.11 0.06 0.07
— Salaried employee in the public sector 2.8 –0.03 –0.09 –0.09 –0.05 –0.05
— Unemployed 6.1 0.06 0.18 0.17 0.09 0.11
— Pensioner 3.4 –0.02 –0.05 –0.05 –0.02 –0.03
— Other professional status 3.1 –0.02 –0.06 –0.06 –0.03 –0.04
Distribution of consumption expenditure
— Poor households 5.8 0.06 0.16 0.15 0.09 0.10
— Not poor households 3.8 0.00 –0.01 –0.01 –0.01 –0.01
Quartiles of consumption expenditure
— 1st (poorest) 6.1 0.06 0.18 0.17 0.10 0.11
— 2nd 5.4 0.04 0.12 0.11 0.07 0.07
— 3rd 4.3 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.02
— 4th (richest) 2.7 –0.03 –0.09 –0.09 –0.05 –0.06
Percentage
share of
groups in
consumption 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004Population groups
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T a b l e  ∞3
Contribution of the different rate of change in "Housing" prices to the difference between overall
inflation and that faced by individual population groups
(Percentage points)
Source: Calculations based on primary HBS data of 1998/99 and on the CPI (NSSG).
Educational level of household head
— University graduate 10.8 –0.09 –0.02 –0.02 –0.04 –0.04
— Upper secondary education completed 11.9 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02
— Lower secondary education completed 12.4 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04
— Primary education completed 11.8 0.07 –0.01 –0.02 0.00 0.00
— Primary education not completed 13.6 0.27 0.03 0.02 0.06 0.07
Region of residence
— Urban areas 12.2 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03
— Semi-urban areas 11.6 0.21 –0.06 –0.05 –0.02 0.00
— Rural areas 9.6 –0.02 –0.08 –0.12 –0.12 –0.13
Status in employment
— Employee 12.0 –0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03
— Self-employed 10.6 –0.03 –0.04 –0.05 –0.05 –0.06
— Employer 10.3 –0.07 –0.05 –0.05 –0.06 –0.06
Sector of activity
— Primary sector 9.4 –0.04 –0.07 –0.11 –0.11 –0.13
— Secondary sector 12.0 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02
— Tertiary sector 11.4 –0.04 0.00 0.00 –0.01 0.00
Occupational status
— Non-agricultural employer 10.8 –0.06 –0.03 –0.03 –0.04 –0.04
— Senior official or manager 10.4 –0.06 –0.04 –0.04 –0.05 –0.05
— Non-agricultural self-employed 11.2 0.00 –0.02 –0.02 –0.02 –0.02
— Agricultural worker 9.4 –0.05 –0.07 –0.11 –0.11 –0.13
— Salaried worker in the private sector 13.5 –0.09 0.01 0.01 –0.01 –0.02
— Salaried employee in the private sector 12.2 –0.03 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.04
— Salaried worker in the public sector 11.1 0.15 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.09
— Salaried employee in the public sector 10.8 –0.08 –0.03 –0.03 –0.05 –0.04
— Unemployed 14.8 0.16 0.13 0.14 0.17 0.16
— Pensioner 11.7 0.10 –0.02 –0.04 –0.01 –0.01
— Other professional status 15.6 0.22 0.12 0.14 0.18 0.18
Distribution of consumption expenditure
— Poor households 19.1 0.55 0.26 0.28 0.37 0.37
— Not poor households 11.3 –0.02 –0.02 –0.02 –0.02 –0.02
Quartiles of consumption expenditure
— 1st (poorest) 18.2 0.55 0.21 0.24 0.33 0.33
— 2nd 15.3 0.33 0.09 0.12 0.17 0.18
— 3rd 12.1 0.07 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02
— 4th (richest) 9.2 –0.21 –0.07 –0.09 –0.12 –0.13
Percentage
share of
groups in
consumption 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004Population groups
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As noted above, it is chiefly the importance each group
of households ascribes to different categories of
goods, combined with the way in which the relative
prices of the individual goods change over time, that
determines a different (average weighted) inflation for
each group. In other words, it is their consumption
pattern that determines the average price of each pop-
ulation group’s basket of goods over time. With this in
mind, we can evaluate theoretical consumption pat-
terns that lead either to the greatest or the smallest
inflation and then see which population groups’ bas-
kets of goods correlate with these patterns to a greater
or lesser extent.
We shall therefore evaluate two consumption patterns
(two baskets of goods and services), the first leading to
the greatest possible inflation (on the basis of the given
changes in the individual CPIs over time) and the sec-
ond to the smallest one. We now compare these two
theoretical consumption patterns with those of individ-
ual population groups. The greater the degree of corre-
lation between the “greatest inflation” theoretical pat-
tern and the actual consumption pattern of a particular
group (as derived from HBS data), the greater the pos-
sibility of the population group in question facing above
average inflation during the period in question, and
vice-versa.
The two theoretical patterns are evaluated using the
mathematical solution to a problem whereby the total
value (shares times prices) of two baskets of goods
must be maximised (or minimised). The pattern defines
groups of goods and services (—wit) for each year which,
on the basis of individual indices ( Iit) observed in the
market, result in the largest average weighted price
increase:
max ∑
i
Ii t × 
—wit with limitations:
1. ∑
i
—wit = 100
2. —wit ≥ than (to) the lower limit
3. —wit ≤ than (to) the upper limit
Groups of goods and services (∼wit) with the smallest
average weighted price increase were evaluated in the
same way:
min ∑
i
Ii t × 
∼wit with limitations:
1. ∑
i
∼wit = 100
2. ∼wit ≥ than (to) the lower limit
3. ∼wit ≤ than (to) the upper limit
In both the above problems, we set variance limits for the
groups to mirror those that emerge from the HBS, our
rationale being that there are minimum and maximum
“acceptable” limits within which every population group
operates (e.g. food —but also expenditure on health, edu-
cation, etc.— cannot account for 0% of a total basket of
goods). Failure to set upper and lower limits would result
in greater divergence, though this would be of purely the-
oretical significance. Consequently, for all 45 different
population groups, upper and lower expenditure limits
were chosen for every sub-index (e.g. expenditure on food
accounted for 12.7% of the expenditure on the basket of
goods for richer households, while very poor households
spend one third —33.5%— of their total income on these
same goods). In the pattern we used the average annual
prices of the goods for 2000-2004 and calculated two dif-
ferent theoretical consumption patterns per year.
Tables B1a and B1b present the theoretical consump-
tion patterns as these were estimated above. The theo-
retical consumption pattern leading to the maximum
possible inflation spends the upper limit on those
goods whose prices increased more than those of other
sub-indices until the basket of goods is complete. The
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Food & non-alcoholic beverages 12.72 33.51 33.51 33.51 12.72
Alcoholic beverages & tobacco 2.30 6.10 6.10 2.22 6.10
Clothing and footwear 5.31 5.31 5.31 5.31 11.81
Housing 19.05 9.16 9.16 16.50 19.05
Consumer durables 4.84 4.84 4.84 4.84 4.84
Health 10.60 5.21 10.60 5.21 10.60
Transport 18.68 5.91 5.91 5.91 5.91
Communications 3.30 3.30 3.30 3.30 3.30
Recreation and culture 2.21 2.77 2.21 2.21 4.67
Education 5.14 5.14 3.20 5.14 5.14
Hotels, cafés & restaurants 11.47 11.47 11.47 11.47 11.47
Miscellaneous goods & services 4.38 7.28 4.38 4.38 4.38
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
T a b l e  µ1a
Theoretical consumption pattern leading to maximum inflation
(Percentage points)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004Main groups of goods and services
Source: Calculations based on primary HBS data of 1998/99 and on the CPI (NSSG).
Food & non-alcoholic beverages 33.51 12.72 12.72 12.72 33.51
Alcoholic beverages & tobacco 2.22 2.22 2.22 6.10 2.22
Clothing and footwear 7.99 8.50 9.02 11.81 5.31
Housing 9.16 19.05 19.05 9.16 9.16
Consumer durables 10.34 10.34 10.34 10.34 10.34
Health 5.21 10.60 5.21 5.53 5.21
Transport 5.91 18.68 18.68 18.68 13.46
Communications 4.67 4.67 4.67 4.67 4.67
Recreation and culture 7.08 2.21 7.08 7.08 2.21
Education 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28
Hotels, cafés & restaurants 6.36 6.36 6.36 6.36 6.36
Miscellaneous goods & services 7.28 4.38 4.38 7.28 7.28
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
T a b l e  µ1b
Theoretical consumption pattern leading to minimum inflation
(Percentage points)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004Main groups of goods and services
Source: Calculations based on primary HBS data of 1998/99 and on the CPI (NSSG).
consumption pattern leading to the smallest inflation
works on the opposite principle: expenditure on food
and hotel/restaurant services is equal to the upper limit
set (for 2001-2003), but the other sub-indices were
either present in smaller shares or at their lower limit.
These data reveal that food would seem to contribute
to higher inflation during 2001-03 and to play a less
important role in 2000 and 2004, while exactly the
opposite is true of housing. Expenditure on consumer
durables, communication and hotels/restaurants con-
tributes to the corresponding baskets of goods without
any changes, since the prices of these groups changed
uniformly throughout the period.
Table B2 estimates the average weighted price increase
(inflation) emerging from each of the two extreme the-
oretical consumption patterns as well as the range of
divergence that can be created in inflation as a result of
these patterns. The range of divergence, except for
2003, is greater than one percentage point. Given that
this divergence is affected by the level of inflation, it is
divided by the real mean annual CPI to render it com-
parable over time. This ratio provides a more accurate
image of the possible inflation divergence over time.
According to this index, the maximum possible diver-
gence in 2000 was in the region of 50% of inflation dur-
ing that period. This means that the divergence bet-
ween two population groups could theoretically reach
half that of overall inflation. In 2001, 2002 and 2003,
this divergence was limited to 34%, 37% and 24%,
respectively. Finally, in 2004, the divergence rose again
to 43% of overall inflation.
As we noted above, the theoretical consumption pat-
terns for both 2000 and 2004 were considerably differ-
ent from those for 2001-2003. This leads us to conclude
that no given population group was closer to either the
maximum or the minimum possible inflation for the
entire period, but only for limited periods of time.
Tables B3a and B3b correlate the theoretical consump-
tion pattern to the real consumption patterns of individ-
ual population groups. The first table correlates the real
patterns with the “maximum inflation” pattern, and the
second with the “minimum inflation”one. The data
reveal that poor households, households whose head
was unemployed, or households whose head had not
completed primary education all faced a level of infla-
tion during 2001-2003 that was closer to the maximum
possible inflation. In contrast, in both 2000 and 2004,
they faced inflation closer to the minimum possible
value. This is mainly due to the significantly smaller
increase in the prices of food in relation to the average
increase of the overall CPI in these years. Households
whose head was a university graduate, senior official,
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a. Maximum inflation 3.40 4.10 4.32 3.94 3.34
b. Minimum inflation 2.07 2.93 2.97 3.09 2.09
c. Divergence (percentage points) 1.33 1.16 1.36 0.85 1.25
d. Overall inflation 2.68 3.44 3.63 3.53 2.90
Ratio (c)/(d) 0.50 0.34 0.37 0.24 0.43
T a b l e  µ2
Degree of inflation divergence on the basis of the two theoretical patterns
(Percentages)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Source: Calculations based on primary HBS data of 1998/99 and on the CPI (NSSG).
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T a b l e  B3a
Degree of correlation between the actual consumption patterns of individual population groups and
the theoretical consumption pattern leading to maximum inflation
Source: Calculations based on primary HBS data of 1998/99 and on the CPI (NSSG).
Educational level of household head
— University graduate 0.76 0.52 0.53 0.60 0.58
— Upper secondary education completed 0.76 0.72 0.72 0.79 0.68
— Lower secondary education completed 0.73 0.79 0.81 0.85 0.72
— Primary education completed 0.66 0.86 0.88 0.89 0.66
— Primary education not completed 0.54 0.89 0.93 0.92 0.66
Region of residence
— Urban areas 0.76 0.73 0.75 0.81 0.70
— Semi-urban areas 0.69 0.81 0.81 0.84 0.64
— Rural areas 0.60 0.87 0.88 0.87 0.59
Occupational status
— Legislators, senior officials and managers 0.70 0.58 0.59 0.63 0.58
— Professionals 0.76 0.40 0.39 0.50 0.51
— Technicians and associate professionals 0.79 0.63 0.61 0.71 0.67
— Clerks 0.77 0.63 0.63 0.71 0.66
— Service workers and shop and market sales workers 0.72 0.74 0.73 0.82 0.75
— Skilled agricultural and fishery workers 0.59 0.86 0.86 0.85 0.56
— Craft and related trades workers 0.74 0.80 0.81 0.85 0.69
Status in employment
— Employee 0.76 0.70 0.70 0.78 0.68
— Self-employed 0.72 0.77 0.77 0.79 0.62
— Employer 0.73 0.60 0.59 0.66 0.61
Sector of activity
— Primary sector 0.59 0.86 0.86 0.85 0.56
— Secondary sector 0.77 0.74 0.75 0.80 0.68
— Tertiary sector 0.76 0.66 0.66 0.73 0.66
Occupational status
— Non-agricultural employer 0.73 0.62 0.61 0.69 0.66
— Senior official or manager 0.82 0.48 0.49 0.54 0.54
— Non-agricultural self-employed 0.69 0.82 0.81 0.84 0.65
— Agricultural worker 0.60 0.86 0.86 0.85 0.57
— Salaried worker in the private sector 0.72 0.75 0.75 0.79 0.64
— Salaried employee in the private sector 0.73 0.62 0.60 0.70 0.70
— Salaried worker in the public sector 0.74 0.80 0.80 0.86 0.71
— Salaried employee in the public sector 0.74 0.58 0.57 0.65 0.56
— Unemployed 0.67 0.83 0.87 0.91 0.76
— Pensioner 0.63 0.85 0.89 0.89 0.64
— Other professional status 0.69 0.75 0.79 0.86 0.76
Distribution of consumption expenditure
— Poor households 0.55 0.91 0.91 0.96 0.64
— Not poor households 0.74 0.73 0.75 0.79 0.67
Quartiles of consumption expenditure
— 1st (poorest) 0.52 0.92 0.92 0.97 0.63
— 2nd 0.58 0.91 0.90 0.96 0.69
— 3rd 0.64 0.85 0.85 0.90 0.69
— 4th (richest) 0.74 0.40 0.43 0.45 0.50
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004Population groups
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T a b l e  B3b
Degree of correlation between the actual consumption patterns of individual population groups and
the theoretical consumption pattern leading to minimum inflation
Source: Calculations based on primary HBS data of 1998/99 and on the CPI (NSSG).
Educational level of household head
— University graduate 0.61 0.83 0.85 0.85 0.64
— Upper secondary education completed 0.76 0.80 0.81 0.80 0.78
— Lower secondary education completed 0.82 0.78 0.76 0.74 0.83
— Primary education completed 0.87 0.70 0.68 0.69 0.89
— Primary education not completed 0.91 0.60 0.54 0.47 0.91
Region of residence
— Urban areas 0.78 0.81 0.81 0.77 0.80
— Semi-urban areas 0.84 0.74 0.74 0.76 0.86
— Rural areas 0.88 0.64 0.62 0.69 0.89
Occupational status
— Legislators, senior officials and managers 0.64 0.74 0.76 0.83 0.65
— Professionals 0.49 0.81 0.88 0.87 0.53
— Technicians and associate professionals 0.64 0.78 0.81 0.80 0.67
— Clerks 0.68 0.80 0.83 0.82 0.70
— Service workers and shop and market sales workers 0.75 0.74 0.77 0.72 0.76
— Skilled agricultural and fishery workers 0.86 0.63 0.62 0.72 0.88
— Craft and related trades workers 0.81 0.76 0.75 0.75 0.83
Status in employment
— Employee 0.75 0.80 0.82 0.81 0.77
— Self-employed 0.77 0.75 0.75 0.80 0.80
— Employer 0.63 0.76 0.78 0.82 0.66
Sector of activity
— Primary sector 0.86 0.63 0.63 0.72 0.88
— Secondary sector 0.76 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.79
— Tertiary sector 0.70 0.79 0.82 0.82 0.72
Occupational status
— Non-agricultural employer 0.65 0.75 0.77 0.78 0.66
— Senior official or manager 0.50 0.82 0.83 0.88 0.56
— Non-agricultural self-employed 0.81 0.71 0.72 0.75 0.83
— Agricultural worker 0.86 0.63 0.63 0.73 0.87
— Salaried worker in the private sector 0.76 0.75 0.75 0.80 0.79
— Salaried employee in the private sector 0.67 0.78 0.82 0.80 0.68
— Salaried worker in the public sector 0.81 0.78 0.77 0.74 0.83
— Salaried employee in the public sector 0.65 0.79 0.84 0.85 0.69
— Unemployed 0.85 0.72 0.67 0.56 0.85
— Pensioner 0.90 0.70 0.64 0.62 0.91
— Other professional status 0.83 0.78 0.73 0.57 0.82
Distribution of consumption expenditure
— Poor households 0.89 0.55 0.54 0.40 0.90
— Not poor households 0.78 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.80
Quartiles of consumption expenditure
— 1st (poorest) 0.90 0.52 0.51 0.38 0.90
— 2nd 0.91 0.60 0.61 0.51 0.90
— 3rd 0.88 0.68 0.69 0.67 0.88
— 4th (richest) 0.48 0.81 0.79 0.88 0.52
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004Population groups
academic or professional, or was a member of a higher
consumption group displayed exactly the opposite.
These households faced lower inflation during 2001-
2003 and greater inflation in 2000 and 2004.
Finally, the different changes in the prices of individual
sub-indices result in a different population group being
burdened more or less each time. In periods when food
prices increase significantly in relation to other goods,
it is vulnerable social groups that are hardest hit, since
food accounts for a larger part of their consumption
pattern. Consequently, these groups face inflation that
can be up to 50% greater than that faced by other
groups, which spend less on food.
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Appendix C
Properties, value limits and relative sensitivity of inequality indices
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1. Introduction
1.1 Quality in work: More jobs through better
jobs
Within Europe the aim of promoting the quality of
available work, along with that of creating full
employment, has recently risen to the top of the
political agenda. “Previously, during periods of
low employment rates, the emphasis was on job
creation. Quantity took precedence over the qual-
ity —the nature and content— of the jobs cre-
ated” (Eurofound, 2002, p. 3). Following, how-
ever, the Conclusions of the Extraordinary European
Council in Lisbon (2000), which were subse-
quently reaffirmed by the Social Policy Agenda
approved by the Council of Nice (2000), Member
States adopted the goal of improving quality in
work as a complementary and mutually support-
ive objective to those of full employment and
social cohesion. Quality promotion was therefore
firmly established as one of the three overarching
objectives of the EU’s Employment Guidelines for
the period 2003-2005.
Indeed, this renewed focus on job quality was
deemed necessary for confronting the profound
challenges resulting from Europe’s transition to a
competitive and knowledge-based economy. In the
light of the increased globalisation of economic
activity, rapid technological, social and demographic
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change, the ongoing restructuring of workplace
organisation, as well as the need to combat
Europe’s persistent long-term unemployment
problem, new and flexible employment patterns
were deployed as a means of providing employers
with adequate leeway to respond to ever-changing
circumstances. Sabethai (2000), for example, doc-
uments the widespread use of such flexible forms
of work (e.g. shifts, overtime, part-time employ-
ment, contracts of temporary duration, seasonal
employment etc.) in Greece in the late 1990s, as
well as numerous legislative measures concerning
the utilisation of labour that sought to adapt
employment and production needs of Greek enter-
prises to changes in demand. Nonetheless, while
the shift towards atypical forms of employment
may have favoured job creation and the adjust-
ment of the economy to cyclical fluctuations, con-
cerns were expressed regarding the potential
downsides in terms of job quality, such as the
impact on job security, work-life balance, possibil-
ities of further training and career prospects, health
and safety at work etc. It was within this context
that some commentators claimed that quantity-
quality trade-offs exist, and that quality improve-
ments can have negative effects, leading to either
increases in labour costs or obstacles to hiring and
firing and/or wage flexibility (European Commis-
sion, 2002, p. 81).
Concerns about job quality also came to the fore
following the strong evidence of a close link
between quality in work, on the one hand, and
labour market segmentation and social exclusion,
on the other. The European Commission (2001a)
was the first to argue that those employed in jobs
of relatively poor quality, which combine low skills
with temporary or precarious work and lack of
career development opportunities, are at much
higher risk of job loss or of dropping out of the
labour force. Moreover, “previous experience of
unemployment and labour market exclusion, in
turn, lowers the probability of returning to
employment in general and into high quality
employment in particular, thus leading to substan-
tial risk of vicious circles of low-quality/low-pro-
ductivity employment, and unemployment, inac-
tivity and social exclusion” (European Commis-
sion, 2002). Indeed, the European Commission
(2003a, p. 138) reports for Greece that between
1995 and 2000 it was among the EU countries
with the least favourable career opportunities for
people in low-quality employment, with above EU-
average transition rates into unemployment, and
below EU-average transition into high quality
employment. Also striking is the persistence of the
no job/low quality trap in Greece, with more than
20% of unemployed Greeks in 1999 moving into
low-quality employment in 2000, and almost 20%
in inactivity. Little above 5% moved into high-qual-
ity jobs (ibid., 2003a, p. 138).
The fear of a vicious cycle between low-quality
jobs and non-employment was further exacer-
bated by the possibility that the trend of increas-
ing employment in the services sector would lead
to a proliferation of dead-end jobs of bad quality.
For Greece, in particular, which has experienced
rapid growth of the services sector over the past
twenty years, it has been argued that the demand
for high profitability by Greek firms, in the face of
slow growth of productivity and high unemploy-
ment, has enabled the propagation of low-wage/
bad jobs in the Greek economy (Ioakimoglou and
Soumeli, 2002).
The focus of the EU on job quality was also stim-
ulated by the acknowledgement that the full
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potential of job creation cannot be achieved if the
jobs on offer are unattractive in terms of quality of
work, consequently proving difficult to fill (Euro-
found, 2001, p. 4). This problem has recently
become starker in European labour markets, as
marked improvements in the quality of the
European labour supply have been met by an
increasing demand for high-quality jobs, charac-
terised by reasonable pay, high skill requirements,
relative job security, work-life balance, access to
training and possibilities for career advancement
(European Commission, 2001b, p. 9). An acute
example of this phenomenon can be found in
Greece, where a common complaint on behalf of
Greek employers is that the large stock of young
educated Greek workers are unwilling to take up
jobs that are perceived by them as of bad quality.
These jobs, instead, are regarded as suitable for
low-skilled economic immigrants only.
Finally, placing greater emphasis on job quality
was also dictated by the evidence that better qual-
ity in work results in faster employment growth
and higher productivity (European Commission,
2003b, pp. 6-8). Specifically, better jobs are
expected to be more attractive to non-partici-
pants, especially women. Safer jobs that offer
access to training are also more likely to result in
productivity gains, by reducing turnover and
absenteeism and by leading to the production of
better goods and services, respectively. At the
same time employees are likely to reciprocate to
their employer’s gift-exchange offer of better
working conditions by exerting greater effort
(much in the spirit of the “reciprocity” arguments
put forward by Fehr and Falk, 2002). Further-
more, high-quality employment is also believed to
contribute to the positive mental and psychical
well-being of employees, thus serving as a pre-
condition for a rich, satisfying and productive life
(Eurofound, 2001, p. 7).
It is not least for these reasons that European
decision-makers in the Barcelona European
Council (2002) sought for more and better jobs,
stressing that the objective of creating better jobs
complements and reinforces that of creating more
jobs. Quality promotion was hence acknowl-
edged as a cornerstone for modernising Europe’s
social model, as a means of ensuring the dynamic
positive complementarity between flexible and
competitive economic policies, on the one hand,
and social cohesion, achieved through strong and
supportive social systems, on the other. Fostering
more jobs through better jobs thus became a key
element for achieving the EU’s strategic goal, pro-
claimed in the Lisbon 2000 Summit, “to become
the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-
based economy in the world, capable of sustain-
able economic growth with more and better jobs
and greater social cohesion”.
1.2 Low-paid workers and the two-tier labour market
Along with the increased emphasis on work qual-
ity, the strong rise in earnings inequality in some
countries since the late 1980s also raised concerns
that this could result in a growing proportion of
the workforce falling into the category of the
“working poor”. In fact, within the EU there was
an attempt to link the declining relative (and some-
times real) position of low-paid workers with the
perceived low quality of work, with the
Commission arguing that such low-paid jobs suf-
fer a “double penalty” as they are also of low qual-
ity (Jones and Sloane, 2004, p. 2). In other words,
it was asserted that in the context of skill-biased
technological change, growing international trade
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with low-wage countries and deregulation of the
traditional institutional framework that supported
the wages of low-skilled workers (trade unions,
centralised collective bargaining, minimum wages
etc.), a two-tier labour market was fostered in
Europe. In this dual market “the first tier is made
up of jobs subject to decent pay, relative job secu-
rity and career prospects, involving generally good
working conditions. The second tier comprises not
only the unemployed and discouraged workers,
but also those employed in jobs of low quality
which have low pay, precarious employment rela-
tionships or lack of further education and career
development prospects” (European Commission,
2001a, p. 79). In the light of this alleged segmen-
tation, one report put forward the claim that “poli-
cies towards low-wage jobs should centre on their
quality at least as importantly as on the level of
pay which they provide” (Salverda et. al., cited in
Leontaridi and Sloane, 2004, p. 1).
Of course, the theoretical framework underlying
the EU’s rationale of low wage jobs also being of
low quality is the dual labour market hypothesis.
According to this theory, the lack of perfect mobil-
ity, and subsequent lack of competition, between
distinct labour markets fosters the development
of “good” and “bad” jobs, whereby the former
enjoy not only better working conditions than the
latter, but also higher pay. In this case significant
differences in the utility derived from work among
otherwise identical individuals arise, with those in
superior jobs enjoying greater job satisfaction.
Such differences cannot be sustained, however, in
markets that are characterised by a perfect flow of
information and lack of barriers to mobility. For in
that case Adam Smith’s (1776) paradigm of com-
pensating wage differentials would prevail.
According to Smith, employers offering jobs char-
acterised by many disamenities would be expected
in the long run to compensate for these with
higher pay, all other things equal, in order to
recruit and retain their workers. Thus, according
to the theory of compensating (or equalising) dif-
ferences, in perfectly competitive labour markers
one expects to observe low-paid jobs with rela-
tively good working conditions, and jobs with bad
working conditions paying high wages. Two oth-
erwise similar individuals, who have the same
demographic, human-capital and job characteris-
tics, but who work in different tiers (i.e. one as
low-paid and the other as high-paid), should
therefore enjoy similar utility from their jobs.
This study therefore attempts, firstly, to detect
whether or not significant differences in perceived
job quality exist among high- and low-paid work-
ers in Greece, and, secondly, to uncover the dif-
ferential effect that certain socio-economic vari-
ables exert on the utility from high- or low-paid
work, respectively. By understanding if (and how)
the determinants of job satisfaction between low-
paid and high-paid workers differ, appropriate pol-
icy responses could then be developed to address
the difference in quality between “good” and
“bad” jobs. To do so we follow the practice of an
ever-increasing number of economists who use
self-reported job satisfaction data to proxy the
overall quality of work as perceived by the individ-
ual worker. This is the approach of Leontaridi and
Sloane (2001), who have shown with British data
that low-paid workers in the UK report greater job
satisfaction than their higher paid counterparts,
presumably because the former obtain compensa-
tion in the form of non-pecuniary benefits. Jones
and Sloane (2004) have also recently illustrated
that job satisfaction in the low-wage economy of
Wales is not lower than in the rest of the UK. In a
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similar spirit to these studies, this paper shows
that low-paid workers in Greece are significantly
less satisfied with their jobs, compared to equiva-
lent higher-paid workers, based on data from eight
waves (1994-2001) of the European Community
Household Panel (ECHP). Further analysis of the
specific facets of jobs reveals that this discrepancy
is the result of greater dissatisfaction among low-
wage employees with their pay and the type of
work that they perform.
The structure of the paper is organised as follows:
Section 2 begins by describing the different
attempts that have been made to quantify the
concept of job quality, one of which is the use of
self-reported survey responses on job satisfaction.
Since we adopt this approach for the rest of the
paper, Section 3 offers a brief literature review of
the growing research that has taken place using
subjective well-being data. In Section 4 the data
used in this study and summary statistics are pre-
sented. Section 5 provides a simplified account of
the econometric methodology and describes the
empirical estimates of the relationship between
low pay status and job satisfaction in Greece,
while Section 6 offers some policy recommenda-
tions. Section 7 concludes the discussion. For
those interested in the technical details of estima-
tion, an extensive discussion of the model specifi-
cation and econometric methodology can be
found in the Appendix.
2. Defining quality in work
Quality in work is a multifaceted concept, which
makes any attempt to quantify the term highly
contentious. The broadest description has been
offered by “Employment in Europe” (European
Commission, 2001a, p. 65), which defined job
quality as “a relative concept regarding a job-
worker relationship which takes into account both
objective characteristics related to the job and the
match between worker characteristics, on the one
hand, and job requirements, on the other. It also
involves subjective evaluation of these character-
istics by the respective worker on the basis of his
or her characteristics, experience, and expecta-
tions”. As is evident from the above definition, the
difficulty of precisely assessing some of these ele-
ments explains the lack of any agreed definition of
job quality among academics and policy-makers.
In fact, it is for this reason that the European
Commission (2001b, p. 7) has suggested that
“given its relative and multidimensional nature,
there can be no one single measure or index of
employment quality”, which, in turn, implies that
“an empirical analysis of job quality has to be
based on data on both objective job and worker
characteristics and subjective evaluations of the
job-worker match” (European Commission,
2001a, p. 65). The Commission went on to sug-
gest a set of indicators covering 10 main elements
of quality within two broad categories – the char-
acteristics of the job itself, and the work and
wider labour market context. These include:
(i) intrinsic job quality; (ii) skills, lifelong learning
and career development; (iii) gender equality;
(iv) health and safety at work; (v) flexibility and
security; (vi) inclusion and access to the labour
market; (vii) work organisation and work-life bal-
ance; (viii) social dialogue and worker involve-
ment; (ix) diversity and non-discrimination; and
(x) overall work performance.
Due to the complexity associated with evaluat-
ing and monitoring all these indicators, how-
ever, most studies have focused on a subset of
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the more easily quantifiable measures of job
quality. The Commission itself has classified
jobs according to certain key objective charac-
teristics, such as job security, training possibili-
ties and career prospects, and productivity and
pay. Based on these three criteria, it distin-
guished jobs into four types: “dead-end jobs”,
“jobs of reasonable quality”, “low pay/produc-
tivity jobs” and, finally, “jobs of good quality”
(European Commission, 2001a, p. 74). Using
this grouping, it showed that, while a majority
of jobs in the EU are of relatively high quality, a
quarter of the workforce remain in jobs of lower
quality, and that Spain and Greece, in particular,
show above average employment shares of indi-
viduals in both “low pay/productivity jobs” and
“dead-end jobs” (ibid., p. 75).
More recently economists have followed a dif-
ferent approach to the issue of measuring job
quality, one that is based on self-reported satis-
faction data from individual questionnaires.
Specifically, many have argued that since overall
subjective job satisfaction is the reflection of the
worker’s weighting in his/her mind of all the
job’s aspects (such as pay, job security, the type
of work, hours and times of work, working con-
ditions, commuting etc.), “then the former
should serve as a reasonable proxy for the over-
all quality of work as perceived by the individual
worker” (Hamermesh, 2001; Leontaridi and
Sloane, 2004, p. 2). Indeed, the strength of this
approach seems to lie in the fact that subjective
assessments of job satisfaction have been found
to be strong predictors of worker behaviour,
such as quits, absenteeism and worker produc-
tivity (inter alia, Freeman, 1978; Clegg, 1983). It
is this method that we will therefore adopt for
the rest of this study.
3. Subjective job satisfaction
3.1 Subjective well-being and job satisfaction
There has been a surge of interest among econo-
mists in recent years regarding the use of subjec-
tive survey questions on the individual’s well-being
and its domains, such as job satisfaction or health
satisfaction. As mentioned above, much research
has now started with the premise that subjective
well-being (SWB) can serve as an empirical proxy
for the theoretical concept of utility, thus over-
coming the traditional economic practice of evalu-
ating individual preferences by means of revealed
behaviour in market situations. This initiative has
followed the lead of many years of psychological
research, which illustrated that comparisons of dif-
ferent measures of SWB are often mutually consis-
tent. For example, self-reported SWB has been
found to be correlated with physiological mea-
sures such as the amount of smiling or frowning,
changes in facial muscles (see Kahneman et al.,
1999) or the evaluation of the individual’s experi-
ence by a third party observer (Kahneman et al.,
1997). Van Praag (1991) has also shown that indi-
viduals belonging to the same language commu-
nity have a very similar understanding of concepts
such as welfare, well-being and happiness. In addi-
tion, the use of subjective well-being data was
encouraged by the robust econometric findings
that were spurred by Freeman’s (1978) pioneering
work on the inverse relationship between job sat-
isfaction and quit behaviour.
Of course, it has been acknowledged that survey
questions about satisfaction suffer from a number
of weaknesses, such as the discrepancy between
remembered utility and experienced utility. For
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example, it has been argued that when evaluating
retrospectively the utility of an event (remem-
bered utility), individuals give a relatively higher
weight to events with a high intensity (peak effect)
and those that have occurred last (end effect)
(hence the term peak-end evaluation rule, which
was coined by the Nobel-prize winner Kahneman).
Another problem arises due to the presence of the
adaptation phenomenon (Easterlin, 2001). Speci-
fically, the evidence of wealthier individuals and
economies being happier at a given point in time,
but not over time, has led to the assertion that
individuals adapt to new situations, such as an
income increase or becoming handicapped, by
changing their expectations. Both of these issues
therefore arouse suspicion concerning the use of
time-series data on subjective happiness.
In spite of these problems, economists have
reported a number of interesting and robust
results regarding the effect of individual socio-
economic characteristics on SWB and its
domains. Concentrating specifically on the
domain of job satisfaction, which is taken as a
proxy of the individual’s utility from work (U),
most of the empirical literature now follows the
theoretical exposition of Clark and Oswald
(1996). According to these authors, job satisfac-
tion depends not only on absolute income (y) and
working hours (h), as in standard indifference
curve microeconomics, but also on a set of indi-
vidual (i) and job-specific (j) features:
U = u(y, h, i, j) u’y>0, u’h<0 (1)
Based on this model, the estimating equations
usually regress the indices of job satisfaction on
a set of demographic (age, gender, marital sta-
tus, number of children etc.), human-capital
(education, training), economic (wages and
salaries, other income), work-related (firm size,
hours of work, contractual arrangement) and
social (unionisation, institutions) determinants.
In this manner the literature has found that
unemployed individuals report substantially
lower levels of well-being than the employed
and are permanently “scarred” as a result of
their jobless experience (Clark and Oswald,
1994; Theodossiou, 1998). It has also been
argued that much of the wage effect on job sat-
isfaction operates through relative wages (Clark
and Oswald, 1996; Clark, 1999; Grund and
Sliwka, 2003) or through the individual’s own
judgement about his past and future financial sit-
uation (Easterlin, 2001; Lydon and Chevalier,
2002).1 Interesting demographic differences
have emerged in that women consistently
declare higher job satisfaction scores than men
(Clark, 1997) and the age effect has been
reported as being U-shaped with middle-aged
people being the least satisfied (Blanchflower
and Oswald, 1999). Finally, satisfaction levels
have been found to be negatively correlated with
both education (Clark and Oswald, 1996; Sloane
and Williams, 1996) and union status (Blanch-
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1 In this case researchers assume a utility function that depends
not only on absolute income, but also on relative income, i.e. U =
u(y, y*, h, i, j), where y* is the reference level of income against
which the individual compares his/her own earnings. The idea is
that utility either declines with an increase in comparison income
when this gives rise to feelings of relative deprivation, or increases
when higher wages of co-workers are regarded as a signal of a
higher potential wage for the individual himself (what is known as
the “tunnel effect” – see Panos, Theodossiou and Nikolaou, 2004,
for an empirical investigation of these two hypotheses).
Contention exists, though, among economists as to what is
exactly the comparison benchmark. While Clark and Oswald
(1996) have defined it as the econometrically predicted “going
rate” for the job, that is the income of comparable employees of
given characteristics, Clark (1999) and Grund and Sliwka (2003)
have recently argued that it is the wage of the prior period that
serves as reference.
flower and Oswald, 1999; Drakopoulos and Theo-
dossiou, 1997).2
3.2 Greek specific research on job satisfaction3
In Greece the empirical research on job satisfac-
tion is limited, with most of the relevant studies
originating in the health sciences. Recent papers
that have focused on the job satisfaction of Greek
teachers include those of Koustelios (2001) and
Stamouli and Ipfling (2001). Koustelios’ (2001)
sample of 345 teachers from 40 public schools in
Thessaloniki showed that they are satisfied with
the job itself and supervision, while they are dis-
satisfied with their pay and promotion opportuni-
ties. Holding a supervisory post or having promo-
tion prospects also appears to have a positive
effect on job satisfaction. Stamouli and Ipfling’s
(2001) cross-national research of four countries
(Greece, Germany, Austria, Switzerland) also
revealed that teachers with greater work auton-
omy and those with good working conditions
(such as administrative support, nice school envi-
ronment, student acknowledgement) are more
satisfied in all countries. A notable difference is
that for Greek teachers the vacation period seems
to be more relevant for their job satisfaction com-
pared to their Central European counterparts.
Two more studies worth mentioning are those of
Blanchflower and Oswald (1999) and Kaiser
(2002), both of which examine job satisfaction in
the whole of Europe including Greece. Blanch-
flower and Oswald (1999), using information from
two waves (1995 and 1996) of the Eurobarometer
survey, show that job satisfaction levels in Greece
are the lowest in the EU, and Greece appears to
be one of the most stressed countries in Europe.
Kaiser (2002) confirms these results using data
from the European Community Household Panel
(ECHP) for the period 1994-1997. According to
Kaiser, Greeks have the lowest average satisfac-
tion in the EU with respect to their jobs in general,
as well as to two specific aspects of their jobs,
notably the number of working hours and job
security. A similarly bleak picture also emerges
from the empirical analysis of this paper, to which
we now turn.
4. Statistical data and descriptive statistics
4.1 Data and description of main variables
The empirical analysis uses statistical data for
Greece drawn from the eight waves of the
European Community Household Panel (ECHP),
covering the period 1994-2001. Designed cen-
trally at Eurostat, but in close coordination with
the Member States, the ECHP is a questionnaire
database that contains information on more than
60,000 nationally representative households and
120,000 observations per year for all EU-15 coun-
tries.4 In constructing the ECHP, emphasis was
placed on developing comparable social statistics
across Member States on income, labour, poverty
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2 Though difficult to test, several hypotheses for these facts have
been put forward. For example, it has been argued that more edu-
cated workers are less satisfied since education raises aspiration
targets. The lower, ceteris paribus, satisfaction of union workers
has been attributed to voice mechanisms that allow workers to
express their dissatisfaction, or to the fact that dissatisfaction is
used by unions as a means to increase demands.
3 This section is heavily based on the literature review for
Greece (Appendix 3) that was undertaken as part of the EPICU-
RUS project by Panos, G. A. and E. Vasileiou at the University of
Macedonia.
4 In the first wave of the ECHP (1994) the sample comprised
60,500 representative households and 130,000 interviewees aged
16 years or over, from 12 Member States. From 1995 onwards
Austria was also included, while in 1996 and 1997 Finland and
Sweden, respectively, joined the survey as well.
and social exclusion, housing, health, as well as
other social indicators concerning living condi-
tions of private households and persons. More
important for our purposes, it contains a consid-
erable amount of information on the personal,
human-capital and employment characteristics of
workers, as well as their stated satisfaction with
their jobs. In particular, in the ECHP respondents
are asked to rate their satisfaction levels with their
main activity status (whether it is employment,
unemployment or inactivity). The employed are
also asked to state their preference with respect
to specific components of their jobs, such as earn-
ings, job security, type of work, working hours,
working times, working conditions/environment
and distance to job/commuting. Each of these are
given a number from one to six, where a value of
one corresponds to “not satisfied at all”, six
reflects “full satisfaction” and the integers from
two to five represent intermediate levels of utility.
It is these self-reported responses that constitute
the dependent variables in the econometric analy-
sis that follows below.
Using the available ECHP data on Greece, the
total number of interviewees for each of the eight
years of the survey was approximately 11,000,
resulting in a total of 85,748 observations on
15,374 individuals for the pooled sample.5
Keeping (for the purpose of retaining homogene-
ity in the sample) only those in paid employment,
who are between 16 and 65 years of age, and
excluding the self-employed and those in unpaid
work in family enterprises resulted in a pooled
sample of 20,785 observations on 5,314 individu-
als, of whom 3,162 are males and 2,152 are
females. Although our sample excludes full-time
students, those working in paid apprenticeship or
those receiving job-related training were included,
given that training possibilities constitute a key
component of the quality of jobs.
As the main focus of this study is on investigating
whether significant differences in job satisfaction
exist between high- and low-paid workers in
Greece, we then proceeded to identify the fraction
(in the ECHP) of Greek employees who are low-
paid. In doing so, we firstly derived gross hourly
earnings for each individual in the sample, by
using the available information on current gross
monthly earnings and the number of weekly hours
of work in the main job. We then adopted a con-
ventional definition that classifies as low-paid
those earning less than two-thirds of the median of
the hourly wage distribution per year. Such a rela-
tive measure is commonly used in the literature,
since an absolute metric poses difficult conceptual
and methodological problems for making interna-
tional comparisons of the incidence of low pay
(OECD, 1996, p. 69). Considering as low-paid
those workers whose wages are less than two-
thirds of the median wage is also the accepted def-
inition of the Institute of Labour (INE) of the Greek
Confederation of Labour (GSEE) (Ioakimoglou and
Soumeli, 2002). Furthermore, given that the pres-
ence of part-time workers introduces the addi-
tional complexity of disentangling differences in
time worked from differences in wage rates,
hourly earnings were constructed in order to neu-
tralise the effect of diverse working hours among
part-time and full-time workers. Using this defini-
tion, Table 1 illustrates that the overall incidence
Socio-economic differences in the job satisfaction of high-paid and low-paid workers in Greece
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5 The decision to pool the eight years of data was made in order to
maximise the number of observations in the sample and to control
for certain unobservable effects that change over time but are con-
stant across individuals (such as inflation and other political and
economic disturbances within the country). This is achieved via the
inclusion of yearly dummy variables in the econometric analysis.
of low-paid employment in Greece, based on ECHP
data for the period 1994-2001, is 17.24%.6 This fig-
ure closely mirrors the results of both Ioakimoglou
and Soumeli (2002) and Marlier and Ponthieux
(2000), who have shown, using slightly different
definitions and data, that low-wage workers in
Greece amount to 16-17% of the total population.
4.2 Descriptive statistics
Having identified the overall incidence of low pay
in Greece, Table 2 depicts the composition of low
wage employment in relation to categories of jobs
and individuals. Specifically, Table 2 shows the
percentage of workers in each category who are
low-paid (incidence), the distribution of low wage
employment among the particular categories, and
the concentration indicator, a measure of the
prevalence of low-paid employment in each
group relative to the overall incidence in the pop-
ulation. This indicator is useful for conducting
cross-national comparisons, as a value greater
than one suggests a higher than average risk of
being low-paid in any country. Taking the cate-
gory of “employment sector” as an example,
Table 2 illustrates that being employed in the pri-
vate sector is associated with a higher than aver-
age probability of being low-paid, since the con-
centration value is 1.48. This is in stark contrast to
public sector workers, whose concentration value
is 0.21, thus implying that the public sector in
Greece acts as a safeguard against low-wage
employment. These figures are a reflection of the
fact that, as shown in column 1, almost 26% of
private sector employees are low-paid, compared
to only 4% in the public sector. Moreover, from
column 2 one can see that among the 17% of
workers who are classified as low-paid in our
ECONOMIC BULLETIN, 24   1/0592
T a b l e  1
Median wages, thresholds, and low-wage workers in Greece, 1994-2001
Notes: Amounts in the second and third column quoted in drachmas (not adjusted for inflation). The threshold refers to 2/3 of the median of the gross hourly wage
distribution. The last column indicates the proportion of employees whose wages are below the threshold.
Source: Own calculations using ECHP data.
1994 1,214.674 809.7827 17.70
1995 1,269.095 846.0635 16.65
1996 1,448.031 965.3543 16.80
1997 1,630.435 1,086.957 17.66
1998 1,702.517 1,135.011 16.62
1999 1,760.870 1,173.913 16.90
2000 1,795.196 1,196.797 18.46
2001 1,835.228 1,223.485 17.22
1994-2001 1,550.311 1,033.541 17.24
Median wages Low-wage threshold Low-paid workers (%)Years
6 It should be borne in mind, though, that in Greece “there is a
large number of atypical low-paid workers who are employed in
the parallel economy, and who therefore do not form part of the
[official] statistics” (Ioakimoglou and Soumeli, 2002). Thus, the
17% figure should be seen as a minimum estimate. Of course, it
should be pointed out that low-wage employees do not necessar-
ily live in low-income households. In Greece, especially, “a per-
son’s likelihood of being poor depends to a large extent on the
income of his (closely knit) family and not exclusively on his indi-
vidual income” (ibid., 2002). Apart from the fact that workers’
households often have two wages, as well as the continued sup-
port by parents and the extended family, non-labour income (such
as property income) is also common.
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T a b l e  2
Incidence, distribution and concentration of low-wage employment in Greece, 1994-2001
Note: Low pay is defined as less than 2/3 of median hourly earnings of all employees aged 16-65.
1 Percentage of workers in each category who are low-paid.
2 Percentage share of all low-wage employment in each category.
3 Incidence of low-wage employment in each category divided by overall incidence of low-paid employment. A value greater than 1 indicates a higher than average
risk of being low-paid, while a value less than 1 indicates a smaller probability.
Source: Own calculations using ECHP data.
Total 17.24 100 1
By sex
Female 22.69 49.93 1.32
Male 13.90 50.07 0.81
By age
16-25 47.37 40.41 2.75
26-35 16.35 29.56 0.95
36-45 9.06 15.02 0.53
46-55 8.97 10.47 0.52
56-65 14.41 4.55 0.84
By marital status
Not married 30.60 61.31 1.77
Married 10.18 38.69 0.59
By working time status
Part-time 19.08 5.90 1.11
Full-time 17.18 94.1 1.00
By sector
Public sector 3.66 8.22 0.21
Private sector 25.55 91.78 1.48
By position in hierarchy
Supervisory 2.29 0.84 0.13
Intermediate 4.15 1.80 0.24
Non-supervisory 18.99 97.35 1.10
By contractual arrangement
Permanent 10.65 49.03 0.62
Fixed/short term 24.79 12.84 1.44
Casual/no contract 44.27 37.21 2.57
Other arrangement 26.73 0.92 1.55
By training incidence
No training/education 21.93 76.91 1.27
Training/education 9.53 23.09 0.55
By educational attainment
Tertiary 6.78 12.06 0.39
Second stage secondary 18.71 40.43 1.09
Below second stage secondary 24.67 47.51 1.43
By health
Very good 17.72 72.76 1.03
Good 15.34 19.78 0.89
Fair 19.23 6.13 1.12
Bad 20.23 0.98 1.17
Very bad 36.11 0.36 2.09
By status last year
Employed 14.14 73.09 0.82
Self-employed 16.75 0.90 0.97
Unemployed 45.10 12.48 2.61
Inactive 49.59 13.54 2.87
By sector of economic activity
Agriculture 44.44 3.81 2.58
Industry 18.69 32.09 1.08
Services 15.67 64.10 0.91
By occupation
Legislators/managers 4.25 0.58 0.25
Professionals 3.41 3.38 0.20
Technicians/associate prof. 11.01 5.47 0.64
Clerks 10.63 11.32 0.62
Service and sales 31.61 26.17 1.83
Skilled agriculture/fishery 38.06 2.74 2.21
Craft/trade 23.20 25.39 1.35
Plant/machine operators 13.47 7.83 0.78
Elementary 30.14 17.12 1.75
Incidence (%)1 Distribution2 Concentration3Category
sample, 92% work in private sector jobs, com-
pared to only 8% who are employed in the public
sector.
From the remaining rows (categories) in Table 2
it is clear that the likelihood of low-wage employ-
ment in Greece is higher for women and younger
workers, as well as those with lower educational
qualifications and absence of training opportuni-
ties in their jobs. This is not surprising, given that
wages tend to increase with working experience,
training and the level of educational attainment,
as has been noted a long time ago by Becker
(1964) and Mincer (1976), the two pioneers of
human capital theory. In fact, our sample con-
firms that low-paid workers have fewer years of
general experience and job tenure (11 and 3.5,
respectively), compared to their higher-paid
counterparts (17 and 9 years). Single workers
and, to a lesser extent, those who work in part-
time jobs are also at higher than average risk of
being in the low-pay category. In addition, low
wages are relatively less common in fairly “sta-
ble” jobs, such as jobs with contracts of indefi-
nite duration. The persistence of the no pay/low
pay cycle that was mentioned above is also evi-
dent, since those who enter or re-enter employ-
ment after being unemployed or inactive a year
earlier are much more likely to be in low-wage
jobs, compared to those who were employed.
From Table 2 it is also apparent that fears of high-
paid jobs in the shrinking manufacturing sector
being increasingly replaced by low-paid jobs in
the growing services sector have not yet materi-
alised in Greece, as the possibility of low pay
seems to be greater in the non-services sectors.
Lastly, the occupational breakdown suggests that
while being in a non-manual occupation (such as
sales) is not a guarantee of being in a relatively
high-paid job, very few managerial, technical and
professional workers receive low wages. All of
these correlations are in close agreement with
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the results that other authors have reported for
many other countries, thus indicating that the
risk of low-wage employment in Greece tends
to be concentrated among the same types of
workers and employment categories as elsewhere
(OECD, 1996, p. 70; Marlier and Ponthieux, 2000,
p. 4; and articles in the volume of Asplund et al.,
1998).
Moving on to an analysis of the raw job satisfac-
tion data, Chart 1 demonstrates that in 2001
Greece had the lowest average job satisfaction
among the EU countries for which such data were
available, thus confirming the findings of Blanch-
flower and Oswald (1999) and Kaiser (2002) for
earlier years. From Chart 2, which illustrates the
distribution of job satisfaction responses in
Greece in 2001, it can be seen that 11% of Greeks
ranked themselves at the bottom of the job satis-
faction ladder (i.e. gave a score of 1 or 2), while
59% were in the middle rungs (scores 3 and 4).
The remaining 30% of Greek employees reported
a satisfaction value of 5 or 6, which constitutes
one of the smallest fractions in the EU. Table 3
now depicts the means of overall job satisfaction
and satisfaction with specific facets of jobs, bro-
ken down by various categories of interest for this
study. As an example, one can see from column 1
of this table that the average job satisfaction score
of high-paid workers in Greece in the years 1994-
2001 was 4.02, which is larger than the average
satisfaction value of 3.17 that low-paid workers
reported. Accordingly, the following patterns
emerge:
ñ Men in Greece seem to be more satisfied with
their pay and security, compared to women, in
line with Papapetrou’s (2004) finding that aver-
age wages of Greek women are 25% less than
those of men. Nevertheless, women express
greater satisfaction with their working hours,
times, conditions and type of work.
Socio-economic differences in the job satisfaction of high-paid and low-paid workers in Greece
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ñ While full-time workers report greater satisfac-
tion with respect to their pay, security, and type
of work, part-time employees in Greece receive
greater satisfaction from their working hours
and conditions. Overall, full-time workers seem
to be happier than those who work part-time,
which probably reflects the fact that part-time
work in Greece is still limited and to a large
extent involuntary. Specifically, among the
5.34% of employees who work in a part-time
job in our sample, almost 47% declare that they
do it because they were unable to find other
work, while only 7.5% preferred this type of
working arrangement. Furthermore, given that
“part-time employment in Greece is directly
interwoven with low pay, low-skilled jobs, lim-
ited prospects of career development, low
social benefits and partial insurance coverage
which also entails low pension rights” (Ioaki-
moglou and Soumeli, 2002), it is understand-
able why such workers report lower job satis-
faction ratings.
ñ Public sector workers in Greece are more satis-
fied with their jobs in general, and with all of
the facets in particular, compared to private
sector employees. This is consistent with
Papapetrou’s (2003, p. 45-7) finding that female
and male wages in the Greek private sector are
on average 37% and 34% less than in the pub-
lic sector, respectively. The high level of secu-
rity satisfaction expressed by Greek public sec-
tor workers can also be explained by the ele-
ment of permanency in such jobs.
ñ Workers on permanent contracts receive
greater utility from their jobs, especially with
regard to the security of their employment,
while those in casual work suffer the most.
ñ Married individuals, those in possession of
more human capital, those who are employed
in supervisory positions and those working in
the services sector are more satisfied with all of
the components of their jobs.
ñ Finally, and more important for the purposes of
this study, low-paid workers in Greece are less
satisfied with all aspects of their work com-
pared to their high-paid counterparts.
5. Econometric methodology and results
5.1 Statistical methodology
These correlations may be spurious, as the influ-
ence of other factors that may obscure the rela-
tionship between the low pay and job satisfaction
variables has not yet been controlled for. As
shown above, we cannot be certain on the basis
of the raw data only that low-paid workers in
Greece are less satisfied than high-paid workers
solely because of the fact that they are low-paid.
Since a large proportion of low-paid workers pos-
sess other characteristics that might have a nega-
tive effect on job satisfaction (e.g. they are more
likely to be single, low-skilled, on non-permanent
contracts, etc.), it might be these features that
cause low-paid workers to appear as less satisfied,
rather than the fact of being low-paid itself.
Therefore, in order to uncover the true ceteris
paribus effect of the low pay variable on job satis-
faction, a multivariate regression methodology is
required to net out the effects of other variables.
As mentioned in Section 3, the estimation of job
satisfaction equations usually involves job satis-
faction “as the dependent variable” being regressed
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on a set of demographic, human capital, eco-
nomic, work-related and other social determi-
nants. In our case the set of independent variables
also includes a dummy variable that distinguishes
between high- and low-paid workers by taking the
value 1 for low-paid employees and 0 otherwise.
The estimated coefficient on this low pay variable
uncovers the difference in average job satisfaction
between high- and low-paid workers, having con-
trolled for the effect of all other factors that affect
job satisfaction and that may be correlated with
low pay status. Of course, given the difficulty of
conditioning on every possible determinant of job
satisfaction (since the researcher usually faces
data constraints), it may be the case that the esti-
mated coefficient on the low pay dummy also
captures the effect of these “unobservable” vari-
ables and is thus biased. To give a relevant exam-
ple, it is known from a number of studies that
union density has an effect on job satisfaction and
that it is also a determining factor for the proba-
bility of a worker being low-paid.7 It follows that if
a union-proxy variable is not included in the equa-
tion, the coefficient on the low pay dummy will
also capture the effect of union status on job sat-
isfaction, thus giving rise to what is known as
“omitted variable bias”. In the results that are pre-
sented below we have therefore made an attempt
to correct for this problem, and the reader inter-
ested in the technical details of how we achieve
this can find a discussion in the Appendix. In what
follows we offer a simplified account of the main
results.
5.2 Empirical results for overall job satisfaction
From the estimation of a job satisfaction equation
for the entire sample of workers (see Table A2 in
the Appendix), we find that low-paid employees
in Greece are significantly less satisfied with their
jobs compared to those who are high-paid, all
other things equal.8 Two “statistically identical”
individuals, who have the same characteristics,
would therefore not be equally satisfied with their
jobs if one of them worked in the low pay tier of
the labour market and the other in the high pay
tier. In reality, the individual who is low-paid
would, on average, receive lower utility from
his/her work. This is evidence in favour of the dual
labour market hypothesis, as it indicates that non-
pecuniary benefits do not seem to compensate
low-wage workers in Greece, as would be
expected in a labour market with perfectly com-
petitive market forces. The idea that there exist
“bad jobs” and “good jobs” in the Greek labour
market is therefore supported by our data.
From the coefficients of Table A2 one can also
derive an estimated value of the amount of money
that low-paid workers in Greece would need to
receive, in order to have their utility equalised to
that of their higher-paid counterparts. Alternatively,
such a calculation allows us to put an approximate
monetary value on the disutility of low-pay
employment in Greece, i.e. on the “implicit”
(shadow) cost that workers are “paying” for being
in low-paid jobs that are also of low quality. This
is done by looking at the relative size of the coef-
ficients on the low pay and wage variables, as this
provides information about how the wages of a
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7 While union status has been found to increase worker satisfac-
tion with pay and security, overall, union workers usually report
less satisfaction compared to non-union workers (Lillydahl and
Singell, 1993). Furthermore, low-union density is also generally
considered as a factor that contributes to low-paid employment
(Ioakimoglou and Soumeli, 2002).
8 Given that data for the type of contractual arrangement were
not available for wave 1 in Greece, the regression output that is
reported in this paper has been estimated on the basis of the
1995-2001 period.
marginal individual would need to change in the
face of a change in his/her pay status, in order to
keep his/her utility from work constant (Blanch-
flower and Oswald, 2004). In our case, the calcu-
lus suggests that if a previously high-paid worker
were to work in a low-paid job, he/she would
need to be compensated with approximately
1,400 drachmas extra per hour if he/she were to
retain the same utility as before the change. As an
indication of the magnitude of this figure, one can
note that the mean gross hourly wage of a low-
paid worker in Greece in the years 1994-2001
was 826 drachmas, while that of a high-paid
worker was 2,034 drachmas. Thus, in order for a
low-paid employee to enjoy the same utility as
that of a higher-paid counterpart, he/she would
need to receive on average approximately (826 +
1,400 =) 2,226 drachmas per hour. It is therefore
clear that equalising the average wages of workers
in the two tiers would not be enough to provide
them with equal utility. Rather, it would be neces-
sary to offer low-paid workers an additional
(2,226–2,034 =) 192 drachmas per hour, pre-
sumably to compensate them for the fact that
low-paid jobs are also of inherent “bad” quality.
Of course, these calculations should be treated
cautiously, but they do illustrate the quantitative
importance of the estimated coefficients.
From the other explanatory variables we observe
further that higher absolute wages have a signifi-
cant positive effect on individual job satisfaction,
consistent with the traditional income-leisure
trade-off of microeconomic theory.9 Job satisfac-
tion is also found to be U-shaped in age (thus con-
firming that the middle-aged are less satisfied),
while we do not discover any significant effect of
marital status or of the presence of young children
in the household. After conditioning on the main
job and worker characteristics, we also find that
Greek men are less satisfied with their jobs com-
pared to women. This might seem surprising,
given that Papapetrou (2004) and others have
found substantial and significant male-female
earnings differentials across occupations and
countries, while there is also evidence of discrim-
ination against women in areas such as hiring/fir-
ing and promotion. Nevertheless, the fact that
women consistently report higher job satisfaction
scores than men is well established in the litera-
ture. Attempts to explain this paradox have usu-
ally focused on the difference in aspirations
between the two genders, with women suppos-
edly expecting less from their jobs due to more
frequent career breaks and previous discrimina-
tory behaviour in the workplace. The narrower
gap between their current working state and what
women expect might therefore explain their
greater happiness (Clark, 1997).
Considering now the variables that capture the
“stability” or “precariousness” of the employment
relationship, it is found that temporary, part-time,
and private sector workers in Greece are strongly
dissatisfied compared to those on permanent, full-
time, and public sector contractual arrangements.
These results seem to confirm popular worries
that increased labour market flexibility affects the
job security of employees, provided that only a
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9 The positive coefficient on total hours of work, however, is
inconsistent with traditional microeconomic theory. Nevertheless, it
should be mentioned that we have not managed to exclude from
our hours variable the effect of overtime (for which Greek employ-
ees receive up to 150% extra pay), which in the low-wage economy
of Greece constitutes a recurrent and welcome element of workers’
income. Thus, the positive impact of the hours variable on job sat-
isfaction may reflect the fact that the compensatory wage effect of
overtime outweighs the disutility of any additional hours of work.
The positive wage effect is further reinforced by the fact that the
total hours variable also includes time worked in additional jobs.
minority of individuals who work on non-perma-
nent and part-time contracts do so by choice.
Significant differences in the subjective evaluation
of jobs are also found among those who have dif-
ferent human capital characteristics. In Greece,
workers with tertiary education and above the
second level of secondary education are more sat-
isfied with their work, compared to those who
have not completed the second stage secondary
level. This is also the case for workers who pos-
sess more job tenure, probably reflecting the pos-
itive impact of specific training or the superior
quality of the worker-employer job match. In
addition, those who believe that their current job
is not utilising their skills to the full extent (i.e.
self-reported over-qualification) have lower satis-
faction scores than those who are content with
their skills-job match. The provision of training by
employers as a means of upskilling and career
development also leads to significantly higher job
satisfaction. Finally, very good health, which can
also be considered a form of human capital in
accordance with Mincer (1976), is an additional
factor that leads to higher utility from work.
Another important result that has surfaced from
the econometric analysis is that the well-docu-
mented non-pecuniary costs of unemployment
seem to exert a negative effect on workers’ satis-
faction with their jobs. This is evident from the
fact that, everything else being equal, an “ex-
unemployed” worker is more likely to be unhappy
with his current job compared to someone who
was employed a year earlier. In contrast, ex-inac-
tive employees are happier with their current
jobs, which is consistent with the fact that most of
these people are women and younger individuals.
This specific group is more likely to be in the
process of entering or re-entering employment,
after having taken some time off due to various
care responsibilities or further education.
Finally, there is also evidence that absenteeism,
non-supervisory positions in the hierarchy and
working outside of Attica negatively impacts on
the perceived quality of jobs.
5.3 Empirical results for facets of job satisfaction
and by sector
Given that we have established that there exist
significant differences in the perceived job quality
among high- and low-paid workers in Greece,
which points towards the existence of a seg-
mented labour market, we now proceed to inves-
tigate the reasons for this discrepancy. To this
end, seven satisfaction equations have been esti-
mated with some of the available components of
jobs (pay, security, type of work, working hours,
working times, working conditions/environment
and commuting) as dependent variables this time
(see Table A3 in the Appendix). The results indi-
cate that, with the exception of travelling distance
to work, low-paid workers are particularly less
satisfied with their pay and the type of work that
they perform. Negative coefficients are also found
with respect to the remaining facets, though these
are not significant at conventional statistical lev-
els. Overall, these findings seem to support the
assertion that low-wage jobs in Greece are inher-
ently of bad quality, though the insignificance of
the working hours, security and working condi-
tions variables does point towards the existence
of some compensating forces.
As an additional task, we have split the sample
into low- and high-paid segments in order to
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unearth any differences in the manner in which
the explanatory variables determine the satisfac-
tion of the two types of workers. In the previous
estimation of overall job satisfaction the coeffi-
cients of the chosen control variables were con-
strained to be the same for both low-paid and
high-paid workers. However, it may be the case
that the individual’s type interacts with the other
personal and workplace characteristics, in which
case high- or low-paid employees will report dif-
ferent satisfaction values to any of these given
traits. This disparity in the job satisfaction deter-
mination process would be possible if differences
in institutional arrangements, hierarchical struc-
tures, and firm policies for the two types of work-
ers existed.
Estimating two separate job satisfaction equations
for the high- and low-pay segments reveals a
number of interesting features (see columns 2
and 3 of Table A2). Gender and working time
arrangements only affect the utility of high-paid
workers in a significant manner, with males or
part-time workers being less satisfied. General
education and additional years of tenure also
seem to exert an exclusive effect on the utility of
the higher-paid, though employer-provided train-
ing is found to have a much larger marginal effect
on the stated satisfaction of low-paid employees.
The negative impact of non-supervisory duties,
previous unemployment, and of working in
Northern or Central Greece, is only evident for
the high-paid group. In contrast, having been
inactive a year earlier has a slight beneficial effect
on the satisfaction of low-wage employees.
Finally, individuals on casual contractual arrange-
ments suffer from a significantly larger negative
effect on job satisfaction in the low-wage tier of
the labour market. On the whole, these results
seem to imply that differences in personal and
workplace characteristics among low-paid work-
ers do not lead to significant deviations in per-
ceived job quality as much as they do among
employees in higher-paid jobs.
5.4 Oaxaca decomposition
Having estimated job satisfaction equations for
the whole sample and for the two groups sepa-
rately also allows for a breakdown according to
standard Oaxaca or related decompositions. By
applying this methodology it is possible to inves-
tigate, firstly, the extent to which differences in
job satisfaction among high- and low-paid emplo-
yees in Greece are attributable to the endow-
ments or characteristics differential between them
and, secondly, what is the unexplained part of this
discrepancy, i.e. that part whereby two “identical”
individuals of average characteristics, one employed
in a high-paid job and one in a low-paid job,
report a different satisfaction value, possibly due
to the presence of institutional factors. Such a
procedure is widespread in decomposing wage
differences between various categories of interest
(see Papapetrou, 2003 and 2004, for a recent
application of this technique to the Greek labour
market), but, to the authors’ knowledge, has not
yet been attempted with subjective satisfaction
data. The results that follow therefore constitute a
significant novelty of this paper.
Table A4 in the Appendix presents the breakdown
of the difference in job satisfaction between high-
and low-paid employees for the entire sample.
The top section of the table, which decomposes
the difference according to the Oaxaca procedure,
illustrates that the most influential factor affecting
the satisfaction disparity of individuals in the two
Socio-economic differences in the job satisfaction of high-paid and low-paid workers in Greece
ECONOMIC BULLETIN, 24   1/05 101
groups is the fact that they have the different char-
acteristics that were identified in this paper; this
accounts for almost 90% of the total discrepancy.
The remaining 10% is “unexplained”, reflecting
disparate institutional features of the high- and
low-pay labour markets. Given the greater weight
of the endowments explanation, the bottom sec-
tion of the table shows which part of the explained
difference in satisfaction is attributable to specific
employee characteristics. While the difference in
mean wages understandably explains the lion’s
share of the overall satisfaction differential (56%),
tenure (3.5%), age (-9%), the sector of employ-
ment (12%), employer-provided training (3%),
non-permanent contractual arrangements (16.5%),
and tertiary education (4%) also contribute to the
difference in satisfaction between high- and low-
wage employees in Greece.
6. Policies and recommendations
As mentioned at the beginning of this paper, the
aim of improving the quality of work is considered
by the EU as closely interlinked with the move
towards a competitive and knowledge-based
economy, as stated in the Lisbon 2000 agenda.
This reflects the evidence of a strong positive cor-
relation between job quality, faster employment
growth and higher productivity. At the same time,
the declining economic prospects of workers on
the lower rungs of the income distribution have
raised concerns regarding the emergence of a
two-tier labour market in Europe. In this paper
evidence was presented that low-paid workers in
Greece do in fact seem to suffer from a double
penalty, as their jobs are also of bad quality. In
view of this segmentation, combined with the fact
that Greece remains a low-wage economy, it
becomes clear that policies that centre on the
quality of jobs are of equal importance to those
that focus on the level of pay that they provide.
This, however, requires the design of a regulatory
framework that promotes the transition of work-
ers from one state (low pay/low quality) to
another (high pay/high quality), by improving the
dynamics that lead to jobs of superior quality and
by encouraging occupational and regional mobil-
ity of those workers who are trapped in low
wage/low quality employment. Concerted efforts
to promote life-long training and raise the qualifi-
cations of employees, to ease young workers’
access to the labour market, to open up possibili-
ties for career advancement and to strengthen
measures that help reconcile work and private
and family lives would be conducive to achieving
this goal (European Commission, 2001a, p. 80).
The empirical findings of this paper illustrate that
such policy implications are relevant for the Greek
labour market as well. The issue of balancing flex-
ibility, on the one hand, and security, on the other
—i.e. of supporting the competitiveness of firms
in the global economy without resorting to pre-
carious forms of employment— is a delicate one
for the Greek economy. The fact that additional
years of tenure do not have a significant impact on
the perceived job quality of low-wage workers
may indicate the lack of rank progression or train-
ing opportunities in this sector. In addition, since
both temporary contracts and involuntary part-
time work are generally related to extreme worker
dissatisfaction, it becomes clear that emphasis
should be put on making these contractual forms
function as stepping stones for reintegrating indi-
viduals into high-quality employment. This can be
achieved by focusing on increasing the share of
voluntary part-time work, as well as introducing
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more flexibility in permanent contracts and more
security in fixed-term ones. Implementation of the
EU Directives for temporary and part-time work is
also essential to ensure that workers under differ-
ent contract statutes enjoy similar access to life-
long learning, good working conditions, appropri-
ate protection against discrimination or unfair dis-
missal, support in the case of job loss, decent pay,
and the right to transfer acquired social rights in
the case of job mobility (European Commission,
2003b, p. 14).
Policies that enhance the quality and efficiency of
investments in human resources are also relevant,
given that higher educational attainment and
more employer-provided training leads to a better
perception of quality at work. However, the fact
that more educational qualifications do not con-
tribute to additional utility from work in low-wage
jobs may reflect the discomfort of educated low-
paid workers whose higher job aspirations have
not materialised as expected. This highlights the
need for general education and vocational training
systems that do not contribute to skills mis-
matches in the labour market.
The strong negative correlation between absen-
teeism and job quality may also partly reflect the
need for better working conditions with more
health and safety, given that lost days at work are
usually a consequence of accidents at work,
work-related illnesses and occupational diseases.
In this respect the EU has called for an intensifi-
cation of efforts aimed at implementing the provi-
sions of the Health and Safety at Work Directives.
Finally, policies that allow employees to adjust
work with their working time preferences and in
particular with their other responsibilities such as
care for children and other dependants would
also add to the improvement in quality of jobs. In
Greece there is currently little flexibility in work-
ing time arrangements, with more than 90% of all
employees working on fixed start and end times.
Moreover, about 30% of Greek employees work
outside core working hours, compared to an EU
average of 20%, while more than half of them
claim that they work in the evening at least some-
times (European Commission, 2003a, p. 148).
These facts point to the need for policies that will
reconcile the work-life balance in Greece in a
more satisfactory fashion.
7. Conclusions
Following the establishment of job quality as one
of the three overarching objectives of the EU’s
Employment Guidelines, and in the face of con-
cerns regarding the declining economic prospects
of workers on the lower rungs of the income dis-
tribution, which has supposedly led to the emer-
gence of a two-tier labour market in Europe, this
study examined whether or not significant differ-
ences in perceived job quality exist among high-
and low-paid workers in Greece. To do so we fol-
lowed the practice of an ever-increasing number of
economists who use self-reported job satisfaction
data to proxy the overall quality of work as per-
ceived by the individual worker. Using data from
the eight waves of the ECHP, evidence was pre-
sented that low-paid workers in Greece do in fact
seem to suffer from a double penalty, as their jobs
are also of bad quality. Further analysis of the spe-
cific facets of jobs revealed that this fact is the
result of lower average satisfaction among low-
wage employees with their pay and the type of
work that they perform. In view of this segmenta-
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tion, combined with the fact that Greece remains
a low-wage economy, it becomes evident that
policies that centre on the quality of jobs are of
equal importance to those that focus on the level
of pay that they provide. This, however, requires
the design of a regulatory framework that pro-
motes the transition of workers from one state
(low pay/low quality) to another (high pay/high
quality), by improving the dynamics that lead to
jobs of superior quality and by encouraging occu-
pational and regional mobility of those workers
who are trapped in low wage/low quality employ-
ment.
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Appendix
This section provides a detailed discussion of the model
specification and econometric procedure that underpins
the results that were presented in the main body of this
paper. We have followed an increasingly popular trend
in the economics literature, which estimates regression
models based on subjective data. Given the ordinal
nature of such data, most of this research uses ordered
probit regression techniques with the aim of identifying
the main determinants of self-reported well-being lev-
els. Specifically, it usually seeks to identify the probabil-
ity of observing a self-reported satisfaction value i (i = 1,
2,..., k), as a function of appropriate individual and
labour market variables. In our case, where the interest
lay in revealing potential differences in job satisfaction
between high- and low-paid workers, we have also
included in the regressions a dummy variable indicating
whether or not individuals are low-paid. The estimated
coefficient on the low-pay dummy will then unveil any
differences in job satisfaction between the two groups
of workers, ceteris paribus. In other words, we have esti-
mated a model of the form:
JS = Xb + Ia + u (2)
where JS (job satisfaction) is the categorical dependent
variable, X is a vector of personal and labour market
characteristics that affect job satisfaction, I is a dummy
variable taking the value 1 if low-paid and 0 otherwise,
and u~N (0, Ûi
2) is the random disturbance term. Of
course, if there exist unobservable variables that affect
job satisfaction and are correlated with the low-pay
dummy (i.e. if Cov (I, u) ≠ 0), then it is well known that
the estimated coefficient a will be biased.
It is for this reason that a “treatment effects model” has
been utilised, which considers the effect of an endoge-
nously chosen binary treatment on another endogenous
continuous variable, conditional on two sets of indepen-
dent variables. Such techniques use either Heckman’s
two-step consistent estimator or full maximum-likeli-
hood, and estimate all of the parameters in the model
JS = Xb + Ia + u (regression equation) (3)
π= 1 iff ZÁ + Â > 0 (treatment equation) (4)
where equation (3) is defined as before, while in (4) Z
is a matrix of identifying variables believed to deter-
mine whether assigned treatment in the low-wage sec-
tor occurs or not, but with at least one not affecting job
satisfaction, Â ~N (0, 1) and Cov (Â, u) = Ú. A point
worth making at this stage is that since these models
require that the dependent variable is continuous, we
have transformed the ordinal job satisfaction variable
into a standardised z-score. This is standard procedure
following Freeman’s (1978) finding that such a trans-
formation does not lead to distortions in the regression
results. It should also be noted that in all of the regres-
sions robust (Hubert-White) standard errors are
reported that also correct for correlation at the individ-
ual level.
Identification of the model is achieved provided that at
least one non-overlapping variable in Z, compared to X, is
present. For this purpose two identifying restrictions have
been used in the selection equation, but not in the main
job satisfaction equation. These consist of, firstly, dummy
variables capturing the number of rooms in the house-
hold per person, ranging from “1 room” to “more than 3
rooms”. Secondly, dummies of an index summarising the
presence of good features in the household have also
been included. The good features consist of whether or
not the dwelling possesses a separate kitchen, bath or
shower, indoor flushing toilet, hot running water, and a
place to sit outside. For both of these identifiers it is pos-
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T a b l e  A1
Probit estimates of low pay incidence in Greece, 1995-2001
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses: robust to arbitrary heteroscedasticity and the repeat sampling of individuals over time. *: significant at 10%; **: significant at 5%;
***: significant at 1%. All regressions include controls for occupation (9), industry (10) and time (7).
Reference groups: Duties: supervisory; Contract: permanent; Education: below 2nd stage; Health: very good; Status last year: employed; Region: Attica; Rooms per
person: 1; Good features: 6.
Source: Own calculations using ECHP data.
Personal
Male –0.555 (0.054)*** –0.067
Age –0.138 (0.015)*** –0.015
Age2 0.002 (0.000)*** 0.000
Married –0.278 (0.059)*** –0.032
Child less than 12 years old –0.181 (0.055)*** –0.019
Unemployed for 5 years 0.069 (0.048) 0.008
Work-related
Tenure –0.033 (0.005)*** –0.004
Total hours –0.555 (0.054)*** 0.004
Full-time 0.041 (0.002)*** –0.043
Private –0.317 (0.101)*** 0.073
Absenteeism 0.760 (0.092)*** 0.001
Duties
Intermediate 0.128 (0.191) 0.015
Non-supervisory 0.572 (0.165)*** 0.043
Contract
Fixed/short term 0.274 (0.062)*** 0.035
Casual work 0.540 (0.052)*** 0.079
Other 0.259 (0.221) 0.034
Human capital
Training –0.160 (0.051)*** –0.016
Overqualified 0.052 (0.040) 0.006
Third level –0.352 (0.079)*** –0.034
2nd secondary –0.128 (0.055)** –0.013
Health 
Good 0.043 (0.046) 0.005
Fair 0.133 (0.087) 0.016
Bad/Very Bad 0.262 (0.194) 0.034
Status last year
Self-employed –0.117 (0.159) –0.011
Unemployed 0.311 (0.064)*** 0.041
Inactive 0.353 (0.070)*** 0.048
Region
Northern GR 0.293 (0.058)*** 0.034
Central GR 0.105 (0.063)* 0.011
Aegean islands 0.092 (0.077) 0.010
Identifying variables
2 rooms per person –0.304 (0.064)*** –0.027
More than 3 rooms per person –0.399 (0.155)** –0.031
Less than 2 good features 0.515 (0.158)*** 0.081
3 good features 0.443 (0.096)*** 0.065
4 good features 0.224 (0.062)*** 0.026
5 good features 0.069 (0.052) 0.007
Constant 0.407 (0.396)
Observations 15,213.00
Wald test (58) 1,914.64 ***
Pseudo R2 0.37
Low pay incidence Marginal effectCategories
tulated that while their existence is correlated with the
probability of an individual belonging in the low-paid
group, it is uncorrelated with the utility that he/she
receives from his/her work. Additional statistical tests,
which are discussed in more detail below, also indicate
that the restrictions for identifying the endogeneity effects
are adequate.
The estimation of the selection equation (4) makes use
of the probit method to identify the factors that deter-
mine whether an individual works in the low pay or
high pay tier. The regression results, as well as the mar-
ginal effects of the included variables, are presented in
Table A1.10 As usual, positive coefficients imply a
greater likelihood of an individual having low wages,
whereas the marginal effects indicate the change in the
probability that an individual is low-paid when each of
the independent variables, calculated at the mean val-
ues of the sample, is increased by one unit. For
instance, if an employee works full-time, the probabil-
ity that he/she will be low-paid decreases by almost
4%, while being employed in the private sector
increases the likelihood of low-pay employment by 7%.
In line with the results of many other studies (see articles
in the volume of Asplund et al., 1998), it is also revealed
that the probability of being in the low-wage group in
Greece is U-shaped in age (so that the middle-aged are
less likely to be low-paid) and negatively related with
marriage and with the male gender. In addition, greater
human capital reduces the chances of an individual falling
into the low-pay category, since those with more years of
tenure, higher educational qualifications, and those who
receive training are more likely to receive higher wages.
The fact that there is a negative correlation between those
who have children under the age of 12 in the household
and low-wage employment confirms the Malthusian
rationale of income being a crucial determinant of fertility
patterns. Furthermore, those who are employed in non-
supervisory positions, on non-permanent contracts, and
who suffer from very bad health are more likely to be
low-paid. Finally, the widespread concerns over the pres-
ence of a vicious circle between low pay and no pay are
verified by the fact that individuals who were unem-
ployed or inactive a year earlier face a higher probability
of being in the low-pay category.
With respect to the identifying restrictions now, it is
clear that these are highly correlated with low pay sta-
tus. Specifically, compared to those who live in house-
holds with only one room per person, those with two
or more than three rooms per person are less likely to
be low-paid. Accordingly, those with fewer good
household features face a greater likelihood of being
low-paid. The Wald test statistic for the joint signifi-
cance of these selection variables in the probit equation
is ¯2 (6) = 59.59, which is significant at the 1% level.
Following the estimation of the probit model, the pre-
dicted probabilities of being in the low-pay segment are
then calculated. The predictions are subsequently
included in the regression of the main job satisfaction
equation, in place of the low-pay dummy. The estimates
that have been corrected for endogeneity are depicted
in Table A2 and have been extensively discussed in
Section 5.2 of the main text. It is noteworthy, though,
that the implementation of this technique leads to an
increase in the marginal effect of the low-pay dummy,
compared to a simple application of OLS (not presented
here, but available from the authors upon request).
In Table A3 estimates of the impact of the low-pay deter-
minant on the facets of job satisfaction (pay, security, type
of work, working hours, working times, working condi-
tions/environment and commuting) are presented, using
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found in Appendix Table A5.
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T a b l e  A2
Estimates of overall job satisfaction in Greece, 1995-2001
Low pay –0.138 (0.062)**
Personal
Male –0.067 (0.023)*** –0.061 (0.072) –0.080 (0.025)***
Age –0.017 (0.008)** –0.034 (0.019)* –0.012 (0.009)
Age2 0.000 (0.000)** 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)
Married –0.025 (0.027) 0.046 (0.072) –0.042 (0.028)
Child less than 12 years old 0.030 (0.021) –0.012 (0.058) 0.036 (0.022)*
Unemployed for 5 years –0.027 (0.022) –0.039 (0.044) –0.022 (0.025)
Work-related
Lnpay 0.409 (0.030)*** 0.356 (0.081)*** 0.410 (0.034)***
Tenure 0.004 (0.002)** –0.000 (0.006) 0.003 (0.002)*
Total hours 0.010 (0.001)*** 0.013 (0.004)*** 0.010 (0.001)***
Full-time 0.197 (0.045)*** 0.146 (0.096) 0.206 (0.050)***
Private –0.200 (0.027)*** –0.240 (0.133)* –0.188 (0.028)***
Absenteeism –0.007 (0.003)** –0.015 (0.008)* –0.005 (0.003)
Duties
Intermediate –0.116 (0.043)*** 0.274 (0.235) –0.120 (0.044)***
Non-supervisory –0.171 (0.038)*** 0.201 (0.226) –0.173 (0.038)***
Contract
Fixed/short term –0.274 (0.033)*** –0.274 (0.068)*** –0.276 (0.038)***
Casual work –0.412 (0.029)*** –0.484 (0.065)*** –0.347 (0.034)***
Other 0.041 (0.082) –0.151 (0.180) 0.124 (0.089)
Human capital
Training 0.096 (0.019)*** 0.232 (0.059)*** 0.076 (0.019)***
Overqualified –0.157 (0.017)*** –0.177 (0.041)*** –0.154 (0.018)***
Third level 0.085 (0.033)** 0.015 (0.088) 0.096 (0.036)***
2nd secondary 0.078 (0.026)*** 0.049 (0.055) 0.081 (0.028)***
Health
Good -0.154 (0.020)*** -0.064 (0.049) -0.168 (0.021)***
Fair -0.089 (0.042)** -0.013 (0.091) -0.101 (0.046)**
Bad/Very Bad -0.057 (0.102) -0.120 (0.230) -0.038 (0.112)
Status last year
Self-employed -0.068 (0.072) -0.122 (0.157) -0.062 (0.082)
Unemployed -0.070 (0.037)* -0.008 (0.060) -0.111 (0.049)**
Inactive 0.069 (0.042)* 0.127 (0.066)* 0.003 (0.055)
Region
Northern GR -0.079 (0.023)*** -0.108 (0.063)* -0.065 (0.025)***
Central GR -0.077 (0.026)*** -0.063 (0.067) -0.081 (0.028)***
Aegean islands -0.003 (0.031) 0.009 (0.072) -0.001 (0.034)
Constant -2.985 (0.288)*** -2.800 (0.662)*** -3.065 (0.331)***
Observations 15,206 2,433 12,773
Wald test(d.f.) 4,324.43 (54)*** 651.00 (53)*** 2,079.14 (53)***
Log-likelihood -22,502.52 -7,274.33 -19,421.28
Lambda 0.09 -0.08
Low-paid High-paidAllCategories
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses: robust to arbitrary heteroscedasticity and the repeat sampling of individuals over time.
*: significant at 10%; **: significant at 5%; ***: significant at 1%. The ordinal dependent variable of overall job satisfaction has been transformed to a continu-
ous z-core variable; all regressions include controls for occupation (9), industry (10) and time (7); column 1 includes Heckman estimates, where the selection
is a probit regression of the treatment lowpay dummy as in Table A1; column 2 includes Heckman ML estimates of the job satisfaction of low-paid workers;
column 3 includes Heckman ML estimates of the job satisfaction of high-paid workers.
Reference groups: Duties: supervisory; Contract: permanent; Education: below 2nd stage; Health: very good; Status last year: employed; Region: Attica; F test
statistic for the joint significance of the identifying restrictions in an overall job satisfaction regression: F (6, 4044) = 1.53
Source: Own calculations using ECHP data.
treatment effect modelling as above. The application of
this two-step empirical procedure once again results in
coefficients that differ with respect to OLS estimates.
Specifically, while the OLS output (not reported here)
does not reveal any significant effect of low-pay status on
the individual facets of job satisfaction, the estimates that
are corrected for endogeneity are significant for pay and
type of work at the 5% level, as discussed in the main text.
Statistical tests that examine the adequacy of the restric-
tions that identify the endogeneity effects were repeatedly
undertaken. Regressions were run in each case to ascer-
tain statistically that our chosen instruments are uncorre-
lated with the job satisfaction measures that were used.
Specifically, the variables used as identifying restrictions
were entered as regressors in the job satisfaction equa-
tions together with the other covariates. In all regressions
the instruments as a group did not add any significant
explanatory power as tested by an F test. The relevant F
statistics are reported at the end of their respective tables.
Given the desire to investigate whether the explanatory
variables exert a differential effect on the satisfaction of
the two types of workers, a Heckman-type selection
correction model was employed for both the low-pay
and the high-pay sample. This model, commonly known
as a “switching regression model with endogenous
switching”, was most notably espoused by Lee (1978).
The switching regression model consists of two job sat-
isfaction equations, one for each sector:
JSHi = XibH + uHi (5)
JSLi = XibL + uLi (6)
and one “selection equation” that determines which
sector the individual ends up in:
Ii* = ZiÁ + Âi (7)
where I * is a latent variable which describes the agent’s
propensity of joining each sector, and Z is a vector of
variables determining the employee’s selection, at least
one not affecting his job satisfaction. Of course, I * is
unobserved, but we know that:
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Notes: Standard errors in parentheses: robust to arbitrary heteroscedasticity and the repeat sampling of individuals over time.
*: significant at 10%; **: significant at 5%; ***: significant at 1%. Results for the remaining explanatory variables are available from the authors upon
request; all columns include Heckman ML estimates, where the first step is a probit regression of the treatment lowpay dummy on the regressors of the
underlying regression model and the chosen selection variables; the ‘Times’ and ‘Conditions’ regressions have been estimated using only rooms per per-
son as selection variables, whereas the rest use the good household features dummies as wel; F-test statistics for the joint significance of the selection vari-
ables in each job satisfaction regression: Pay – F(6, 4044) = 0.90; Security – F(6, 4044) = 1.62; Type of Work – F(6, 4044) = 1.61; Hours – F( 6, 4044)
= 1.56; Times – F(6, 4044) = 0.39; Conditions – F(2, 4044) = 1.64; Commuting – F(6, 4044) = 0.32.
T a b l e  A3
Estimates of effect of low pay status on facets of job satisfaction in Greece, 1995-2001
CommutingTimesConditionsHoursType of workSecurityPay
Lowpay -0.188 -0.011 -0.113 -0.042 -0.046 -0.034 0.178
(0.094)** -0.053 (0.058)** -0.058 0.096 -0.075 (0.093)*
Observations 15,213.00 15,213.00 15,213.00 15,213.00 15,213.00 15,213.00 15,213.00
Wald test (54) 3,015.77*** 9,639.1*** 3,683.91*** 2,486.37*** 2,152.64*** 2,111.51*** 715.76**
Log-likelihood –23,017.70 –20,605.33 –22,829.87 –23,531.61 –23,704.82 –23,911.20 –24,667.64
Ii = 1  iff  Ii* > 0 (8)
Ii = 0  iff  Ii* ≤ 0 (9)
Thus, our observed JS data are defined as follows:
JSi = JSLi iff  Ii > 0 (10)
JSi = JSHi iff  Ii = 0 (11)
ÛHH ÛHL ÛHÂ
CÔÓ(uHi , uLi , Âi) = ÛHL ÛLL ÛHÂ  (12)ÛHÂ ÛLÂ 1 
and it is evident that since E (uLi / Ii*>0) ≠ 0 and
E (u∏i / Ii*≤0) ≠ 0, estimation by OLS will result in
inconsistency.
The estimation of the selection equation therefore fol-
lows the probit method, and then the coefficients from
the probit are used for the calculation of the inverse
Mill’s ratio, as is illustrated in the following two steps:
Firstly, from (7) we retrieve Á^ from which we construct
ÛLÂ = CoÓ(uL, Â) × 
Ê(ZÁ^)

Φ(ZÁ^) (13)
and
Û∏Â = CoÓ(u∏, Â) × 
Ê(Z

1–º
Á^)

(∑Á^)
(14)
Secondly, the job satisfaction equations are estimated
including the respective Mill’s ratios as independent
variables, as follows:
JS∏i = Xi bH – ÛHÂ + ËHi (15)
JSLi = Xi bL – ÛLÂ + ËLi (16)
The estimated coefficients of bH and bL should now pro-
vide unbiased estimates of the effect of X. The esti-
mates reported in columns 2 and 3 of Table A2 have
therefore allowed for this correction.
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T a b l e  A4
Oaxaca decomposition of job satisfaction difference between high-paid and low-paid workers 
in Greece
Source: Own calculations using ECHP (1994-2001) data.
Raw differential 0.727
(mean job satisfaction of high-paid – mean job satisfaction of low-paid)
Differential due to:
Endowments 0.601
Coefficients 0.076
Interaction 0.05
Decomposition of explained difference
Lnpay 0.336
Age -0.055
Age2 0.045
Tenure 0.022
Private 0.074
Training 0.017
Fixed contract 0.015
Casual work 0.100
Tertiary education 0.023
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T a b l e  A5
Description of variables
Job satisfaction scores (1 = ‘not satisfied’, 6 = ‘fully satisfied’)
Overall job satisfaction Respondent satisfaction rating with work or main activity
Job satisfaction: facets Respondent satisfaction rating of facet i of present job (i = earnings, job secu-
rity, type of work, number of working hours, working times, work conditions/
environment, distance to work/commuting)
Identifying variables
1 room pp 1, if individual lives in household with 1 room per person (not counting kitchen,
bathroom and toilets), 0 otherwise
2 rooms pp 1, if individual lives in household with 2 rooms per person (not counting kitchen,
bathroom and toilets), 0 otherwise
3 rooms pp 1, if individual lives in household with more than 3 rooms per person (not count-
ing kitchen, bathroom and toilets), 0 otherwise
< 2 good features 1, if accommodation individual lives in has less than two good features, 0 other-
wise
3 good features 1, if accommodation individual lives in has 3 good features, 0 otherwise
4 good features 1, if accommodation individual lives in has 4 good features, 0 otherwise
5 good features 1, if accommodation individual lives in has 5 good features, 0 otherwise
6 good features 1, if accommodation individual lives in has 6 good features, 0 otherwise (omitted)
Job and personal characteristics
Lowpay 1, if individual is low-paid, 0 otherwise
Lnpay natural log of gross hourly wage of main job (including overtime)
Age age of respondent at date of interview
Age2 age squared
Tenure job tenure at date of interview
Married 1, if individual is married, 0 otherwise
Male 1, if gender is male, 0 otherwise
Hours Total number of hours worked per week (in main plus additional jobs, including
paid overtime)
Child < 12yrs 1, if household has 1 or more children under 12, 0 otherwise
Unemployed 5yrs 1, if individual has been unemployed during 5 years before joining the survey, 0
otherwise
Full-time 1, if main job is full-time, 0 otherwise
Private 1, if current job is in the private sector, 0 otherwise
Absenteeism Days absent from work because of illness or other reason during last 4 working
weeks, not counting holiday weeks
Human capital
Training 1, if individual had formal training or education that gave skills needed for pre-
sent type of work, 0 otherwise
Overqualified 1, if individual feels has skills or qualifications to do more demanding job than
the one has now, 0 otherwise 
Below 2nd stage secondary 1, if highest level of education completed is less than 2nd stage of secondary
education, 0 otherwise (omitted)
Second stage secondary 1, if highest level of education completed is second stage of secondary educa-
tion, 0 otherwise 
Third level 1, if highest level of general or higher education completed recognised third level
education, 0 otherwise 
DescriptionVariable
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T a b l e  A5 (continued)
Description of variables
Job satisfaction scores (1 = ‘not satisfied’, 6 = ‘fully satisfied’)
Duties
Supervisory 1, if job status in current job is supervisory (omitted), 0 otherwise
Intermediate 1, if job status in current job is intermediate, 0 otherwise
Non-supervisory 1, if job status in current job is non-supervisory, 0 otherwise
Contract
Permanent 1, if employment contract in main job is permanent, 0 otherwise (omitted)
Fixed/short term 1, if employment contract in main job is fixed-term or short-term, 0 otherwise
Casual work 1, if employment contract in main job is casual work with no contract, 0 other-
wise
Health
Health: very good 1, if health in general is very good, 0 otherwise (omitted)
Health: good 1, if health in general is good, 0 otherwise
Health: fair 1, if health in general is fair, 0 otherwise
Health: poor 1, if health in general is poor, 0 otherwise
Health: very poor 1, if health in general is very poor, 0 otherwise 
Status last year
Employed 1, if most frequent activity last year was employment, 0 otherwise (omitted)
Self-employed 1, if most frequent activity last year was self-employment, 0 otherwise
Unemployed 1, if most frequent activity last year was unemployment, 0 otherwise
Inactivity 1, if most frequent activity last year was inactivity, 0 otherwise
Region
Attica 1, if region in which the household is situated is Attica, 0 otherwise (omitted)
Northern GR 1, if region in which the household is situated is Northern Greece, 0 otherwise
Central GR 1, if region in which the household is situated is Central Greece, 0 otherwise
Aegean Islands, Crete 1, if region in which the household is situated are the Aegean Islands or Crete, 0
otherwise
Other controls
Industry A set of 10 dummies for one-digit industry, taking the value 1 if the respondent’s
job belongs to the corresponding industry classification, 0 otherwise. The one-
digit industries include: agriculture; mining and manufacturing; construction;
retail trade; hotels and restaurants; transport and communication; financial ser-
vices; public administration; education; health, social services and other (omit-
ted: agriculture) 
Occupation A set of nine dummies for one-digit occupation, taking the value 1 if the respon-
dent’s job belongs to the corresponding occupational classification, 0 otherwise.
The one-digit occupations include: legislators, senior officials and managers;
professionals; technicians and associate professionals; clerks; service and shop
and market sales workers; skilled agricultural and fishery workers; craft and
related trades workers; plant and machine operators and assemblers; elemen-
tary occupations (omitted: elementary occupations)
Year A set of seven dummies taking the value 1 for observactions that belong to the
corresponding wave of the ECHP, 0 otherwise. Years of sample comprise: 1995,
1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000 and 2001 (omitted category: 1995) 
DescriptionVariable
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Purchasing power parity (PPP) has long attracted
the interest of economists and has served as a
useful building block in a large number of open
economy macroeconomic models. In its relative
version it states that changes in nominal exchange
rates should equal inflation differentials or, equiv-
alently, that real exchange rates should be con-
stant. Yet, even in its long-run version, PPP has
often proved difficult to establish empirically.
Various explanations for the failure of long-run
PPP based on theoretical or statistical arguments
have, therefore, been put forward. The main the-
oretical arguments are the nature of shocks in the
economy and problems related to transaction
costs, while the statistical arguments (pointing to
an apparent rather than a real failure of PPP)
mainly relate to the low power of the statistical
tests used and to measurement errors in prices.
In this paper we offer an alternative hypothesis by
considering the relevance of long-run PPP in a
framework that allows for influences caused by
the implementation of an exchange rate rule by
the authorities when they are targeting the
exchange rate. The novelty of our approach is in
emphasising that the coefficient estimates of long-
run PPP may compound two distinct effects com-
ing from the behaviour of policymakers interven-
ing in the foreign exchange market in support of a
policy rule and of market participants engaging in
goods arbitrage. Specifically, market participants,
on the one hand, tend to establish PPP in the long
run, although their short-run behaviour may be
influenced by interventions of the monetary
authorities in the foreign exchange market. The
monetary authorities, on the other hand, may
undertake interventions in the market to support
an exchange rate rule that they may follow. If the
short-run behaviour of market participants is
actually affected by interventions which, in turn,
are governed by a policy rule, then testing for
long-run PPP by examining the behaviour of
exchange rates and relative prices alone, would
produce a long-run coefficient between these two
variables which depends on the policy rule para-
meter. Thus, there is a potential bias towards not
accepting PPP even as a long-run relationship.
The validity of the theoretical arguments is
assessed by drawing on the performance of two
European Union countries, Greece and France, for
the post-Bretton Woods period. The choice of this
sample was motivated by the fact that the mone-
tary authorities of the two countries were pursu-
ing —although in a different institutional setting—
an implicit or explicit exchange rate target for the
whole or part of the period analysed. Long-run
PPP is tested as an equilibrium relationship using
the Johansen multivariate cointegration tech-
nique. The model specification advocated by this
technique allows for different short-run and long-
run effects.
The empirical results support the validity of our
theoretical postulates. In particular, the results are
very supportive of long-run PPP in the case of
Greece, once policy effects are taken into account.
For France, the results revealed that biases due to
Working Papers
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policy effects are not as important as in the case of
Greece, confirming that the competitive disinfla-
tion policy pursued by the French authorities suc-
ceeded only in maintaining competitiveness in the
long run rather than improving it.
Our results can be viewed as complementary to
the growing body of recent empirical evidence of
long-run PPP over the recent float. The new ele-
ment introduced by our analysis is the investiga-
tion of the short-run PPP dynamics and the
mechanism establishing this arbitrage condition
in the long run in the presence of an intervention
policy under exchange rate targeting, which
potentially biases empirical tests of long-run PPP.
However, our findings show that policy behav-
iour, while affecting short-run adjustment to PPP
and our ability to uncover long-run PPP, cannot
prevent the long-run tendency towards purchas-
ing power parity.
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Fixed exchange rate regimes can be regarded as
“rules with escape clauses” which allow the mon-
etary authorities to suspend convertibility tem-
porarily and enact a discretionary policy only
under well-understood contingencies, such as
wartime emergencies and financial panics. Seen
from this perspective, adherence to the specie
convertibility rule enabled peripheral countries to
establish credibility for the nation's economic pol-
icy and, thus, to obtain access to core countries'
capital markets. Countries with poor records of
adherence were charged considerably more for
borrowing. Through institutional arrangements,
countries could lower borrowing costs on global
capital markets and this was a strong incentive to
adopt the gold standard rule quickly. This paper
attempts to examine whether Greece can be con-
sidered as an example of a country that followed
a fixed exchange rate regime with the accepted
“escape clauses” for war and financial emergen-
cies. The following questions are addressed. First,
under what circumstances did the government
choose to “escape”? Second, how aggressively
did the Greek government try to return to a fixed
exchange rate regime? And third, did adherence
to the specie convertibility rule enable the coun-
try to derive important benefits in the form of
long-term foreign borrowing? The evidence
assembled in the paper, both historical and
empirical, supports the conclusion that Greece
seems to have tried very hard to adhere to “good
housekeeping rules”. Furthermore, the existence
of a time series for market yields on Greek bonds
provides an opportunity to corroborate previous
evidence gleaned from the case studies. Empirical
findings reveal that Greek bond spreads were
lower and less persistent in the years when the
country adhered to the convertibility rule.
Working Papers
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A large body of the empirical research on the rela-
tionship between finance and growth focuses on
banking, the traditional intermediation channel.
However, over the last two decades, the new ele-
ment in many countries, especially the developing
ones, has been the increasing role for stock mar-
kets as providers of intermediation. This develop-
ment derives from measures to liberalise the
financial sector. As a result, there has been
renewed research interest in the role of the stock
markets as a stimulus to economic growth. Recent
advances in the endogenous growth literature
have determined the role of financial intermedi-
aries by showing that these can contribute to eco-
nomic growth through various aspects of produc-
tive activity.
The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the
empirical investigation of the finance-growth
nexus, recognising the separate roles of banking
and the stock market. Utilising time-series meth-
ods and applying vector error-correction (VEC)
model estimation, we examine whether financial
intermediation exerts a causal influence on eco-
nomic growth in the case of Greece, over the
period 1986-99. We also test the dynamic inter-
actions among financial variables and economic
growth and look into the extent to which the
financial sector contributes to the country's eco-
nomic growth process. Greece is a medium-size
EU country with a less mature financial market
compared to other advanced economies. Over
the last two decades, its financial market has
undergone a process of liberalisation at an accel-
erating pace and expanded considerably, while
the fairly remarkable growth rates achieved by the
Greek economy after the early 90s have enabled
the country to enter the euro area.
The paper provides empirical evidence on two
aspects of financial intermediation for the case of
Greece, employing monthly data for the period
1986-1999. The first concerns the linkage
between real economic activity and total private
financial intermediation, whether through banks
or the stock market. The second aspect refers to
the relationship between the industrial sector's
financing and economic performance to investi-
gate the specific role of industry in the growth
process. To this end, two models are analysed. In
the first model the linkages among real output,
total stock market capitalisation and total bank
credit to the private sector are examined, while in
the second model the relationship among real
output, industrial stock capitalisation and bank
credit to industry is considered.
The relationship between financial intermediation
and economic growth is explained in a temporal
Granger-causal framework. This is accomplished
by examining the dynamic relationships among
the three variables in a multivariate system. The
empirical results indicate the existence of a long-
run relationship among the three variables in both
models. The tests employed show that there
exists Granger causality in at least one direction.
In the long run real economic activity in Greece
should be considered endogenous, affected by
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changes in stock market capitalisation and bank
credit. Thus, the results suggest that a bi-directional
causality exists between real economic activity and
stock market capitalisation and also between real
economic activity and bank credit. In addition,
structural breaks were not detected in the long-run
relationships. These findings hold true for the
model concerning the whole economy and also for
the model for the Greek industrial sector.
However, the estimated coefficients are small in
magnitude, suggesting that the interrelation
between financing (stock market and bank) and
overall economic activity is limited. Thus, in the
long run, economic performance is only partially
related to financing through intermediation.
Besides, the contribution of the stock market
financing to the growth process is substantially
smaller compared to bank financing. The limited
contribution of the stock market to growth is not
surprising, given its minor role traditionally played
in Greece. However, the limited role of bank
financing, shown in our results, is noticeable and
needs further investigation, considering the con-
tribution that it is usually thought to have to eco-
nomic growth.
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We examine the implications of a regional, fixed-
exchange-rate regime for global exchange rate
volatility. The paper uses a three-country general
equilibrium model whose main features include
perfect competition, nominal wage rigidities,
active monetary policy (forward looking Taylor
rules) and a variety of shocks (supply, fiscal and
monetary). A generic calibration of the model that
relies heavily on parameters commonly used in
the literature serves as a useful benchmark. Its
purpose is to illuminate the role played by various
factors that have been emphasised in the opti-
mum currency area literature (the degree of
labour market flexibility and the existence of vari-
ous types of international asymmetries).
We find that a regional fixed-exchange rate regime
tends to decrease global exchange rate volatility
if there is sufficient symmetry in the world
economy. The results tend to be more ambigu-
ous in the presence of asymmetries, a factor
that has been emphasised by the optimum cur-
rency area —OCA— theory. In particular, the
reduction in volatility is greater when (1) the
“ins” have more flexible labour markets than the
“outs” (2) the pegging is done by a country with
a relatively more flexible labour market and
more volatile productivity, and (3) negative cor-
relation in productivity across countries is pre-
sent. Based on the relationship obtained bet-
ween country characteristics and volatility, we
speculate that global exchange rate volatility
would be more likely to decline under a bilateral
EUR/USD targeting or if it were the US —rather
than the EMU members— that unilaterally tar-
geted the EUR/USD rate.
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The present paper extends the current literature
on PPP by re-examining the validity of the PPP
hypothesis for the three key currencies of the
recent floating exchange rate period, the US dol-
lar, the German mark and the Japanese yen, in a
multilateral framework. We argue that PPP test-
ing is more adequate in a system context, which
takes into account the dynamic interactions of
exchange rates and prices of more than two
economies, simultaneously. Some form of causal-
ity among the variables of the system is also
assessed empirically with the aid of weak exo-
geneity tests. The results illustrate the impor-
tance of the multilateral testing. The system
analysis provides positive evidence for PPP: weak
PPP is supported for the US and Germany but
also for the US and Japan, in contrast to evidence
of earlier empirical studies, which rejects weak
PPP between Japan and the US. The analysis also
provides some support for PPP between
Germany and Japan. These results probably imply
that both Germany and Japan preserved steady
price competitiveness with the US for the period
analysed, and this is reflected in the third Japan –
Germany relationship, which can be considered
as a secondary relationship. The system analysis
also provides interesting results concerning the
weak exogeneity of the variables. It indicates that
US prices are the weakly exogenous variable for
the long-run relations and thus function as the
driving variable in the system. This implies that
any shocks that hit US prices are passed through
to German and Japanese prices via the equilib-
rium real exchange rate. The results thus support
the hypothesis that the US monetary policy is
transmitted to the prices of Germany and Japan.
Working Papers
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Monetary policy and
financial system
supervision measures
(July 2004 - January 2005)
Monetary policy measures of the
Eurosystem
1 July, 2 August, 2 September, 7 October,
4 November, 2 December 2004
The Governing Council of the ECB decides that
the minimum bid rate on the main refinancing
operations and the interest rates on the marginal
lending facility and the deposit facility will remain
unchanged at 2.0%, 3.0% and 1.0% respectively.
13 January 2005
The Governing Council of the ECB decides that
the minimum bid rate on the main refinancing
operations and the interest rates on the marginal
lending facility and the deposit facility will remain
unchanged at 2.0%, 3.0% and 1.0% respectively.
14 January 2005
The Governing Council of the ECB decides to
increase the allotment amount for each of the
longer-term refinancing operations to be conducted
in the year 2005 from €25 billion to €30 billion.
This increased amount takes into consideration the
higher liquidity needs of the euro area banking sys-
tem anticipated in 2005. The Eurosystem will how-
ever continue to provide the bulk of liquidity
through its main refinancing operations. 
Bank of Greece decisions concerning the
establishment and operation of credit
institutions and the supervision of the
financial system
19 July 2004
– Credit institutions which are not members of the
Athens Exchange are allowed to finance legal per-
sons for conducting stock exchange transactions.
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– To achieve correct and consistent implementa-
tion of the relevant provisions, the Bank of Greece
clarifies some of its decisions referring to the
interest rates charged by credit institutions and to
the information provided to credit institution cus-
tomers.
– The “Christoforos K. Varvias & Associates S.A. –
Financial Services” is authorised to operate as a
money transfer intermediary.
– The “Advanced Chronocash Financial – Electronic
Fund Transfer S.A.” is authorised to operate as a
money transfer intermediary.
– Ceilings are set on the amount of non-innova-
tive hybrid securities issued by credit institutions
that may be included in their core capital.
27 July 2004
The Bank of Greece withdraws the authorisation
of the “Arab Bank plc” branch operating in
Greece.
4 August 2004
– “CBN Greece S.A.” is authorised to operate as a
money transfer intermediary.
– “Moneylink S.A.” is authorised to operate as a
money transfer intermediary.
9 September 2004
– The Bank of Greece approves the merger of
“Emboriki Bank” with several of its subsidiaries
(“Emboriki Investment Bank” inclusive). The
merger will be effected through absorption of the
above firms by “Emboriki Bank”.
– “Smith & Smith Hellas S.A.” is authorised to
operate as a money transfer intermediary.
10 November 2004
“Athens Tourism Enterprises S.A.” is authorised to
operate as a money transfer intermediary.
21 December 2004
The ceiling on Postal Savings Bank (PSB) financing
of natural persons for the purchase of goods and
for covering other personal needs is set at 15% of
the PSB’s own funds, on condition that its provi-
sions for doubtful loans will at least equal the
amount provided for by Law 2238/1994 (1% of
the amounts lent).
19 January 2005
Alpha Bank is authorised to acquire 100% of the
share capital of the Belgrade-based bank “Jubanka
a.d. Beograd”.
26 January 2005
The provisioning ratios for claims (i) from non-
performing consumer loans one year past due or
in permanent arrears and (ii) from doubtful con-
sumer loans are increased, respectively, from 70%
to 90% and from 84% to 100%. At the same time,
the provisioning ratio on performing loans backed
by residential mortgages is lowered from 0.7% to
0.5%, provided that the amount of the loan does
not exceed 70% of the objective value of the resi-
dential property.
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Decisions of the Bank
of Greece
Re: Clarifications on Bank of Greece Governor’s Acts
1087/1987, 1216/1987, 1955/1991, 2286/1994,
2326/1994 and 2501/2002 on credit institutions’
interest rate determination and on information dis-
closure to credit institutions’ customers (Banking
and Credit Committee decision 178/3/19 July 2004)
The Banking and Credit Committee, having regard
to:
a) the provisions of the Statute of the Bank of
Greece, in particular Articles 2 and 55A
thereof, as currently in force;
b) Legislative Decree 588/1948 on credit control,
as currently in force;
c) Article 13, paragraph 5 and Article 18, para-
graph 5, first indent, of Law 2076/1992
“Taking up and pursuit of business of credit
institutions and other provisions”, as cur-
rently in force;
d) the Treaty establishing the European Commu-
nity and the principles underlying monetary
policy conduct by the European System of
Central Banks;
e) Bank of Greece Governor’s Act 1087/1987, in
conjunction with Bank of Greece Governor’s
Acts 1216/1987, 1955/1991, 2286/1994 and
2326/1994 regarding, inter alia, the free deter-
mination of interest rates by credit institutions;
f) Bank of Greece Governor’s Act 2501/2002 on
information disclosure to credit institutions’ cus-
tomers with respect to the terms and conditions
governing the provision of bank services;
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g) the fact that bank and non-bank interest rates
are two separate types of interest rates, the
determination of each of which is subject to
different criteria and, hence, to distinct, non-
overlapping provisions (Article 2, paragraph 3,
of Legislative Decree 588/1948 in conjunction
with Article 1 of Law 1266/1982, as currently
in force, and Article 15, paragraph 5, of Law
876/1979, respectively);
h) the fact that bank interest rates are freely deter-
mined, according to the principles underlying
monetary policy conduct by the European
System of Central Banks, i.e. free competition,
open-market economy, under Articles 2, 4 and
105.1 of the Treaty establishing the European
Community and Article 2 of the Statute of the
European System of Central Banks and the
European Central Bank;
i) the need to clarify some provisions of the
aforementioned Bank of Greece Governor’s
Acts with a view to ensuring correct and uni-
form implementation thereof and thus easier
achievement of the Acts’ objectives;
j) Hellenic Bank Association document 865/23
June 2004 requesting the interpretation of the
provisions on bank interest rate determination;
k) the Bank of Greece Governor’s document
dated 23 May 2002, which, in reply to a
request of the Hellenic Bank Association simi-
lar to that in j) above, provides detailed, legally
grounded, clarifications,
has decided to clarify the relevant provisions of Bank
of Greece Governor’s Acts 1087/1987, 1216/1987,
1955/1991, 2286/1994 and 2326/1994, as well as
Bank of Greece Governor’s Act 2501/2002, last
indent of Section A, paragraphs 1(f), 2a(iv), 2a(vi)
and 3 of Section B, paragraphs 1(e) and 2 of
Section C, and Section F, as follows:
1. Setting an administrative ceiling on bank
rates or correlating them with the current
ceiling on non-bank rates is incompatible
with the principles referred to in indents (g)
and (h) above. As far as its content and pur-
pose are concerned, the ceiling on non-bank
rates does not belong to the factors deter-
mining bank rates. The latter are set freely,
following an assessment of relevant risks,
conditions prevailing in financial markets and
the overall obligations of banks stemming
from the provisions which govern their oper-
ation. Therefore, agreements concluded fol-
lowing the liberalisation of bank rates (Bank
of Greece Governor’s Act 1087/1987 etc.)
and setting bank rates which exceed the
administrative ceiling on non-bank rates shall
not be considered unfair for this reason.
2. a) Paragraph 2, indent a (iv), of Section B of
Bank of Greece Governor’s Act 2501/2002 on
floating rates conforms with the above prin-
ciple and aims at ensuring full transparency
and effectively informing bank borrowers on
how the initially agreed interest rate of a loan
agreement may change.
b) Changes in floating rates shall be exclusively
associated with changes in general and
broadly accessible interest rate indicators,
such as the European Central Bank key inter-
est rates, the Euribor, bond yields, yields on
short-term securities, etc., which shall be
explicitly specified in the loan agreement.
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The loan agreement shall also explicitly set
out the method for the adjustment of the
contractual interest rate:
i) as a maximum multiple of the change in
the interest rate indicator, or
ii) as the interest rate indicator plus a mar-
gin subject to a ceiling.
If more than one indicators are selected, the
weight of each indicator in the calculation of the
floating rate adjustment shall also be specified in
the loan agreement.
c) The phrase “... as well as ... the loan” in para-
graph 2, indent a (iv), Section B, of Bank of
Greece Governor’s Act 2501/2002 refers
exclusively to prior information to be pro-
vided to prospective borrowers on the fac-
tors that may affect the evolution of the
interest rate agreed to be used as benchmark
rate. Such factors shall not determine per se
the contractual interest rate.
3. a) One-off costs, expenses on behalf of third
parties, as well as special service fees charged
by credit institutions in the context of their
lending operations (including cash with-
drawals via credit cards) shall not be specified
as percentages but as fixed amounts, as per
the case, the level of which shall be reason-
able on account of the nature and type of the
service provided (Section B, paragraph 2,
indent a (vi), and Section F of Bank of Greece
Governor’s Act 2501/2002).
b) The requirement for a reasonable and ser-
vice-specific level of costs and fees shall also
apply to deposits and other banking opera-
tions (Section B, paragraphs 1 (f) and 3 of
Bank of Greece Governor’s Act 2501/2002).
4. No fees shall be charged for the periodical
statements issued with respect to the mini-
mum information required under Section C,
paragraph 2, of Bank of Greece Governor’s
Act 2501/2002.
5. a) The minimum information requirements
under Section B of Bank of Greece
Governor’s Act 2501/2002 shall not replace
the requirement on credit institutions to expli-
citly set out, in every agreement, the rights
and obligations of their counterparties.
b) Any clause allowing for a unilateral modifica-
tion, on the part of a credit institution, of an
agreement (Section C, paragraph 1(e), of Bank
of Greece Governor’s Act 2501/2002) shall
be accompanied by an explicit determination
of specific and reasonable criteria for such a
modification.
*   *   *
Re: Recognition of certain types of securities as core
capital items of credit institutions (Banking and
Credit Committee decision 178/7/19 July 2004)
The Banking and Credit Committee, having regard
to:
a) Bank of Greece Governor’s Act 2053/18
March 1992 “Definition of own funds of
credit institutions established in Greece”, as
currently in force;
Decisions of the Bank of Greece
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b) Bank of Greece Administration’s Circular
17/21 October 2002 “Clarifications on the
minimum requirements for the recognition of
certain types of securities as core capital items
of credit institutions”;
c) the advisability of setting specific requirements
for the recognition of non-innovative hybrid
securities issued by credit institutions as core
capital items, in line with international practice,
has decided as follows:
a) Hybrid securities that meet the basic require-
ments of Bank of Greece Administration’s
Circular 17/2002 and are included in the
credit institutions’ core capital as “Lower Tier
1 capital” may not exceed 30% of core capital.
Specifically with respect to securities provid-
ing the issuing bank with a call option and
offering a stepped-up yield to investors if the
issuer does not exercise the call option, their
share in the Tier 1 capital of the issuing bank
may not exceed 15%.
b) The Department for the Supervision of
Credit and Financial Institutions is autho-
rised to amend the aforesaid Bank of Greece
Administration’s Circular in line with the
above provisions and adjust the following
requirements for the recognition of the said
hybrid (innovative and non-innovative) secu-
rities as core capital items:
— the minimum Capital Adequacy and Upper-
Tier-1-Capital-to-Weighted-Assets ratios
that shall apply to the credit institution at the
initial issuance and up to maturity of the
securities, and
— the period after which the issuing bank may
exercise any existing call option.
*   *   *
Re: Amendment to Bank of Greece Governor’s Act
2442/29 January 1999 “Adequacy of credit institu-
tions’ provisioning coverage of loans”, as currently
in force (Bank of Greece Governor’s Act 2557/26
January 2005)
The Governor of the Bank of Greece, having
regard to:
a) the provisions of the Statute of the Bank of
Greece, notably Article 55A, as currently in
force;
b) Article 1 of Law 1266/1982 ‘’Authorities
responsible for the conduct of monetary,
credit and exchange rate policies, and other
provisions’’, taken together with Article 12 of
Law 2548/1997;
c) Article 18 of Law 2076/1992 ‘’Taking up and
pursuit of business of credit institutions, and
other relevant provisions’’, as amended by
Article 38, par. 3, of Law 2937/2001;
d) Bank of Greece Governor’s Act 2442/29
January 1999 “Adequacy of credit institutions’
provisioning coverage of loans’’, as amended
by Bank of Greece Governor’s Act 2513/15
January 2003;
e) Bank of Greece Governor’s Act 2054/18
March 1992 “Solvency ratio of credit institu-
tions established in Greece”, as currently in
force;
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f) Bank of Greece Governor’s Act 2523/12 June
2003 on consumer credit and personal loans;
g) Circular 412/12 May 2003 of the Department
for the Supervision of Credit and Financial
Institutions, providing instructions and clarifi-
cations on the implementation of the Bank of
Greece Governor’s Acts referred to in d), e)
and f) above for the calculation of provisions;
h) the advisability of adjusting the minimum pro-
visioning ratios for certain categories of loans;
i) the fact that the applicable provisioning
framework does not relieve credit institutions
of their obligation to develop risk manage-
ment systems;
has decided to amend the provisions of Bank of
Greece Governor’s Act 2442/29 January 1999, as
currently in force, as follows:
1. The minimum provisioning ratios set forth in
par. 1 of Bank of Greece Governor’s Act
2442/29 January 1999, as currently in force,
applying to loans to natural persons accord-
ing to Bank of Greece Governor’s Act 2523/
2003, are increased as follows:
i) from 70% (as it resulted after the increase
provided for in par. 3(b) of Bank of Greece
Governor’s Act 2513/15 January 2003) to
90% for loans under categories (d) and (e)
of par. 1 of Bank of Greece Governor’s
Act 2442/29 January 1999, as currently in
force; and
ii) from 84% (as it resulted after the increase
provided for in par. 3(b) of Bank of Greece
Governor’s Act 2513/15 January 2003) to
100% for loans under category (f) of par. 1
of Bank of Greece Governor’s Act 2442/29
January 1999, as currently in force.
2. The minimum provisioning ratio applying,
under par. 1 (a) of Bank of Greece Gover-
nor’s Act 2442/29 January 1999, to the bal-
ances of performing loans backed by resi-
dential mortgages is reduced from 0.7% (as
it resulted after the reduction provided for in
par. 3(a) of Bank of Greece Governor’s Act
2513/15 January 2003) to 0.5%, subject to
the provisions of par. 3(a) of Bank of Greece
Governor’s Act 2513/15 January 2003.
3. The amounts resulting from the adjustment
of provisioning ratios under par. 1 and 2
above shall be taken into account as follows
for the evaluation of the capital adequacy of
credit institutions: by 50% on the data
reported on 31 March 2005 and by 50% on
the data reported on 30 September 2005.
Decisions of the Bank of Greece
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T a b l e  I.1
Consumer price index
(Percentage changes with respect to the corresponding period of the previous year)
Source: Calculations based on National Statistical Service of Greece (NSSG) data (CPI 1999=100).
2001  . . . . . . . . 3.4 3.7 3.8 3.2 3.7 5.1 9.2 –4.8
2002  . . . . . . . . 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.2 4.3 5.3 13.8 –1.7
2003  . . . . . . . . 3.5 3.1 3.2 3.1 4.2 5.0 10.7 3.9
2004  . . . . . . . . 2.9 3.2 3.3 2.3 3.8 0.5 –11.9 7.5
2002 I  . . . . . . 4.0 3.4 3.3 4.0 3.9 9.9 43.2 –7.4
II  . . . . . . 3.5 3.9 3.9 3.0 4.4 4.7 9.0 –4.9
III  . . . . . 3.5 3.6 3.7 2.7 4.6 4.0 4.5 –0.4
IV  . . . . . 3.6 3.5 3.5 3.0 4.5 2.9 1.0 6.7
2003 I  . . . . . . 3.8 3.4 3.6 3.4 4.5 2.3 –5.4 15.9
II  . . . . . . 3.7 3.0 3.1 3.4 4.1 8.3 27.6 –2.4
III  . . . . . 3.4 2.9 3.0 2.9 4.1 6.1 19.2 0.9
IV  . . . . . 3.2 3.3 3.2 2.5 4.3 3.3 4.6 1.9
2004 I  . . . . . . 2.7 3.2 3.3 1.8 4.0 3.3 2.6 –5.7
II  . . . . . . 2.9 3.2 3.3 2.3 3.9 –0.7 –16.3 11.6
III  . . . . . 2.8 3.4 3.4 2.1 3.9 –1.3 –22.8 9.6
IV  . . . . . 3.2 2.9 3.0 2.9 3.5 0.8 –11.3 15.5
2002 Jan.  . . . . 4.4 3.2 3.3 5.2 3.3 12.9 59.0 –6.4
Feb.  . . . . 3.4 3.2 3.1 3.1 3.9 8.6 38.1 –10.3
March  . . 4.0 3.7 3.6 3.8 4.4 8.1 33.4 –5.5
Apr.  . . . . 3.8 3.5 3.4 4.0 3.6 7.2 26.7 –2.9
May  . . . . 3.8 4.3 4.2 2.4 4.9 3.0 –0.6 –6.8
June  . . . 3.3 3.8 3.9 2.5 4.5 3.9 2.2 –4.8
July  . . . . 3.3 3.5 3.7 2.7 4.4 3.9 1.7 –1.0
Aug.  . . . 3.5 3.6 3.6 2.9 4.5 4.2 6.1 0.5
Sept.  . . . 3.5 3.8 3.7 2.7 4.8 3.9 5.8 –0.8
Oct.  . . . 3.7 3.6 3.5 3.2 4.6 4.1 8.1 4.3
Nov.  . . . 3.6 3.5 3.5 3.1 4.5 4.0 6.3 4.0
Dec.  . . . 3.4 3.5 3.5 2.8 4.3 0.8 –9.1 12.1
2003 Jan.  . . . . 3.1 3.6 3.7 2.1 4.7 –1.4 –19.6 13.7
Feb.  . . . . 4.3 3.5 3.8 4.1 4.7 3.7 –0.5 18.6
March  . . 4.1 3.1 3.4 4.1 4.1 4.7 5.5 15.4
Apr.  . . . . 3.4 3.1 3.4 2.6 4.5 5.8 10.9 –1.9
May  . . . . 3.8 2.8 2.9 3.9 3.7 10.3 40.2 –3.7
June  . . . 3.8 3.0 3.0 3.6 4.2 8.9 34.6 –1.6
July  . . . . 3.6 2.9 2.9 3.2 4.1 7.4 28.5 0.5
Aug.  . . . 3.3 2.9 3.0 2.8 4.0 5.6 17.0 1.6
Sept.  . . . 3.3 3.1 3.2 2.8 4.2 5.2 12.6 0.7
Oct.  . . . 3.2 3.2 3.2 2.5 4.2 3.7 4.9 1.1
Nov.  . . . 3.3 3.2 3.1 2.9 4.1 3.3 5.6 6.3
Dec.  . . . 3.1 3.4 3.3 2.2 4.5 3.0 3.2 –1.4
2004 Jan.  . . . . 2.9 3.2 3.2 2.3 3.9 3.5 4.9 –3.0
Feb.  . . . . 2.5 3.1 3.1 1.5 4.0 3.7 4.7 –8.7
March  . . 2.7 3.3 3.4 1.8 4.2 2.8 –1.3 –5.4
Apr.  . . . . 2.9 3.2 3.2 2.3 3.9 0.4 –10.2 8.3
May  . . . . 2.9 3.2 3.3 2.4 3.8 –1.0 –17.4 14.9
June  . . . 2.8 3.3 3.5 2.1 3.9 –1.5 –20.9 11.7
July  . . . . 2.9 3.8 3.8 2.2 4.0 –2.5 –28.2 10.0
Aug.  . . . 2.7 3.1 3.2 1.9 4.0 –0.7 –20.3 9.2
Sept.  . . . 2.8 3.2 3.3 2.2 3.7 –0.7 –19.5 9.5
Oct.  . . . 3.2 3.0 3.0 3.1 3.5 0.3 –13.6 17.5
Nov.  . . . 3.1 2.9 3.1 2.8 3.6 0.2 –16.2 16.7
Dec.  . . . 3.1 2.8 2.9 2.8 3.5 1.9 –4.1 12.1
Period
General
index
General
index
excluding
food and fuel
General index
excluding fresh
fruit/vegetables
and fuel Goods Services
Sub-indices
Food and
non-alcoholic
beverages
Fresh fruit
and vegetables Fuel
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Source: NSSG.
2001  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3 10.0 2.7 0.7 1.9
2002  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4 11.2 2.6 1.9 0.4
2003  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 8.6 2.7 0.1 1.1
2004  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4 –1.7 4.5 3.4 0.5
2002 I  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3 34.7 2.6 2.4 0.6
II  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.7 6.9 2.2 1.2 0.2
III  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.6 4.8 2.4 1.3 0.2
IV  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.0 0.6 3.1 2.7 0.6
2003 I  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.7 –2.5 3.6 1.1 1.5
II  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 19.6 1.9 –2.0 0.9
III  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 12.2 2.4 0.2 1.0
IV  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 7.1 3.1 1.0 0.8
2004 I  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.8 4.6 2.8 1.6 0.0
II  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.6 –8.1 5.4 5.6 0.6
III  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4 –6.0 4.9 4.1 0.5
IV  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.8 3.1 4.7 2.5 0.9
2002 Jan.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.1 44.4 2.7 2.4 0.8
Feb. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.6 29.5 2.0 1.9 0.5
March  . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2 30.5 3.0 2.8 0.5
Apr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.7 23.3 2.7 2.8 0.4
ªay . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2 1.4 2.1 1.2 0.2
June  . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.3 –3.4 1.8 –0.3 0.0
July  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.8 –0.7 2.3 0.5 –0.1
∞ug.  . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 9.2 2.5 1.7 0.4
Sept.  . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.9 6.0 2.5 1.7 0.4
Oct. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4 5.6 3.1 3.2 0.3
Nov.  . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 4.5 2.9 2.2 0.5
Dec.  . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.4 –6.8 3.2 2.7 0.9
2003 Jan.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.5 –14.2 3.5 1.4 1.4
Feb. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.6 2.5 4.1 1.9 1.6
March  . . . . . . . . . . . 2.0 4.9 3.0 0.0 1.4
Apr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.0 6.5 1.8 –2.2 1.0
ªay . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4 28.1 1.7 –3.3 0.9
June  . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1 26.6 2.2 –0.3 1.0
July  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.9 20.9 2.2 0.7 1.2
∞ug.  . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 10.6 2.5 0.7 1.0
Sept.  . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.5 5.6 2.5 –0.7 0.9
Oct. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.9 7.5 2.7 0.2 0.9
Nov.  . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.6 7.9 3.5 1.8 0.9
Dec.  . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.0 5.9 3.0 1.1 0.6
2004 Jan.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3 10.6 2.7 1.9 0.0
Feb. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.4 4.7 2.5 0.5 –0.1
March  . . . . . . . . . . . 1.6 –0.7 3.1 2.3 0.0
Apr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.8 –2.3 5.0 4.6 0.7
ªay . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1 –8.5 5.9 7.5 0.7
June  . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.9 –13.5 5.4 4.8 0.6
July  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3 –8.2 5.3 4.1 0.5
∞ug.  . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 –7.1 4.9 4.0 0.3
Sept.  . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.7 –2.5 4.6 4.2 0.7
Oct. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.9 –2.2 5.2 4.1 0.9
Nov.  . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.6 1.5 4.7 2.2 0.8
Dec.  . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.9 9.7 4.1 1.1 0.9
T a b l e  I.2
Wholesale price index
(Percentage changes with respect to the corresponding period of the previous year)
General
index
Sub-indices
Final domestic products
for home consumption
Exported
products
(primary
and
industrial)
Final
imported
productsPrimary IndustrialPeriod
Statistical section
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T a b l e  I.3
Industrial production index (2000=100)
(Percentage changes with respect to the corresponding period of the previous year)
Period
Main categories of goods
Industry
Consumer
non-
durables
Consumer
durables
Capital
goods
Inter-
mediate
goodsEnergy
Electricity-
town gas-
water
supply
Mining-
quarrying
Manu-
facturing
General
index
2000 . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.2 5.1 13.4 11.5 12.3 6.2 7.3 12.7 1.9
2001 . . . . . . . . . . . . –1.8 –2.5 2.4 –0.1 –0.3 –0.5 –13.0 –14.4 0.7
2002 . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.8 –0.1 9.7 1.8 2.3 1.6 –7.2 –15.4 2.3
2003 . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.3 –0.4 –5.2 5.8 2.9 –0.4 0.8 –3.6 –1.4
2002 IV . . . . . . . . . . 2.5 2.0 14.5 1.0 2.9 1.9 6.5 –17.8 3.4
2003 I . . . . . . . . . . . –1.5 –2.3 –11.3 6.2 4.1 –1.9 –11.1 –5.5 –3.7
II. . . . . . . . . . . 0.9 0.3 –5.8 6.7 2.9 –2.0 9.4 –8.5 0.4
III . . . . . . . . . . 1.6 0.8 –3.8 7.1 6.4 –0.6 8.5 –0.3 –2.4
IV . . . . . . . . . . 0.1 –0.5 –0.1 3.0 –1.8 3.0 –2.7 –0.2 0.1
2004 I . . . . . . . . . . . 1.5 0.4 5.9 4.2 2.2 0.2 3.3 –0.6 1.7
II. . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 2.7 9.2 –3.5 –0.5 4.9 –1.4 20.0 1.6
III . . . . . . . . . . 0.9 1.5 –5.9 1.1 –0.5 –0.4 –0.9 3.1 4.3
2002 Jan. . . . . . . . . . –3.6 –7.6 13.4 8.4 4.7 –7.8 –32.0 –25.7 5.2
Feb. . . . . . . . . –0.3 –1.5 19.7 –1.4 2.2 2.9 –26.3 –12.4 7.0
March . . . . . . . 2.7 2.7 11.9 –0.6 6.8 1.8 –7.0 –12.8 4.6
∞pr. . . . . . . . . 5.3 5.1 8.5 4.9 4.8 13.5 –16.6 –8.3 5.9
May . . . . . . . . –1.3 –2.6 11.1 0.2 –1.3 –1.4 –11.9 –16.2 3.5
June . . . . . . . . 1.1 –0.7 8.8 6.8 4.1 1.4 –2.0 –21.0 0.5
July . . . . . . . . . 0.7 –0.5 1.6 5.4 1.7 1.2 1.8 –14.3 0.0
Aug. . . . . . . . . –1.5 –2.4 7.5 –1.3 1.2 0.4 1.8 –19.9 –5.4
Sept. . . . . . . . . –1.2 –0.5 –2.7 –3.7 –4.6 1.7 0.7 –4.3 –1.4
Oct. . . . . . . . . –0.2 0.0 5.2 –2.9 –0.1 0.4 2.2 –10.8 –0.8
Nov. . . . . . . . . 1.3 –0.5 17.1 3.9 5.8 –1.5 0.8 –14.4 1.3
Dec. . . . . . . . . 7.0 7.2 25.0 1.9 3.0 8.1 16.4 –26.2 11.3
2003 Jan. . . . . . . . . . 1.6 4.6 –8.8 –5.6 –1.6 8.8 –9.4 9.3 0.1
Feb. . . . . . . . . –3.6 –6.4 –16.0 15.1 6.9 –5.8 –21.1 –9.1 –5.9
March . . . . . . . –2.1 –3.9 –8.9 10.4 7.2 –6.8 –2.2 –11.6 –5.0
∞pr. . . . . . . . . –1.9 –3.3 –0.8 5.0 6.1 –7.4 –1.2 –20.6 –1.9
May . . . . . . . . 3.6 2.9 –8.0 12.1 10.3 –1.0 9.2 –6.3 1.7
June . . . . . . . . 1.0 1.2 –7.9 3.5 –6.5 2.4 19.3 2.8 1.4
July . . . . . . . . . 1.9 2.4 –6.0 2.8 3.0 1.6 7.2 1.8 –0.3
Aug. . . . . . . . . –2.4 –5.3 –4.1 8.8 6.1 –5.3 1.1 –0.8 –9.7
Sept. . . . . . . . . 4.9 4.3 –1.4 10.8 10.6 0.8 14.4 –1.8 2.3
Oct. . . . . . . . . 0.6 –0.5 0.3 6.3 –2.0 1.7 –3.5 2.4 3.2
Nov. . . . . . . . . –2.6 –2.8 –11.5 2.0 –4.5 2.4 –6.8 –0.6 –5.0
Dec. . . . . . . . . 2.5 2.0 14.5 1.0 0.9 5.3 1.5 –2.3 2.3
2004 Jan. . . . . . . . . . –2.7 –5.9 –1.5 9.9 6.1 –9.8 3.4 –23.3 –5.0
Feb. . . . . . . . . 2.2 2.2 6.6 0.7 0.7 2.2 –1.6 0.3 5.1
March . . . . . . . 4.5 4.4 12.0 2.5 0.1 7.6 7.2 16.5 4.4
Apr. . . . . . . . . 3.3 3.3 12.9 –0.2 –2.2 6.5 1.3 17.6 5.2
ªay . . . . . . . . 2.3 3.9 4.6 –6.1 –2.6 7.0 1.3 20.6 1.1
June . . . . . . . . 0.8 1.1 10.2 –4.0 3.5 1.3 –5.7 21.6 –1.4
July . . . . . . . . . 2.1 2.6 3.7 0.0 0.0 1.3 6.8 12.8 3.3
Aug. . . . . . . . . 0.5 2.3 –13.9 –0.3 –3.1 –3.2 –4.8 6.7 9.3
Sept. . . . . . . . . 0.0 –0.1 –7.6 3.8 1.7 –0.2 –6.3 –7.5 1.1
Oct. . . . . . . . . –3.6 –4.9 –2.2 1.9 –3.5 –4.0 –3.6 –12.4 –2.6
Nov.* . . . . . . . 2.8 3.4 –11.4 5.6 7.7 0.2 –0.1 –12.5 2.9
* Provisional data.
Source: NSSG, revised industrial production index with 2000 as the base year.
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Sources: NSSG and Eurostat. Revised index of retail sales volume (excluding VAT).
T a b l e  I.4
Retail sales volume (2000=100)
(Percentage changes with respect to the corresponding period of the previous year)
Period
General
index
Clothing and
footwear
Sub-indices
Furniture
and
fixtures
Books-stationery-
other items
2000  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.8 7.4 13.3 11.5 8.3
2001  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4 2.3 3.3 4.7 5.9
2002  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.5 4.5 2.8 4.4 5.2
2003  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.6 5.4 1.6 4.0 7.5
2002 III  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.5 7.6 0.9 5.7 6.3
IV  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.9 7.0 3.9 2.9 3.3
2003 I  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.7 7.7 –3.5 13.7 7.2
II  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.6 1.3 10.5 –1.7 11.5
III  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.9 4.7 7.8 3.6 8.8
IV  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.5 7.7 –4.9 1.7 3.2
2004 I  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.9 6.2 0.6 5.7 6.6
II  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.1 7.8 –1.4 6.2 4.6
III  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.7 8.2 3.0 3.6 5.7
2002 Apr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . –1.9 –4.7 –3.2 1.7 2.2
ªay . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.9 10.8 2.1 –0.1 12.8
June  . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.8 7.7 –0.6 3.6 7.7
July  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.6 4.6 1.6 1.9 7.0
Aug.  . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3 9.7 –8.8 6.7 3.3
Sept.  . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.6 8.7 10.0 9.0 8.0
Oct. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4 6.4 7.7 0.7 4.1
Nov.  . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.8 6.4 3.9 2.2 0.0
Dec.  . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.2 7.9 1.5 5.1 5.0
2003 Jan.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.2 9.6 –4.2 19.8 11.6
Feb. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.6 7.0 –8.5 10.1 3.5
March  . . . . . . . . . . . 7.3 6.6 5.0 10.8 6.3
Apr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2 4.2 12.3 –8.0 21.2
ªay . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.8 –0.8 12.3 1.8 8.1
June  . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.7 0.3 6.2 1.4 5.3
July  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 –0.1 5.5 2.0 3.0
Aug.  . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.2 9.1 12.5 6.9 12.6
Sept.  . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2 5.3 6.4 2.2 11.2
Oct. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2 6.8 –5.6 5.7 1.2
Nov.  . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.5 9.4 1.3 2.8 9.5
Dec.  . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.4 7.2 –8.7 –2.4 0.5
2004 Jan.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.9 7.2 –3.9 –3.4 2.2
Feb. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.4 4.8 5.6 13.0 10.1
March  . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4 6.5 0.2 9.1 8.1
Apr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.9 8.6 –3.5 9.7 4.9
May . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3 6.7 –5.3 7.9 4.5
June  . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.0 8.2 5.7 1.4 4.5
July  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.6 13.7 2.0 2.7 4.3
Aug.  . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3 3.5 5.0 4.7 8.0
Sept.  . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3 7.6 2.5 3.5 5.3
Oct. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2 10.0 6.2 3.4 4.9
Nov.  . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.8 . . . . . . . . . . . .
Food-beverages-
tobacco
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T a b l e  I.5
Gross value added at basic prices and gross domestic product at market prices
Annual percentage changes
(at constant 1995 prices)
Million
euro
1995
Source: NSSG/National Accounts, September 2004: final data for 1999 and revised data for 2000-2003. Ministry of Economy and Finance (Stability and Growth Programme
2004-2007) for 2004.
1.1 Primary sector (agriculture) 7,277 3.5 –4.2 –4.1 –1.3 –4.2 . . .
1.2 Secondary sector 16,550 2.4 5.4 6.4 2.0 5.5 . . .
1.2.a Mining and quarrying 476 –17.9 23.2 2.2 8.4 –4.8 . . .
1.2.b Manufacturing 9,572 1.3 4.6 3.3 2.4 2.5 . . .
1.2.c Electricity - town gas - water supply 1,751 13.4 4.8 1.3 1.8 6.3 . . .
1.2.d Construction 4,751 2.3 5.7 14.4 0.8 11.2 . . .
1.3 Tertiary sector 50,031 2.0 5.1 5.2 3.6 4.9 . . .
1.3.a Trade 10,018 –0.8 3.1 11.4 1.4 6.7 . . .
1.3.b Hotels - restaurants 4,821 –5.7 5.4 6.2 5.2 5.2 . . .
1.3.c Transport - communications 4,978 33.4 16.2 1.3 5.9 6.0 . . .
1.3.d Financial intermediaries 3,112 11.0 10.0 5.9 –5.2 8.9 . . .
1.3.e Real estate management and
other activities 12,577 –5.9 3.5 3.6 1.6 2.8 . . .
1.3.f Public administration - security 5,308 0.9 –2.8 1.1 8.0 2.4 . . .
1.3.g Education 3,298 –2.2 1.6 –1.2 12.2 1.4 . . .
1.3.h Health 3,855 –2.0 3.0 2.5 4.9 4.9 . . .
1.3.i Other activities 2,064 9.6 7.6 15.2 7.4 6.0 . . .
1.4 Gross value added 73,858 2.1 4.4 4.8 3.0 4.4 . . .
1.5 Imputed bank services –2,175 2.8 13.7 12.1 –9.4 13.1 . . .
1.6 Gross value added at basic prices 71,683 2.1 4.1 4.5 3.5 4.1 . . .
2.1 Final consumption 70,655 2.4 4.2 1.8 3.4 3.1 3.9
2.1.a Private consumption 58,405 2.5 2.0 3.0 3.0 4.4 3.5
2.1.b Public consumption 12,250 2.1 14.8 –3.1 5.3 –2.5 5.5
2.2 Gross fixed capital formation 14,867 11.0 8.0 6.5 5.7 13.7 5.8
2.2.a Residential 4,031 3.7 –4.3 4.8 8.8 7.3 –6.5
2.2.b Non-residential construction 5,391 6.6 8.9 8.2 0.7 13.2 12.6
2.2.c Equipment 4,680 21.4 14.1 4.9 6.9 18.3 6.5
2.2.d Other investment 765 –2.4 7.6 20.1 20.0 3.4 2.0
2.3 Stocks and statistical discrepancy
(percentage of GDP) 251 0.0 0.7 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.0
2.4 Domestic final demand 85,774 3.8 5.6 2.4 4.2 5.3 4.3
2.5 ∂xports of goods and services 14,087 18.1 14.1 –1.1 –7.7 1.0 7.3
2.5.a ∂xports of goods 8,344 6.3 8.7 –1.6 –7.1 4.2 –10.0
2.5.b ∂xports of services 5,743 29.0 18.2 –0.7 –8.1 –1.3 20.0
2.6 Final demand 99,861 6.1 7.2 1.7 2.0 4.6 4.8
2.7 Imports of goods and services 19,934 15.0 15.1 –5.2 –2.9 4.8 8.3
2.7.a Imports of goods 18,084 8.5 15.2 –6.3 3.2 6.6 7.5
2.7.b Imports of services 1,849 52.9 14.4 –0.4 –26.5 –5.3 13.0
2.8 GDP at market prices 79,927 3.4 4.5 4.3 3.6 4.5 3.7
200420032002200120001999
I CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCE (I.A+I.B+I.C+I.D)
I.A TRADE BALANCE (I.A.1– I.A.2)
Non-oil trade balance
Oil trade balance
I.A.1 Exports of goods
Oil
Other
I.A.2 Imports of goods
Oil
Other
I.B SERVICES BALANCE (I.B.1– I.B.2)
I.B.1 Receipts
Travel
Transport
Other
I.B.2 Payments
Travel
Transport
Other
I.C INCOME BALANCE (I.C.1– I.C.2)
I.C.1 Receipts
Compensation of employees
Interest, dividends, profits
I.C.2 Payments
Compensation of employees
Interest, dividends, profits
I.D TRANSFERS BALANCE (I.D.1– I.D.2)
I.D.1 Receipts
General government (EU transfers)
Other (emigrants’ remittances, etc.)
I.D.2 Payments
General government
Other
II FINANCIAL ACCOUNT (II.A+II.B+II.C+II.D)
II.A DIRECT INVESTMENT 1
By residents abroad
By non-residents in Greece
II.B PORTFOLIO INVESTMENT 1
Assets
Liabilities
II.C OTHER INVESTMENT2
Assets
Liabilities
(General government loans)
II.D CHANGE IN RESERVE ASSETS 2
III ERRORS AND OMISSIONS
RESERVE ASSETS 3
–7,013.8 –7,055.9 –5,083.7 –1,516.0 –1,251.8 –1,367.6
–20,706.4 –20,382.8 –23,046.8 –1,985.6 –1,787.7 –2,312.3
–17,541.6 –16,736.8 –18,875.4 –1,679.3 –1,453.9 –1,887.6
–3,164.8 –3,646.0 –4,171.4 –306.3 –333.8 –424.7
9,446.5 10,088.0 11,416.3 845.9 907.7 1,180.2
1,012.7 1,186.2 1,401.1 83.9 72.9 167.5
8,433.8 8,901.8 10,015.2 762.0 834.8 1,012.7
30,152.9 30,470.8 34,463.1 2,831.6 2,695.5 3,492.6
4,177.5 4,832.2 5,572.5 390.2 406.7 592.2
25,975.4 25,638.6 28,890.6 2,441.4 2,288.8 2,900.4
10,474.4 11,099.8 14,811.5 259.4 354.3 593.7
19,995.9 19,993.1 25,015.7 1,185.4 1,274.2 1,578.9
10,043.3 9,273.8 10,119.0 248.5 250.0 248.0
7,818.5 8,599.6 12,094.7 742.8 832.8 1,150.2
2,134.0 2,119.7 2,802.0 194.1 191.4 180.7
9,521.4 8,893.3 10,204.3 926.0 919.9 985.3
2,344.0 1,945.6 2,078.5 265.1 220.0 210.0
4,626.9 4,396.6 5,230.7 434.1 445.5 505.8
2,550.6 2,551.1 2,895.1 226.8 254.4 269.4
–1,864.4 –2,376.0 –2,287.8 –128.6 –69.7 –74.2
1,487.2 1,397.9 1,528.5 127.8 104.5 143.5
474.2 309.9 253.3 32.1 24.1 20.6
1,013.1 1,088.0 1,275.2 95.7 80.4 122.9
3,351.6 3,773.9 3,816.2 256.4 174.2 217.7
226.0 153.2 172.1 18.6 18.2 17.7
3,125.6 3,620.7 3,644.1 237.8 156.0 200.0
5,082.5 4,603.1 5,439.3 338.9 251.4 425.2
7,236.5 6,962.6 8,082.0 499.9 656.7 710.5
5,101.1 4,729.7 5,850.3 310.6 475.4 525.1
2,135.4 2,232.9 2,231.7 189.3 181.3 185.4
2,154.0 2,359.5 2,642.7 161.0 405.4 285.3
1,575.8 1,857.6 2,037.6 120.3 356.9 224.2
578.2 501.9 605.0 40.7 48.4 61.1
8,377.8 7,730.9 6,005.9 1,394.4 1,137.5 1,004.4
–516.6 –599.2 563.9 –42.9 –326.2 –49.5
–546.1 –466.5 –450.6 –73.8 –22.6 –19.9
29.6 –132.6 1,014.5 30.8 –303.6 –29.6
10,983.3 10,640.5 10,484.1 1,473.1 –513.5 –1,205.9
–1,265.3 –7,944.7 –10,223.3 27.3 –1,723.1 –2,049.4
12,248.7 18,585.2 20,707.4 1,445.8 1,209.6 843.4
–32.0 –6,180.4 –6,735.2 82.3 2,017.2 1,985.8
–7,790.2 –5,019.4 –11,356.3 –1,274.2 359.6 –1,046.6
7,758.2 –1,161.0 4,621.1 1,356.5 1,657.6 3,032.5
–4,078.1 –2,459.5 –804.7 –1,074.3 –169.0 –67.7
–2,057.0 3,870.0 1,693.0 –118.0 –40.0 274.0
–1,364.0 –675.0 –922.1 121.6 114.3 363.2
9,088.0 5,144.0 2,700.0
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T a b l e  II.1
Balance of payments
(Million euro)
1 (+) net inflow, (–) net outflow.
2 (+) decrease, (–) increase.
3 Reserve assets, as defined by the European Central Bank, include only monetary gold, the reserve position in the IMF, the special drawing rights and the Bank of Greece claims
in foreign currency on residents of non-euro area countries. Conversely, reserve assets do not include claims in euro on residents of non-euro area countries, claims in foreign
currency and in euro on residents of euro area countries, and the Bank of Greece participation in the capital and reserves of the ECB.
* Provisional data.
Source: Bank of Greece.
January – November November
2002 2003 2004* 2002 2003 2004*
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* The effective exchange rate is the value of a representative basket of foreign currencies, each of which is weighted on the basis of its importance in the country’s
external trade. Up to end-2000, the effective exchange rate of the drachma was calculated weighting the individual bilateral exchange rates of the drachma against
the other currencies, as these rates were formulated in the foreign exchange market. On 1 January 2001, Greece adopted the euro. In the present table, the
weighting of the euro exchange rate vis-à-vis the other currencies is calculated on the basis of the country’s non-oil external trade. As from January 2001, the change
in the index is limited, since trade with the 11 other euro area countries (which accounts for a large share of total trade) is conducted in euro. This index should
not be confused with the effective exchange rate of the euro, which is calculated on the basis of the external trade of the euro area as a whole.
1 A positive sign indicates an appreciation of the euro, while a negative sign a depreciation.
Source: Bank of Greece.
T a b l e  Iπ.2
Effective exchange rate of the euro calculated on the basis of Greece’s external trade*  
(Period averages) 
Index
(1990=100)
Previous
year
Percentage changes over:1
1997  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64.3 –1.9 –1.9 
1998  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60.5 –5.9 –5.9 
1999  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59.9 –0.9 –0.9 
2000  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56.2 –6.2 –6.2 
2001  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55.9 –0.6 –0.6 
2002  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56.4 0.9 0.9
2003  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58.0 2.9 2.9 
2004  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58.5 0.8 0.8 
2002 I  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55.9 –0.01 –0.3 
II  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56.2 0.5 1.0 
III  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56.6 0.7 1.4 
IV  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56.8 0.4 1.6 
2003 I  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57.5 1.2 2.8 
II  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58.2 1.2 3.5 
III  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58.1 –0.2 2.6 
IV  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58.2 0.3 2.5 
2004 I  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58.5 0.5 1.8 
II  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58.2 –0.6 0.01
III  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58.4 0.3 0.5 
IV  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58.8 0.8 1.0 
2003 Jan.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57.3 0.6 2.4
Feb. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57.6 0.4 3.0
March  . . . . . . . . . . . 57.7 0.2 3.2
Apr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57.8 0.2 3.3
May . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58.4 1.1 3.9
June  . . . . . . . . . . . . 58.4 0.1 3.4
July  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58.2 –0.3 2.8
Aug.  . . . . . . . . . . . . 58.1 –0.3 2.7
Sept.  . . . . . . . . . . . . 58.0 –0.2 2.4
Oct. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58.1 0.3 2.5
Nov.  . . . . . . . . . . . . 58.1 –0.1 2.2
Dec.  . . . . . . . . . . . . 58.5 0.7 2.6
2004 Jan.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58.6 0.2 2.3
Feb. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58.6 –0.1 1.8
March  . . . . . . . . . . . 58.4 –0.4 1.3
Apr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58.1 –0.5 0.5
May . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58.3 0.4 –0.2
June  . . . . . . . . . . . . 58.2 –0.1 –0.3
July  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58.3 0.2 0.2
Aug.  . . . . . . . . . . . . 58.4 0.01 0.5
Sept.  . . . . . . . . . . . . 58.4 0.1 0.8
Oct. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58.6 0.3 0.9
Nov.  . . . . . . . . . . . . 58.8 0.3 1.3
Dec.  . . . . . . . . . . . . 59.0 0.4 0.9
2005 Jan.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58.9 –0.3 0.4
Previous
periodPeriod
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Previous
period
Previous
period
Previous
period
Percentage
change over:
Percentage
change over:
Previous
period
T a b l e  II.3
Bilateral exchange rates of the euro*
(Units of national currency per euro, period averages)
* To 31 December 1998, rates for the ECU; from 1 January 1999, rates for the euro. A positive sign indicates an appreciation of the euro, while a negative sign a
depreciation. On 1 January 2001, Greece adopted the euro. Therefore, the evolution of the exchange rate of the drachma vis-à-vis the currencies of non-euro area
countries is identical with the evolution of the exchange rate of the euro vis-à-vis these currencies. Up to end-2001, however, the differentiation observed in the
annual rates of change is attributable to the deviation of the drachma from its central parity in 2000. 
Sources: Bank of Greece and European Central Bank (ECB). 
1997  . . . . . . 1.134 –10.7 –10.7 137.1 –0.7 –0.7 7.48 1.7 1.7 0.692 –14.9 –14.9 
1998  . . . . . . 1.121 –1.1 –1.1 146.4 6.8 6.8 7.50 0.2 0.2 0.676 –2.3 –2.3 
1999  . . . . . . 1.066 –4.9 –4.9 121.3 –17.2 –17.2 7.44 –0.8 –0.8 0.659 –2.6 –2.6 
2000  . . . . . . 0.924 –13.3 –13.3 99.5 –18.0 –18.0 7.45 0.1 0.1 0.609 –7.6 –7.6 
2001  . . . . . . 0.896 –3.1 –3.1 108.7 9.3 9.3 7.45 0.03 0.03 0.622 2.1 2.1 
2002  . . . . . . 0.945 5.5 5.5 118.1 8.6 8.6 7.43 –0.3 –0.3 0.629 1.1 1.1 
2003  . . . . . . 1.131 19.7 19.7 131.0 10.9 10.9 7.43 0.003 0.003 0.692 10.1 10.1 
2004  . . . . . . 1.243 9.9 9.9 134.4 2.6 2.6 7.44 0.1 0.1 0.679 –1.9 –1.9 
2002 I  . . . . . 0.876 –2.1 –5.1 116.0 4.8 6.4 7.43 –0.1 –0.4 0.615 –1.0 –2.8 
II  . . . . . 0.919 4.9 5.3 116.5 0.4 8.8 7.43 0.04 –0.3 0.629 2.3 2.3 
III  . . . . 0.984 7.0 10.4 117.3 0.7 8.3 7.43 –0.1 –0.2 0.635 1.0 2.6 
IV  . . . . 1.000 1.7 11.7 122.5 4.4 10.7 7.43 0.0004 –0.2 0.636 0.2 2.5 
2003 I  . . . . . 1.074 7.3 22.5 127.7 4.2 10.1 7.43 0.03 –0.02 0.670 5.3 9.0 
II  . . . . . 1.136 5.9 23.7 134.7 5.5 15.6 7.43 –0.1 –0.1 0.701 4.7 11.6 
III  . . . . 1.124 –1.1 14.3 132.1 –1.9 12.7 7.43 0.1 0.04 0.699 –0.4 10.0 
IV  . . . . 1.189 5.8 18.9 129.5 –2.0 5.7 7.44 0.1 0.1 0.697 –0.2 9.6 
2004 I  . . . . . 1.251 5.2 16.5 134.0 3.5 5.0 7.45 0.2 0.3 0.680 –2.5 1.5 
II  . . . . . 1.204 –3.7 6.0 132.1 –1.4 –1.9 7.44 –0.1 0.2 0.667 –1.9 –4.9
III  . . . . 1.222 1.5 8.7 134.4 1.7 1.7 7.44 –0.04 0.1 0.672 0.8 –3.8 
IV  . . . . 1.296 6.1 9.0 137.1 2.0 5.9 7.43 –0.03 –0.03 0.695 3.4 –0.3 
2003 Jan.  . . . 1.063 4.4 20.3 126.2 1.6 7.8 7.43 0.1 –0.004 0.657 2.4 6.6
Feb. . . . 1.077 1.4 23.8 128.6 1.9 10.6 7.43 –0.01 0.02 0.670 1.9 9.5
March  . 1.081 0.3 23.4 128.2 –0.3 11.8 7.43 –0.1 –0.1 0.683 1.9 10.8
Apr. . . . 1.085 0.4 22.5 130.1 1.5 12.4 7.43 –0.03 –0.1 0.689 0.9 12.2
May . . . 1.158 6.8 26.3 135.8 4.4 17.2 7.42 –0.01 –0.1 0.713 3.5 13.5
June  . . 1.166 0.7 22.2 138.1 1.6 17.2 7.43 0.01 –0.1 0.702 –1.5 9.1
July  . . . 1.137 –2.5 14.6 135.0 –2.2 15.3 7.43 0.1 0.04 0.700 –0.3 9.7
Aug.  . . 1.114 –2.0 13.9 132.4 –1.9 13.8 7.43 –0.01 0.1 0.699 –0.2 9.9
Sept.  . . 1.122 0.7 14.4 128.9 –2.6 8.9 7.43 –0.1 0.003 0.697 –0.3 10.5
Oct.  . . 1.169 4.2 19.2 128.1 –0.6 5.4 7.43 0.04 0.01 0.698 0.1 10.7
Nov.  . . 1.170 0.1 16.9 127.8 –0.2 5.1 7.44 0.1 0.1 0.693 –0.7 8.7
Dec.  . . 1.229 5.0 20.7 132.4 3.6 6.6 7.44 0.1 0.2 0.702 1.3 9.3
2004 Jan.  . . . 1.261 2.7 18.7 134.1 1.3 6.3 7.45 0.1 0.2 0.692 –1.4 5.3
Feb. . . . 1.265 0.3 17.4 134.8 0.5 4.8 7.45 0.04 0.3 0.677 –2.2 1.1
March  . 1.226 –3.0 13.5 133.1 –1.2 3.9 7.45 –0.02 0.3 0.671 –0.8 –1.7
Apr. . . . 1.199 –2.3 10.5 129.1 –3.0 –0.8 7.44 –0.1 0.2 0.665 –0.9 –3.4
May . . . 1.201 0.2 3.7 134.5 4.2 –1.0 7.44 –0.04 0.2 0.672 0.9 –5.8
June  . . 1.214 1.1 4.1 132.86 –1.2 –3.8 7.43 –0.1 0.1 0.664 –1.1 –5.4
July  . . . 1.227 1.1 7.9 134.08 0.9 –0.7 7.44 0.02 0.03 0.666 0.2 –5.0
Aug.  . . 1.218 –0.7 9.3 134.54 0.3 1.6 7.44 0.01 0.1 0.669 0.5 –4.3
Sept.  . . 1.222 0.3 8.9 134.51 –0.02 4.3 7.44 0.02 0.1 0.681 1.8 –2.2
Oct.  . . 1.249 2.2 6.8 135.97 1.1 6.1 7.44 –0.003 0.1 0.691 1.5 –0.9
Nov.  . . 1.299 4.0 11.0 136.09 0.1 6.5 7.43 –0.1 –0.1 0.699 1.0 0.8
Dec.  . . 1.341 3.2 9.1 139.14 2.2 5.1 7.43 0.03 –0.1 0.695 –0.5 –1.0
2005 Jan.  . . . 1.312 –2.2 4.0 135.63 –2.5 1.1 7.44 0.1 –0.1 0.699 0.5 0.9
Period
Pound sterlingDanish kroneJapanese yenUS dollar
Previous
year
Previous
year
Percentage
change over:
Previous
year
Percentage
change over:
Previous
year
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T a b l e  II.3 (continued)
Bilateral exchange rates of the euro*
(Units of national currency per euro, period averages)
* To 31 December 1998, rates for the ECU; from 1 January 1999, rates for the euro. A positive sign indicates an appreciation of the euro, while a negative sign a
depreciation. On 1 January 2001, Greece adopted the euro. Therefore, the evolution of the exchange rate of the drachma vis-à-vis the currencies of non-euro area
countries is identical with the evolution of the exchange rate of the euro vis-à-vis these currencies. Up to end-2001, however, the differentiation observed in the
annual rates of change is attributable to the deviation of the drachma from its central parity in 2000. 
Sources: Bank of Greece and European Central Bank (ECB).
1997  . . . . . . 8.65 1.6 1.6 1.644 4.9 4.9 8.02 –2.2 –2.2 1.528 –5.9 –5.9 1.569 –9.4 –9.4 
1998  . . . . . . 8.92 3.1 3.1 1.622 –1.3 –1.3 8.47 5.6 5.6 1.787 17.0 17.0 1.665 6.1 6.1 
1999  . . . . . . 8.81 –1.2 –1.2 1.600 –1.4 –1.4 8.31 –1.8 –1.8 1.652 –7.6 –7.6 1.584 –4.9 –4.9 
2000  . . . . . . 8.45 –4.1 –4.1 1.558 –2.6 –2.6 8.11 –2.4 –2.4 1.589 –3.8 –3.8 1.371 –13.4 –13.4 
2001  . . . . . . 9.26 9.5 9.5 1.510 –3.1 –3.1 8.05 –0.8 –0.8 1.732 9.0 9.0 1.387 1.1 1.1 
2002  . . . . . . 9.16 –1.0 –1.0 1.467 –2.9 –2.9 7.51 –6.7 –6.7 1.737 0.2 0.2 1.483 6.9 6.9 
2003  . . . . . . 9.12 –0.4 –0.4 1.521 3.6 3.6 8.00 6.5 6.5 1.738 0.1 0.1 1.582 6.7 6.7 
2004  . . . . . . 9.12 0.003 0.003 1.544 1.5 1.5 8.37 4.7 4.7 1.689 –2.8 –2.8 1.617 2.2 2.2 
2002 I  . . . . . 9.16 –3.4 1.7 1.473 –0.001 –3.9 7.81 –2.0 –4.8 1.692 –3.3 –2.8 1.397 –1.3 –0.9 
II  . . . . . 9.16 –0.02 0.3 1.465 –0.6 –4.1 7.52 –3.7 –6.2 1.666 –1.5 –2.2 1.428 2.2 6.1 
III  . . . . 9.23 0.8 –2.0 1.464 –0.1 –2.8 7.40 –1.6 –7.6 1.796 7.8 3.5 1.536 7.6 11.7 
IV  . . . . 9.09 –1.5 –4.0 1.467 0.2 –0.5 7.32 –1.1 –8.2 1.792 –0.3 2.4 1.570 2.2 10.9 
2003 I  . . . . . 9.18 1.0 0.3 1.466 –0.02 –0.5 7.58 3.5 –3.0 1.809 1.0 6.9 1.620 3.2 16.0 
II  . . . . . 9.14 –0.4 –0.1 1.518 3.5 3.6 7.96 5.0 5.8 1.774 –1.9 6.5 1.589 –1.9 11.3 
III  . . . . 9.16 0.2 –0.7 1.545 1.8 5.6 8.25 3.7 11.5 1.709 –3.7 –4.9 1.553 –2.2 1.1 
IV  . . . . 9.01 –1.7 –0.9 1.554 0.6 5.9 8.22 –0.3 12.4 1.661 –2.8 –7.3 1.566 0.8 –0.2 
2004 I  . . . . . 9.18 1.9 –0.01 1.569 0.9 7.0 8.64 5.0 14.0 1.633 –1.7 –9.7 1.649 5.3 1.8 
II  . . . . . 9.15 –0.4 0.03 1.538 –2.0 1.3 8.26 –4.3 3.9 1.689 3.4 –4.8 1.637 –0.8 3.0
III  . . . . 9.16 0.1 –0.06 1.536 –0.1 –0.6 8.39 1.5 1.7 1.723 2.0 0.8 1.600 –2.3 3.0 
IV  . . . . 9.01 –1.6 0.05 1.534 –0.2 –1.3 8.20 –2.3 –0.3 1.713 –0.6 3.1 1.582 –1.1 1.0 
2003 Jan.  . . . 9.18 0.9 –0.5 1.462 –0.4 –0.8 7.34 0.6 –7.4 1.822 0.8 6.6 1.636 3.1 15.8
Feb. . . . 9.15 –0.3 –0.4 1.467 0.3 –0.7 7.54 2.8 –3.1 1.811 –0.6 6.8 1.630 –0.4 17.4
March  . 9.23 0.9 1.8 1.470 0.1 0.1 7.85 4.0 1.7 1.795 –0.9 7.5 1.594 –2.2 14.7
Apr. . . . 9.15 –0.8 0.2 1.496 1.8 2.1 7.83 –0.2 2.7 1.781 –0.8 7.7 1.585 –0.6 13.2
May . . . 9.16 0.02 –0.7 1.516 1.3 4.0 7.87 0.5 4.7 1.787 0.3 7.2 1.602 1.0 12.7
June  . . 9.12 –0.4 0.04 1.541 1.7 4.7 8.16 3.7 10.2 1.755 –1.8 4.6 1.580 1.6 8.1
July  . . . 9.19 0.7 –0.9 1.548 0.4 5.8 8.29 1.6 11.9 1.718 –2.1 –4.1 1.569 –0.7 2.4
Aug.  . . 9.24 0.6 –0.1 1.540 –0.5 5.2 8.26 –0.4 11.1 1.711 –0.4 –5.2 1.557 –0.8 1.5
Sept.  . . 9.07 –1.8 –1.1 1.547 0.5 5.6 8.20 –0.7 11.3 1.697 –0.9 –5.4 1.533 –1.5 –0.7
Oct.  . . 9.01 –0.6 –1.0 1.549 0.1 5.7 8.23 0.4 12.1 1.687 –0.6 –5.4 1.549 1.0 0.1
Nov.  . . 8.99 –0.2 –1.0 1.559 0.7 6.2 8.20 –0.4 12.0 1.634 –3.1 –8.5 1.536 –0.8 –2.4
Dec.  . . 9.02 0.3 –0.8 1.554 –0.3 5.9 8.24 0.6 13.0 1.663 1.8 –8.0 1.613 5.0 1.6
2004 Jan.  . . . 9.14 1.3 –0.4 1.566 0.7 7.1 8.59 4.3 17.1 1.637 –1.5 –10.1 1.635 1.3 –0.1
Feb. . . . 9.18 0.4 0.3 1.573 0.5 7.2 8.78 2.1 16.3 1.626 –0.7 –10.2 1.682 2.9 3.2
March  . 9.23 0.6 0.1 1.567 –0.4 6.6 8.54 –2.7 8.9 1.637 0.7 –8.8 1.631 –3.0 2.3
Apr. . . . 9.17 –0.8 0.1 1.555 –0.8 3.9 8.30 –2.8 5.9 1.614 –1.4 –9.4 1.607 –1.5 1.4
May . . . 9.13 –0.4 –0.3 1.540 –0.9 1.6 8.21 –1.1 4.3 1.703 5.5 –4.7 1.654 2.9 3.3
June  . . 9.143 0.2 0.3 1.519 –1.4 –1.4 8.29 1.0 1.5 1.748 2.6 –0.4 1.649 –0.3 4.4
July  . . . 9.196 0.6 0.1 1.527 0.5 –1.3 8.48 2.3 2.2 1.714 –2.0 –0.3 1.622 –1.6 3.4
Aug.  . . 9.186 –0.1 –0.6 1.539 0.8 –0.1 8.33 –1.7 0.9 1.715 0.1 0.2 1.601 –1.3 2.8
Sept.  . . 9.092 –1.0 0.3 1.543 0.3 –0.3 8.36 0.3 2.0 1.740 1.5 2.5 1.577 –1.5 2.9
Oct.  . . 9.062 –0.3 0.6 1.543 –0.03 –0.4 8.23 –1.5 0.1 1.705 –2.0 1.1 1.560 –1.1 0.7
Nov.  . . 8.998 –0.7 0.05 1.522 –1.4 –2.4 8.14 –1.1 –0.7 1.687 –1.1 3.2 1.554 –0.4 1.2
Dec.  . . 8.982 –0.2 –0.5 1.536 1.0 –1.2 8.22 1.0 –0.3 1.746 3.5 5.0 1.633 5.1 1.3
2005 Jan.  . . . 9.048 0.7 –1.0 1.547 0.7 –1.2 8.21 –0.1 –4.4 1.715 –1.8 4.7 1.606 –1.7 –1.8
Period
Canadian dollarAustralian dollarNorwegian kroneSwiss francSwedish krona
Previous
year
Percentage
change over:
Previous
year
Percentage
change over:
Previous
year
Percentage
change over:
Previous
year
Percentage
change over:
Previous
year
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2001  . . . . . . . . 239.7 2,039.2 2,279.0 1,088.8 1,316.6 4,684.4 218.5 398.0 145.9 5,446.8 
2002  . . . . . . . . 341.2 2,158.3 2,499.4 1,075.7 1,406.3 4,981.0 226.9 470.5 127.7 5,806.4 
2003  . . . . . . . . 397.9 2,331.4 2,729.3 1,039.0 1,529.6 5,297.9 208.7 582.0 88.4 6,177.0 
2002 Jan. . . . . . 246.5 1,976.8 2,223.3 1,081.0 1,335.0 4,639.3 216.2 416.6 141.8 5,413.9 
Feb.  . . . . 240.3 1,972.2 2,212.5 1,076.8 1,339.1 4,628.4 221.1 427.0 138.8 5,415.2 
March  . . 254.3 1,969.1 2,223.4 1,088.5 1,343.1 4,655.0 229.6 431.2 137.2 5,468.4 
Apr.  . . . . 261.7 2,001.1 2,262.8 1,092.1 1,336.1 4,691.0 228.1 437.5 134.7 5,506.6 
May  . . . . 273.8 2,001.2 2,275.0 1,099.6 1,338.1 4,712.4 234.8 442.6 144.0 5,549.6 
June  . . . . 285.7 2,048.4 2,334.1 1,074.9 1,343.5 4,752.2 229.6 439.2 132.8 5,569.6 
July . . . . . 296.6 2,015.9 2,312.4 1,083.7 1,346.5 4,742.3 228.8 450.3 125.5 5,562.7 
Aug.  . . . . 301.1 1,984.6 2,285.7 1,096.9 1,351.9 4,734.2 236.5 463.4 126.5 5,576.7 
Sept. . . . . 306.7 2,057.4 2,364.1 1,073.6 1,354.1 4,791.4 238.3 460.4 131.3 5,622.7 
Oct.  . . . . 313.9 2,041.0 2,354.8 1,093.7 1,362.2 4,810.4 235.6 463.1 133.7 5,643.4 
Nov.  . . . . 321.4 2,093.1 2,414.5 1,086.3 1,374.6 4,875.0 229.6 477.6 131.1 5,713.8 
Dec.  . . . . 341.2 2,158.3 2,499.4 1,075.7 1,406.3 4,981.0 226.9 470.5 127.7 5,806.4 
2003 Jan. . . . . . 312.1 2,128.7 2,440.8 1,077.2 1,405.5 4,923.8 233.0 534.9 109.2 5,800.5 
Feb.  . . . . 319.3 2,131.9 2.451.2 1,079.6 1,420.7 4,950.8 233.3 547.2 109.0 5,841.1 
March  . . 327.2 2,170.3 2.497.5 1,072.9 1,435.8 5,003.6 224.0 550.8 99.4 5,880.3 
Apr.  . . . . 336.3 2,190.9 2,527.2 1,082.1 1,443.1 5,052.4 230.5 565.5 122.6 5,970.9 
May  . . . . 343.8 2,217.7 2,561.5 1,097.4 1,450.5 5,109.4 231.7 571.5 103.7 6,016.3 
June  . . . . 351.0 2,254.4 2,605.4 1,060.6 1,464.0 5,130.1 215.0 570.5 99.9 6,015.5 
July . . . . . 361.5 2,223.3 2,584.8 1,064.1 1,475.3 5,124.3 219.9 585.0 94.1 6,023.3 
Aug.  . . . . 362.7 2,210.5 2.573.2 1,070.1 1,482.7 5,126.0 217.1 587.3 92.5 6,022.8 
Sept. . . . . 364.8 2,250.7 2,615.6 1,038.6 1,482.8 5,136.9 211.5 576.9 87.6 6,013.0 
Oct.  . . . . 371.3 2,249.1 2,620.4 1,049.6 1,487.9 5,157.9 224.7 582.3 99.6 6,064.5 
Nov.  . . . . 379.2 2,288.6 2,667.8 1,043.5 1,494.8 5,206.1 224.7 585.1 99.5 6,115.4 
Dec.  . . . . 397.9 2,331.4 2,729.3 1,039.0 1,529.6 5,297.9 208.7 582.0 88.4 6,177.0 
2004 Jan. . . . . . 389.1 2,314.0 2,703.1 1,021.5 1,547.2 5,271.7 214.6 591.6 90.9 6,168.8 
Feb.  . . . . 393.5 2,310.1 2,703.6 1,016.2 1,553.8 5,273.5 228.6 599.2 92.2 6,193.5 
March  . . 399.6 2,346.2 2,745.8 1,005.3 1,559.1 5,310.2 219.4 602.0 89.7 6,221.4 
Apr.  . . . . 409.4 2,361.6 2,771.0 1,006.1 1,567.5 5,344.5 225.5 610.8 94.7 6,275.5 
May  . . . . 416.6 2,372.3 2,788.9 1,015.1 1,573.4 5,377.4 221.9 609.7 90.9 6,300.0 
June  . . . . 423.0 2,410.5 2,833.5 988.8 1,585.7 5,407.9 217.7 609.2 95.0 6,329.9 
July . . . . . 436.2 2,398.4 2,834.6 1,000.2 1,593.3 5,428.1 223.0 613.1 92.7 6,356.8 
Aug.  . . . . 433.4 2,362.7 2,796.0 1,003.2 1,599.0 5,398.3 226.0 624.1 93.8 6,342.2 
Sept. . . . . 438.0 2,420.0 2,858.0 993.6 1,600.8 5,452.4 218.7 609.6 92.8 6,373.5 
Oct.  . . . . 444.4 2,422.4 2,866.7 1,019.4 1,604.8 5,490.9 230.7 617.1 92.6 6,431.3 
Nov.*  . . . 448.7 2,464.5 2,913.3 1,003.7 1,611.4 5,528.3 224.3 613.5 95.6 6,461.6 
1 Monetary aggregates comprise monetary liabilities of MFIs and central government (Postal Savings Bank, Ministry of Finance) vis-à-vis non-MFI euro area residents
excluding central government. 
2 Euro area-11 up to end-2000. Euro area-12 from 1 January 2001 onwards. 
3 M3 and its components exclude non-euro area residents' holdings of money market fund units, money market paper and debt securities with an initial maturity of
up to 2 years.
* Provisional data.
Source: ECB.
T a b l e III.1
Monetary aggregates of the euro area1,2
(Outstanding balances in billion euro, not seasonally adjusted)
End of period
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2001  . . . . . . . 70.8 16.1 54.7 29.4 2.4 24.2 9.7 0.1 136.7
2002  . . . . . . . 71.7 15.2 56.5 28.9 2.3 20.0 10.7 0.2 133.8
2003  . . . . . . . 79.5 17.6 61.9 32.3 2.0 10.8 15.7 0.5 140.8
2004  . . . . . . . 91.7 20.7 71.0 33.4 1.9 9.5 15.2 0.5 152.3
2002 Jan. . . . . . 69.2 14.3 54.9 26.5 2.4 23.9 9.8 0.1 131.9
Feb.  . . . . 68.9 13.8 55.1 27.3 2.4 23.0 9.4 0.1 131.1
March  . . 67.4 12.5 54.9 27.2 2.4 24.2 9.3 0.1 130.7
Apr.  . . . . 69.3 13.7 55.6 26.9 2.4 22.9 8.9 0.0 130.4
May  . . . . 69.0 13.3 55.7 26.6 2.4 22.8 8.9 0.0 129.8
June  . . . . 70.6 14.2 56.4 26.0 2.3 22.6 8.7 0.0 130.2
July . . . . . 70.8 14.3 56.5 26.0 2.3 22.5 8.9 0.0 130.6
Aug.  . . . . 71.3 14.1 57.2 26.3 2.3 22.8 8.9 0.1 131.7
Sept. . . . . 72.3 14.7 57.6 25.4 2.3 22.9 9.1 0.1 132.2
Oct.  . . . . 70.0 13.5 56.5 26.6 2.3 23.2 9.0 0.1 131.2
Nov.  . . . . 69.1 13.3 55.8 27.3 2.3 22.0 9.1 0.2 130.0
Dec.  . . . . 71.7 15.2 56.5 28.9 2.3 20.0 10.7 0.2 133.8
2003 Jan. . . . . . 70.3 14.2 56.1 28.9 2.2 20.2 12.0 0.2 133.7
Feb.  . . . . 71.8 14.4 57.4 27.1 2.2 19.2 12.9 0.2 133.5
March  . . 72.5 14.9 57.6 27.3 2.2 16.8 14.1 0.2 133.2
Apr.  . . . . 72.7 14.6 58.1 28.7 2.2 16.3 14.4 0.3 134.7
May  . . . . 71.9 14.5 57.4 28.8 2.0 15.7 14.7 0.3 133.4
June  . . . . 74.9 16.7 58.2 29.7 2.1 13.5 15.7 0.4 136.3
July . . . . . 72.9 15.8 57.1 32.0 2.1 13.0 15.8 0.4 136.3
Aug.  . . . . 74.0 16.1 57.9 33.0 2.2 12.2 15.7 0.4 137.5
Sept. . . . . 74.9 17.1 57.8 32.7 2.1 12.0 15.6 0.4 137.7
Oct.  . . . . 74.0 16.2 57.8 33.3 2.1 11.8 15.6 0.5 137.3
Nov.  . . . . 74.1 15.4 58.7 32.9 2.1 11.6 15.5 0.5 136.7
Dec.  . . . . 79.5 17.6 61.9 32.3 2.0 10.8 15.7 0.5 140.8
2004 Jan. . . . . . 79.5 17.2 61.6 32.5 2.1 10.6 15.2 0.5 139.7
Feb.  . . . . 79.6 17.3 62.3 32.1 2.1 10.5 15.2 0.5 139.9
March  . . 82.1 17.8 64.3 31.8 2.1 9.5 15.8 0.4 141.6
Apr.  . . . . 81.4 17.8 63.6 33.5 2.2 9.1 15.9 0.4 142.5
May  . . . . 82.5 17.0 65.5 32.2 2.1 8.9 15.6 0.4 141.8
June  . . . . 84.9 18.3 66.6 32.4 2.1 9.4 15.8 0.4 145.0
July . . . . . 85.5 18.3 67.2 33.0 2.1 9.3 15.9 0.4 146.2
Aug.  . . . . 84.9 17.7 67.2 33.2 2.1 9.6 15.8 0.4 146.1
Sept. . . . . 86.0 18.7 67.3 33.4 2.1 10.5 15.3 0.5 147.8
Oct.  . . . . 86.4 18.9 67.5 33.6 2.0 10.4 15.4 0.5 148.2
Nov.  . . . . 87.5 19.6 67.9 33.8 2.0 10.1 15.3 0.5 149.1
Dec.  . . . . 91.7 20.7 71.0 33.4 1.9 9.5 15.2 0.5 152.3
1 The Greek contribution begins upon Greece’s entry into the euro area (1 January 2001). For statistical reasons, however, the data on monetary aggregates were extended
to cover previous years as well.
2 Including savings deposits in currencies other than the euro.
3 The Greek M3 (and likewise any euro area national M3) can no longer be accurately calculated, since part of the quantity of euro banknotes and coins that have been
put into circulation in a euro area country is held by residents of other euro area countries and/or by non-residents. Due to these technical problems, the compilation of
the Greek M0, M1, M2 and M3 was interrupted in January 2003.
Source: Bank of Greece.
T a b l e  III.2
Greek contribution to the main monetary aggregates of the euro area1
(Outstanding balances in billion euro, not seasonally adjusted)
End 
of period
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2001  . . . . . . . . . . . 101,809.5 79,566.0 22,243.5 13,385.2 58,323.1 30,101.1
2002  . . . . . . . . . . . 104,761.1 87,732.3 17,028.8 13,367.3 60,406.1 30,987.7
2003  . . . . . . . . . . . 115,750.1 98,119.3 17,630.8 15,395.8 65,141.1 35,213.2
2004  . . . . . . . . . . . 128,424.6 110,206.7 18,217.9 18,274.2 73,954.2 36,196.1
2002 Jan.  . . . . . . . . 97,542.0 78,693.6 18,848.4 11,839.1 58,355.2 27,347.7
Feb.  . . . . . . . 98,302.4 79,029.9 19,272.4 11,356.7 58,674.4 28,271.3
March  . . . . . . 96,741.8 77,970.2 18,771.6 10,267.5 58,309.6 28,164.7
Apr.  . . . . . . . 98,685.7 80,274.3 18,411.5 11,584.4 58,979.2 28,122.2
May  . . . . . . . 97,779.9 79,934.6 17,845.3 10,795.2 59,174.0 27,810.7
June  . . . . . . . 98,751.5 81,549.4 17,202.1 11,758.3 59,654.1 27,339.2
July  . . . . . . . . 99,132.9 81,816.4 17,316.4 11,888.0 59,768.1 27,476.8
Aug.  . . . . . . . 99,924.1 82,255.7 17,668.4 11,656.2 60,475.4 27,792.5
Sept.  . . . . . . . 101,076.4 84,497.2 16,579.2 12,328.6 61,820.2 26,927.6
Oct.  . . . . . . . 100,492.7 83,175.9 17,316.8 11,399.8 60,572.9 28,519.9
Nov.  . . . . . . . 100,771.6 83,612.4 17,159.2 11,686.3 59,933.8 29,151.4
Dec.  . . . . . . . 104,761.1 87,732.3 17,028.8 13,367.3 60,406.1 30,987.7
2003 Jan.  . . . . . . . . 102,687.7 85,423.3 17,264.4 11,703.0 59,707.7 31,277.0
Feb.  . . . . . . . 102,455.9 85,527.5 16,928.4 12,419.8 60,981.4 29,054.7
March  . . . . . . 103,684.4 86,637.5 17,046.9 12,996.7 61,203.6 29,484.0
Apr.  . . . . . . . 105,407.4 87,642.8 17,764.6 12,664.5 61,690.6 31,052.2
May  . . . . . . . 104,593.8 86,997.3 17,596.5 12,586.4 60,809.6 31,197.8
June  . . . . . . . 108,637.5 90,199.0 18,438.5 14,702.7 61,700.5 32,234.3
July  . . . . . . . . 108,694.9 89,934.1 18,760.8 13,670.6 60,471.2 34,553.1
Aug.  . . . . . . . 110,793.2 91,498.3 19,294.9 14,035.9 61,242.3 35,515.0
Sept.  . . . . . . . 111,384.5 92,881.7 18,502.8 14,958.4 61,151.5 35,274.5
Oct.  . . . . . . . 111,068.9 92,207.8 18,861.1 14,024.4 61,020.5 36,024.0
Nov.  . . . . . . . 110,668.9 92,383.7 18,285.2 13,157.4 61,846.9 35,664.6
Dec.  . . . . . . . 115,750.1 98,119.3 17,630.8 15,395.8 65,141.1 35,213.2
2004 Jan.  . . . . . . . . 114,996.0 96,977.6 18,018.4 14,874.7 64,645.4 35,476.0
Feb.  . . . . . . . 115,491.9 97,036.0 18,455.9 15,089.7 66,332.2 34,070.0
March  . . . . . . 117,571.4 98,647.3 18,924.1 15,479.0 67,322.0 34,770.4
Apr.  . . . . . . . 118,835.4 99,526.4 19,309.0 15,687.6 66,697.8 36,450.0
May  . . . . . . . 118,645.4 99,905.7 18,739.7 14,995.6 68,548.9 35,100.9
June  . . . . . . . 120,997.2 102,774.4 18,222.8 16,078.1 69,641.4 35,277.7
July  . . . . . . . . 122,396.3 103,778.5 18,617.8 16,368.9 70,186.6 35,840.9
Aug.  . . . . . . . 122,065.6 103,347.9 18,717.7 15,579.5 70,397.0 36,089.1
Sept.  . . . . . . . 123,471.3 104,687.8 18,783.6 16,727.8 70,396.8 36,346.7
Oct.  . . . . . . . 123,971.8 105,394.3 18,577.5 16,840.4 70,593.6 36,537.8
Nov.  . . . . . . . 124,875.8 106,408.6 18,467.2 17,304.0 70,903.5 36,668.3
Dec.  . . . . . . . 128,424.6 110,206.7 18,217.9 18,274.2 73,954.2 36,196.1
1 Other Monetary Financial Institutions (OMFIs) comprise credit institutions (other than the Bank of Greece) and money market funds.
2 Including (until 31 December 2001) deposits in drachmas and the other euro legacy currencies.
3 Including blocked deposits.
Source: Bank of Greece.
T a b l e  πππ.3
Greece: deposits of domestic firms and households with OMFIs,1 by currency and type
(Outstanding balances in million euro, not seasonally adjusted)
Total
deposits
By currency By type
Deposits
in euro2
Deposits
in other
currencies
Sight
deposits
Savings
deposits
Time
deposits3
End
of period
Statistical section
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1 Comprising manufacturing and mining.
Source: Bank of Greece.
T a b l e πππ.4
Domestic MFI loans to domestic enterprises and households, by branch of economic activity
(Balances in million euro)
2001 . . . . . . . 74,027.4 66,722.6 7,304.8 3,724.2 12,614.9 15,524.3 15,652.2 2,171.3 7,852.0 16,488.5
2002 . . . . . . . 86,510.5 80,099.7 6,410.8 3,224.7 14,364.0 15,670.8 21,224.7 2,903.2 9,755.4 19,367.7
2003 . . . . . . . 101,178.1 95,649.4 5,528.7 3,082.7 15,865.1 16,514.4 26,534.2 3,488.2 12,409.6 23,283.9
2004 . . . . . . . 117,201.7 111,951.1 5,250.6 3,248.0 15,675.6 18,821.6 33,126.8 4,040.0 17,053.8 25,235.9
2002 Jan. . . . . 73,982.0 66,648.1 7,333.9 3,230.0 12,435.1 15,174.6 16,024.7 2,236.0 7,783.7 17,097.9
Feb.. . . . 75,202.2 67,723.9 7,478.3 3,030.3 12,724.5 15,846.7 16,417.5 2,267.5 7,944.7 16,971.0
March . . 76,235.3 69,080.0 7,155.3 3,139.4 13,168.1 15,788.0 16,891.9 2,316.4 8,129.8 16,801.7
Apr.. . . . 76,958.0 69,886.9 7,071.1 3,196.1 12,801.1 15,939.4 17,362.1 2,341.0 8,301.2 17,017.1
May . . . 78,009.6 71,192.8 6,816.8 3,193.0 12,912.6 16,064.7 17,721.8 2,372.2 8,508.3 17,237.0
June . . . 79,960.9 73,475.3 6,485.6 3,167.7 13,360.0 16,516.2 18,194.3 2,414.5 8,678.1 17,630.1
July . . . . 81,233.9 74,622.8 6,611.1 3,167.7 13,720.8 16,570.9 18,759.9 2,411.6 8,868.0 17,735.0
Aug. . . . 82,041.4 75,311.8 6,729.6 3,191.4 13,625.4 16,580.6 19,304.9 2,399.3 8,997.7 17,942.1
Sept. . . . 82,662.6 75,930.7 6,731.9 3,212.8 13,785.6 16,059.8 19,503.8 2,560.0 9,228.1 18,312.5
Oct. . . . 83,996.1 77,164.1 6,832.0 3,221.6 13,961.2 16,161.2 19,914.7 2,635.0 9,420.9 18,681.5
Nov. . . . 85,614.8 78,732.9 6,881.9 3,167.1 14,528.2 15,663.2 20,416.6 2,761.1 9,612.9 19,465.7
Dec. . . . 86,510.5 80,099.7 6,410.8 3,224.7 14,364.0 15,670.8 21,224.7 2,903.2 9,755.4 19,367.7
2003 Jan. . . . . 88,241.8 81,751.6 6,490.2 2,964.2 14,529.2 16,321.5 21,599.4 2,978.4 9,884.9 19,964.2
Feb.. . . . 88,787.7 82,332.2 6,455.5 2,980.5 14,485.6 16,310.3 22,062.6 3,049.0 10,023.3 19,876.4
March . . 89,363.0 83,075.2 6,287.8 2,994.0 14,422.3 16,053.5 22,366.8 3,095.5 10,247.3 20,183.6
Apr.. . . . 90,770.3 84,710.6 6,059.7 3,043.0 14,565.0 16,113.4 22,747.1 3,149.2 10,344.7 20,807.9
May . . . 92,497.1 86,811.4 5,685.7 3,027.6 14,866.7 16,488.6 23,183.1 3,085.8 10,432.6 21,412.7
June . . . 94,344.1 88,447.4 5,896.7 3,062.3 15,165.2 16,139.3 23,705.7 3,201.0 10,600.9 22,469.7
July . . . . 96,253.7 90,203.0 6,050.7 3,062.9 15,674.1 16,307.5 24,267.2 3,207.5 10,871.8 22,862.7
Aug. . . . 97,350.8 91,177.5 6,173.3 3,102.1 15,681.4 16,700.8 24,573.2 3,255.1 11,075.2 22,963.0
Sept. . . . 97,747.2 91,865.5 5,881.7 3,103.0 15,544.4 16,612.9 25,043.9 3,278.1 11,301.1 22,863.8
Oct. . . . 98,403.4 92,480.6 5,922.8 3,117.3 15,481.2 16,393.0 25,559.5 3,321.0 11,670.4 22,861.0
Nov. . . . 99,829.3 94,044.9 5,784.4 3,093.6 15,780.9 16,633.3 25,808.6 3,392.4 12,063.2 23,057.3
Dec. . . . 101,178.1 95,649.4 5,528.7 3,082.7 15,865.1 16,514.4 26,534.2 3,488.2 12,409.6 23,283.9
2004 Jan. . . . . 102,748.9 96,982.9 5,766.0 3,055.4 16,005.1 16,822.7 26,902.8 3,536.8 12,690.8 23,735.3
Feb.. . . . 103,899.7 98,214.0 5,685.7 3,042.0 15,948.2 17,060.8 27,334.5 3,587.7 13,041.9 23,884.6
March . . 105,263.2 99,372.4 5,890.8 3,095.5 15,831.8 17,012.4 27,894.2 3,661.6 13,442.3 24,325.4
Apr.. . . . 106,447.1 100,530.0 5,917.1 3,150.5 15,734.1 17,134.7 28,465.8 3,703.2 13,798.6 24,460.2
May . . . 108,835.0 103,158.1 5,676.9 3,242.6 15,950.4 17,773.5 29,080.6 3,766.9 14,169.3 24,851.7
June . . . 109,806.8 104,096.1 5,710.7 3,324.8 15,831.1 17,952.6 29,035.7 3,801.5 14,585.6 25,275.5
July . . . . 111,624.2 105,976.3 5,647.9 3,348.0 15,997.2 18,214.6 29,822.1 3,862.7 14,985.2 25,394.4
Aug. . . . 111,905.0 106,222.2 5,682.8 3,376.4 15,740.2 18,062.7 30,244.2 3,841.8 15,327.8 25,311.9
Sept. . . . 113,392.1 107,821.5 5,570.6 3,402.8 15,743.6 18,335.8 30,832.5 3,865.3 15,722.9 25,489.2
Oct. . . . 114,868.1 109,490.1 5,378.0 3,397.8 15,988.2 18,687.8 31,404.7 3,987.5 16,114.1 25,288.0
Nov. . . . 115,636.5 110,275.4 5,361.1 3,303.2 15,755.2 18,612.8 32,138.9 3,930.4 16,580.3 25,315.7
Dec. . . . 117,201.7 111,951.1 5,250.6 3,248.0 15,675.6 18,821.6 33,126.8 4,040.0 17,053.8 25,235.9
End
of period Total
In
euro
In foreign
currency
Agricul-
ture Industry1
Branches of economic activity
Trade Housing Tourism
Consumer
credit Other
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T a b l e  πππ.5
ECB and Bank of Greece interest rates
(Percentages per annum)
1999 1 Jan. 2.00 3.00 4.50 1999 14 Jan. 11.50 9.75 12.00 13.50
4 Jan.2 2.75 3.00 3.25 21 Oct. 11.00 9.75 11.50 13.00
22 Jan. 2.00 3.00 4.50 16 Dec. 10.25 9.25 10.75 12.25
9 Apr. 1.50 2.50 3.50 27 Dec. 10.25 9.00 10.75 11.50
5 Nov. 2.00 3.00 4.00
2000 4 Feb. 2.25 3.25 4.25 2000 27 Jan. 9.50 8.50 9.75 11.00
17 March 2.50 3.50 4.50 9 March 8.75 8.00 9.25 10.25
28 Apr. 2.75 3.75 4.75 20 Apr. 8.00 7.50 8.75 9.50
9 June 3.25 4.25 5.25 29 June 7.25 – 8.25 9.00
28 June3 3.25 4.25 5.25 6 Sept. 6.50 – 7.50 8.25
1 Sept. 3.50 4.50 5.50 15 ¡ov. 6.00 – 7.00 7.75
6 Oct. 3.75 4.75 5.75 29 ¡ov. 5.50 – 6.50 7.25
13 Dec. 4.75 – 5.75 6.50
27 Dec. 3.75 – 4.75 5.75
2001 11 May 3.50 4.50 5.50 
31 Aug. 3.25 4.25 5.25 
18 Sept. 2.75 3.75 4.75
9 ¡ov. 2.25 3.25 4.25
2002 6 Dec. 1.75 2.75 3.75
2003 7 March 1.50 2.50 3.50
6 June 1.00 2.00 3.00
With
effect from1
1. ∂CB interest rates 2. Bank of Greece interest rates
Lombard
rate
14-day
intervention
rate
Overnight
deposit
facility,
second tier4
Overnight
deposit
facility,
first tier4
With
effect from
Marginal
lending
facility
Main
refinancing
operations3
Deposit
facility
1 The date refers to the deposit and marginal lending facilities. For main refinancing operations, unless otherwise indicated, changes in the rate are effective from the first
operation following the date indicated. The change on 18 September 2001 was effective on that same day.
2 On 22 December 1998 the ECB announced that, as an exception measure between 4 and 21 January 1999, a narrow corridor of 50 basic points would be applied between
the interest rate for the marginal lending facility and that for the deposit facility, aimed at facilitating the transition of market participants to the new regime.
3 Until 21 June 2000: fixed-rate tenders, from 28 June 2000: minimum bid rate in variable rate tenders.
4 On 29 June 2000 the second tier of the deposit facility was abolished; the interest rate thereafter applies to the unified deposit acceptance account.
Sources: ECB and Bank of Greece.
Statistical section
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2000  . . . . . . . . . . . 6.22 5.99 5.98 6.05 6.10 6.26 6.35
2001  . . . . . . . . . . . 4.08 4.28 4.58 4.82 5.30 5.51 5.76
2002  . . . . . . . . . . . 3.50 4.06 4.45 4.78 5.12 5.24 5.52
2003  . . . . . . . . . . . 2.34 2.82 3.37 3.83 4.27 4.32 4.91
2004  . . . . . . . . . . . 2.27 2.87 3.37 3.81 4.25 4.53 4.77
2002 Jan.  . . . . . . . . 3.48 4.27 4.51 4.95 5.24 5.36 5.55
Feb. . . . . . . . . 3.59 4.37 4.73 5.07 5.31 5.41 5.60
March  . . . . . . 3.81 4.58 5.00 5.27 5.51 5.58 5.78
Apr.  . . . . . . . . 3.86 4.59 4.99 5.27 5.51 5.60 5.84
May . . . . . . . . 3.98 4.63 5.00 5.27 5.52 5.60 5.86
June . . . . . . . . 3.87 4.46 4.81 5.09 5.36 5.47 5.71
July  . . . . . . . . 3.65 4.23 4.59 4.90 5.21 5.33 5.57
Aug.  . . . . . . . 3.44 3.90 4.29 4.60 4.95 5.07 5.34
Sept.  . . . . . . . 3.24 3.59 3.98 4.33 4.73 4.86 5.18
Oct. . . . . . . . . 3.13 3.52 3.95 4.34 4.79 4.94 5.32
Nov.  . . . . . . . 3.02 3.40 3.87 4.26 4.76 4.90 5.33
Dec.  . . . . . . . 2.87 3.19 3.63 4.05 4.58 4.71 5.13
2003 Jan.  . . . . . . . . 2.70 2.91 3.36 3.81 4.43 4.51 4.97
Feb. . . . . . . . . 2.50 2.65 3.31 3.89 4.24 4.27 4.83
March  . . . . . . 2.41 2.82 3.38 3.83 4.26 4.33 4.90
Apr.  . . . . . . . . 2.46 2.99 3.50 3.96 4.38 4.45 5.02
May . . . . . . . . 2.25 2.64 3.12 3.57 4.02 4.09 4.73
June . . . . . . . . 2.02 2.38 2.88 3.33 3.81 3.86 4.57
July  . . . . . . . . 2.08 2.62 3.18 3.65 4.12 4.16 4.83
Aug.  . . . . . . . 2.28 2.98 3.51 3.91 4.29 4.34 4.90
Sept.  . . . . . . . 2.26 2.91 3.47 3.91 4.32 4.37 4.96
Oct. . . . . . . . . 2.30 2.94 3.52 3.95 4.38 4.43 5.02
Nov.  . . . . . . . 2.41 3.06 3.67 4.09 4.51 4.55 5.10
Dec.  . . . . . . . 2.38 2.97 3.58 4.02 4.45 4.49 5.04
2004 Jan.  . . . . . . . . 2.21 2.71 3.34 3.81 4.37 4.33 4.94
Feb. . . . . . . . . 2.17 2.91 3.28 3.90 4.35 4.28 4.91
March  . . . . . . 2.06 2.71 3.26 3.71 4.17 4.43 4.75
Apr.  . . . . . . . . 2.16 2.90 3.45 3.90 4.35 4.72 4.88
May . . . . . . . . 2.30 3.08 3.63 4.07 4.49 4.86 5.01
June . . . . . . . . 2.41 3.19 3.73 4.15 4.55 4.89 5.03
July  . . . . . . . . 2.36 3.07 3.61 4.03 4.44 4.79 4.93
Aug.  . . . . . . . 2.30 2.91 3.43 3.85 4.28 4.63 4.78
Sept.  . . . . . . . 2.37 2.91 3.40 3.79 4.22 4.56 4.70
Oct. . . . . . . . . 2.32 2.76 3.25 3.65 4.11 4.47 4.61
Nov.  . . . . . . . 2.33 2.66 3.12 3.53 3.97 4.33 4.47
Dec.  . . . . . . . 2.30 2.59 2.98 3.36 3.77 4.10 4.24
Source: Bank of Greece.
T a b l e  πππ.6
Greek government paper yields
(Percentages per annum, period averages)
Yield on government bonds
20-year15-year10-year7-year5-year3-year
Yield on
one-year
Treasury billsPeriod
ECONOMIC BULLETIN, 24  1/05154
Period Savings2Overnight1,2
2002 Sept.  . . . . . . . 1.57 1.57 3.13 0.84 3.36 3.22
Oct. . . . . . . . . 1.56 1.57 3.17 0.90 3.39 3.01
Nov.  . . . . . . . 1.55 1.55 3.15 0.84 3.46 3.17
Dec.  . . . . . . . 1.10 1.09 2.93 0.74 3.10 2.97
2003 Jan.  . . . . . . . . 1.10 1.09 2.83 0.74 2.88 2.75
Feb.  . . . . . . . . 1.10 1.10 2.73 0.75 2.79 2.71
March  . . . . . . 1.06 1.05 2.68 0.69 2.40 2.54
Apr.  . . . . . . . . 1.05 1.04 2.70 0.73 2.67 2.46
May . . . . . . . . 1.04 1.03 2.61 0.70 2.66 2.45
June . . . . . . . . 0.82 0.81 2.44 0.55 2.41 2.10
July  . . . . . . . . 0.80 0.79 2.38 0.60 2.36 2.04
Aug.  . . . . . . . 0.81 0.79 2.29 0.52 2.31 2.00
Sept.  . . . . . . . 0.81 0.80 2.30 0.55 2.30 1.98
Oct. . . . . . . . . 0.87 0.85 2.27 0.62 2.37 1.98
Nov.  . . . . . . . 0.87 0.85 2.29 0.54 2.33 1.94
Dec.  . . . . . . . 0.87 0.86 2.22 0.59 2.35 1.98
2004 Jan.  . . . . . . . . 0.88 0.86 2.26 0.55 2.18 1.99
Feb.  . . . . . . . . 0.88 0.87 2.18 0.57 2.17 1.98
March  . . . . . . 0.89 0.87 2.29 0.54 2.13 1.95
Apr.  . . . . . . . . 0.89 0.88 2.26 0.56 2.13 1.97
May . . . . . . . . 0.90 0.89 2.24 0.56 2.23 1.95
June . . . . . . . . 0.91 0.90 2.29 0.54 2.16 1.97
July  . . . . . . . . 0.91 0.91 2.32 0.56 2.18 1.97
Aug.  . . . . . . . 0.92 0.91 2.31 0.60 2.19 1.96
Sept.  . . . . . . . 0.93 0.92 2.33 0.53 2.12 1.97
Oct. . . . . . . . . 0.94 0.93 2.35 0.53 2.17 1.98
Nov.  . . . . . . . 0.95 0.94 2.36 0.51 2.18 2.00
Dec.  . . . . . . . 0.96 0.94 2.30 0.55 2.20 2.01
1 Weighted average of the current account rate and the savings deposit rate.
2 End-of-the-month rate.
3 Average monthly rate.
Source: Bank of Greece.
Deposits by households
Deposits by 
non-financial corporations 
With an agreed
maturity of up to
1 year3 Overnight2
With an agreed
maturity of up to
1 year3
Repurchase
agreements
(repos)3
T a b l e  πππ.7
Greece: bank rates on new euro-denominated deposits of, and loans to, euro area residents
(Percentages per annum)
Statistical section
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Period
Loans
without 
defined
maturity 2,3
2002 Sept.  . . . . . . . 14.40 10.86 10.43 4.62 4.74 7.31 6.64 5.33
Oct. . . . . . . . . 14.51 10.69 10.45 4.65 4.81 7.28 6.37 4.98
Nov.  . . . . . . . 14.48 10.87 10.61 4.56 4.75 7.23 5.78 4.54
Dec.  . . . . . . . 14.54 10.58 10.45 4.42 4.61 7.23 5.76 4.50
2003 Jan.  . . . . . . . . 14.71 10.46 10.17 4.53 4.77 7.15 5.53 4.39
Feb.  . . . . . . . . 14.68 11.13 10.60 4.58 4.81 7.09 5.59 4.27
March  . . . . . . 14.66 10.82 10.76 4.58 4.87 7.04 5.37 4.06
Apr.  . . . . . . . . 14.76 11.15 10.82 4.58 4.93 7.07 5.55 4.14
May . . . . . . . . 14.58 11.13 10.70 4.59 4.93 6.95 5.68 3.76
June . . . . . . . . 14.54 10.61 10.44 4.53 4.86 6.84 5.15 3.47
July  . . . . . . . . 14.24 10.41 10.33 4.37 4.66 6.70 5.06 3.68
Aug.  . . . . . . . 14.05 10.24 10.37 4.48 4.76 6.67 4.95 3.60
Sept.  . . . . . . . 14.14 10.37 10.60 4.62 4.81 6.67 5.14 4.27
Oct. . . . . . . . . 14.22 10.57 10.58 4.57 4.81 6.68 5.24 4.68
Nov.  . . . . . . . 14.27 10.36 10.46 4.35 4.63 6.72 5.14 3.66
Dec.  . . . . . . . 14.08 9.60 9.86 4.31 4.53 6.78 5.13 3.78
2004 Jan.  . . . . . . . . 13.92 9.82 9.94 4.36 4.68 6.74 5.12 3.92
Feb.  . . . . . . . . 13.97 9.94 9.99 4.35 4.63 6.85 5.16 4.09
March  . . . . . . 14.00 9.44 9.87 4.37 4.63 7.13 4.88 3.45
Apr.  . . . . . . . . 14.06 9.56 9.85 4.36 4.55 7.11 5.15 3.49
May . . . . . . . . 13.79 9.82 10.07 4.33 4.54 7.02 4.91 3.45
June . . . . . . . . 13.89 9.71 10.05 4.30 4.54 7.06 4.89 3.58
July  . . . . . . . . 13.84 9.60 9.67 4.24 4.43 7.03 4.84 3.53
Aug.  . . . . . . . 13.77 9.70 10.05 4.34 4.53 7.06 4.95 3.52
Sept.  . . . . . . . 13.62 9.37 9.91 4.23 4.43 7.05 4.87 3.80
Oct. . . . . . . . . 13.72 9.68 9.87 4.29 4.45 7.02 4.86 3.83
Nov.  . . . . . . . 13.75 9.40 9.72 4.23 4.36 7.05 5.06 3.61
Dec.  . . . . . . . 13.41 8.58 9.36 4.21 4.37 6.97 5.04 3.77
1 Charges are not included.
2 Weighted average of interest rates on loans to households through credit cards, open loans and current account overdrafts.
3 End-of-month rate.
4 Average monthly rate.
5 Weighted average of interest rates on corporate loans through credit lines and sight deposit overdrafts.
Source: Bank of Greece.
T a b l e  πππ.7 (continued)
Greece: bank rates on new euro-denominated deposits of, and loans to, euro area residents
(Percentages per annum)
Consumer loans4
Loans to households1 Loans to non-financial corporations1
With a floating rate or an initial
rate fixation of up to 1 year4Housing loans4
Average 
rate on total
consumer
loans
With a
floating rate or
an initial rate
fixation of up
to 1 year
Average 
rate on total
housing
loans
Loans
without 
defined
maturity 3,5
Up to
€1 million
Over 
€1 million
With a
floating rate or
an initial rate
fixation of up
to 1 year
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Central government 7,102 10,526 15,605
– State budget 6,674 10,833 15,377
(Ordinary budget)4 2,128 4,106 8,841
(Public investment budget) 4,546 6,727 6,536
– OPEKEPE5 428 –307 228
Percentage of GDP 5.0 6.9 9.5
1 This table will henceforth show the borrowing requirement of central government on a cash basis. The borrowing requirement of public organisations will
henceforth be calculated by the NSSG on the basis of detailed data collected directly from these entities, in the framework of a special quarterly survey concerning
their financial results (revenue-expenditure) and their financial situation (loans, investment in securities, deposits etc.).
2 As shown by the movement of relevant accounts with the Bank of Greece and credit institutions.
3 Excluding the repayment of debts of the Greek government to the Social Insurance Institute (IKA) through bond issuance (Law 2972/2001, Article 51). These debts
amounted to €3,927.9 million and were repaid in three instalments (2002: €1,467.4 million, 2003: €1,549.5 million and 2004: €911 million).
4 Including the movement of public debt management accounts.
5 Payment and Control Agency for Guidance and Guarantee Community Aid. It replaced DICAGEP (Agricultural Markets Management Service) as of 3 September
2001.
* Provisional data and estimates.
Source: Bank of Greece.
T a b l e  IV.1
Net borrowing requirement of central government on a cash basis1,2,3
(Million euro)
2002 2004*2003
January-December
Statistical section
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T a b l e  IV.2
Financing of borrowing requirement of central government
(Million euro)
1 Comprising domestically issued Treasury bills and government bonds as well as privatisation certificates.
2 Excluding government bond issuance for the repayment of debts to IKA (Law 2972/2001, Article 51). Also see footnote 3 in Table IV.1.
3 Including changes in central government accounts with the Bank of Greece and other credit institutions, as well as the change in the OPEKEPE account.
4 Comprising government borrowing abroad and securities issuance abroad, as well as the change in government deposits with foreign banks. Excluding non-residents’
holdings of domestically issued government bonds.
* Provisional data.
Source: Bank of Greece.
2002
January-December
Percen-
tage
of
totalAmount
Greek Treasury bills and government bonds1,2 11,929 168.0 13,378 127.1 16,829 107.8
Change in balances of central government accounts 
with the credit system3 90 1.3 –871 –8.3 –1,929 12,4
External borrowing4 –4,917 –69.2 –1,981 –18.8 705 4.5
Total 7,102 100.0 10.526 100.0 15,605 100.0
2003
Percen-
tage
of
totalAmount
2004*
Percen-
tage
of
totalAmount
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